

# A NECESSARY REPLY

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“It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”

— Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

I certainly appreciate the very well-informed and articulate review by Garnet James Wolseley. The main issue is several statements in my writing where I ascribe hatred as a normative characteristic of Jewish attitudes toward the peoples and culture of the West. This is an important issue that bears some explication.

First, I am not saying that all Jews may be accurately described in this manner. As discussed in the preface to the paperback edition of *The Culture of Critique*, my main topic is Jewish influence, i.e., Jewish organizations and intellectual movements that aim at transforming white societies. This includes the organized Jewish community as well as participants in major Jewish intellectual and political movements discussed in *The Culture of Critique*; in the book of essays under review, it would also apply to the neoconservatives. I show that indeed the main players have been Jews who strongly identified as Jews and have acted on the basis of Jewish motives.

My views on this matter were shaped partly by reading the long history of Jewish attitudes toward the West. At a theoretical level, it begins with the discussion of social identity theory in Chapter 1 in *Separation and Its Discontents*—the evolved psychological basis for negative attitudes toward outgroup members. Psychological research shows that people in strongly identified groups tend to have negative views of outgroups. Then, in Chapter 6, I describe the sense of persecution that is central to Jewish religious consciousness. For strongly identified Jews, the history of Jews in the West begins with the Ro-

mans sacking Jerusalem, proceeds to the Inquisitions, expulsions, and blood libels of the Middle Ages, and then segues into the persecutions attributed to the Tsars in the nineteenth century, culminating finally in the Holocaust. In the contemporary world, the failure of European countries to support Israel 100 percent is sometimes seen as resulting from the long history of European anti-Semitism. This history of normative Jewish hostility toward the peoples and the culture of the West is considerably expanded in Chapter 1 of *Cultural Insurrections*, and I suggest interested readers make up their own minds.

In writing *The Culture of Critique* I was continually struck by the expressions of hostility against the West by very prominent Jewish intellectual figures. Sigmund Freud's Hannibal fantasy of being a military leader attempting to destroy Rome to avenge anti-Jewish slurs against his father is perhaps the best known, but it barely scratches the surface. Wolseley seems to agree with me that this deep wellspring of hostility may have been an important motivation of Stalin's willing executioners in the USSR.

But we should not forget that such hostility was quite characteristic among Jewish radicals in America and that radicalism was a very mainstream movement among American Jews. Consider for example, this quotation in the chapter on Jewish involvement in the left from sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset: many of these "red diaper babies" came from "families which around the breakfast table, day after day, in Scarsdale, Newton, Great Neck, and Beverly Hills have discussed what an awful, corrupt, immoral, undemocratic, racist society the United States is" (*Cultural Insurrections*, pp. 219–20).

Consider also Princeton University sociologist Michael Walzer's description of the "pathologies of Jewish life": "the sense that 'all the world is against us,' the resulting fear, resentment, and hatred of the *goy*, the secret dreams of reversal and triumph" (p. 218). Walzer is also quite frank about how these attitudes influenced Jewish involvement in the civil rights movement of the 1960s:

In the civil rights movement, we were emphatically Jewish leftists. Our personal identities, self-knowledge, understanding of our own past, and, most important, our deepest feelings were more engaged in this fight than in any of [the other leftist causes]. . . . We had our own memories of Passover seders [and its theme of Jews as slaves], and we could quote the prophets and tell stories

of Jewish persecution. Southern sheriffs with dogs looked to us like Cossacks . . . or Nazis. Things that we didn't think about and didn't talk about in the other movements came easily to mind and tongue in this one. We surprised ourselves with the extent of our identification: of American blacks as Jews, of ourselves as blacks. Civil rights, we thought, was our fight. (p. 219)

In the collection of essays under review, the main discussion of these issues is in Chapter 1, "Background Traits for Jewish Activism," where I discuss the strong sense of historical grievance against the West that is common among strongly identified Jews. I also link this historical sense of grievance with the tendency for strongly identified Jews to be the vanguard of the Jewish community (the subject of Chapter 2, "Zionism and the Internal Dynamics of the Jewish Community"). Obviously, these are not the Jews who are marrying non-Jews; they are the activists who lead the community and determine its future direction. A prototypical example is the quotation from Dov Fischer, vice-president of the Zionist Organization of America, in Chapter 14, "Can the Jewish Model Help the West Survive?" Fischer, a strongly identified Jew and a leader in the Jewish community, writes:

Although we appreciate a half-century of West European democracy more than we appreciated the prior millennia of European brutality, we recognize who they are, what they have done—and what's what. We know, if they don't, that they need Arab oil more than they need Jewish philosophy and creativity. We remember that the food they eat is grown from soil fertilized by 2,000 years of Jewish blood they have sprinkled onto it. Atavistic Jew-hatred lingers in the air into which the ashes rose from the crematoria. (p. 361)

I think that Wolseley knows all this but hopes for a rapprochement between Jews and whites in America. I agree with him that it would be rational for Jews to pursue such a policy, but the main stumbling block remains a psychological one: can activist Jews overcome their gut feelings of hostility toward the West? Wolseley emphasizes the neoconservative movement as possibly morphing into a pro-white sensibility.

An example, from Chapter 4 on "Neoconservatism as a Jewish Movement," is Elliott Abrams who believes that the traditional hostil-

ity of Jews toward Christianity is maladaptive in contemporary America. He acknowledges that the mainstream Jewish community “clings to what is at bottom a dark vision of America, as a land permeated with anti-Semitism and always on the verge of anti-Semitic outbursts” (p. 86). The result is that Jews have taken the lead in secularizing America, but that has not been a good strategy for Jews because Jews themselves have become less religious and therefore less inclined to marry other Jews. Following Leo Strauss, therefore, Abrams thinks that a strong role for Christianity in America is good for Jews:

In this century we have seen two gigantic experiments at postreligious societies where the traditional restraints of religion and morality were entirely removed: Communism and Nazism. In both cases Jews became the special targets, but there was evil enough even without the scourge of anti-Semitism. For when the transcendental inhibition against evil is removed, when society becomes so purely secular that the restraints imposed by God on man are truly eradicated, minorities are but the earliest victims. (p. 180)

Abrams therefore believes that Jews should be less hostile to Christianity because it would be good for Jews—an example of the sort of alliance between Jews and non-Jews envisioned by Wolseley. But Abrams is also acknowledging the psychological hurdle that needs to be overcome: the dark vision of America and Christianity held by the mainstream Jewish community.

In the area of immigration policy (which is really the only thing that matters), there are indeed Jews who advocate restrictions on immigration as good for Jews, but again the emotional hurdles are much in evidence. Stephen Steinlight is the main spokesman for this view, basing his case on the hostility of Muslim immigrants toward Jews and Israel. In other words, Steinlight is not advocating a white America, just a Muslim-free America. He has no problem with mass immigration of other races and religions to America.

But even in his case, one can see the hostility toward traditional America that his rational brain has had to overcome. As I noted elsewhere, Steinlight’s “animosity toward the restrictionism of 1924–1965 shines through clearly. This ‘pause’ in immigration is perceived as a moral catastrophe. He describes it as ‘evil, xenophobic, anti-Semitic,’

'vilely discriminatory,' a 'vast moral failure,' a 'monstrous policy.' Jewish interests are his only consideration, while the vast majority of pre-1965 Americans are described as a 'thoughtless mob' because they advocate a complete moratorium on immigration" (p. 347).

Jewish attachment to a post-European America is a gut emotion that goes beyond rational calculation. As Steinlight notes:

The prospect of breaking with the old [pro-immigration] consensus is so wrenching many are effectively paralyzed by it, but it must concentrate their minds wonderfully to know that upholding it endangers the viability of the community whose protection is their *raison d'être*. They recognize they risk a harsh rebuke by history as those responsible for "losing America" —just as their predecessors have been pilloried for their failure to do more to save European Jewry in the years leading up to and during the Holocaust. American-Jewish leadership is experiencing profound vertigo as it seeks to chart a course through circumstances that appear logical only to a schizophrenic.<sup>1</sup>

So we have a classic battle between the gut wrenching anti-white emotions that are so central to Jewish identity and a rational assessment of Jewish self-interest. This, of course, is exactly the theme of Chapter 10 of *Cultural Insurrections*, "Psychology and White Ethnocentrism." Like Wolseley, I am struck by the fact that whites in the not too distant past had a strong sense of their own people, and I likewise mention white people who had a sense of racial identity and were willing to defend these interests, even heroically. In that chapter I argue, based on a great deal of psychological research, that the rational/symbolic/cultural part of the brain (mainly the prefrontal cortex) is able to control the more evolutionarily ancient emotional part of the brain, including evolved tendencies toward ethnocentrism.

Fundamentally, the point of that chapter is that white people have lost control of their culture to the point that to pursue even basic forms of self-interest (such as keeping one's job or gaining the approval of valued peers, not to mention elites in the media and academic world) means inhibiting tendencies toward ethnocentrism.

Applied to the Jewish situation, this implies that Jews could, like

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/back404.html>.

Stephen Steinlight, overcome their gut feelings of hostility and realize their common interests with whites in developing immigration policy. The problem is that I just don't see it happening at this time to any significant degree. It is certainly true that the neocons have suddenly developed a sense of American patriotism that serves their interests. Indeed, in Chapter 2 ("Stalin's Willing Executioners") I briefly discussed Soviet writer Lev Kopelev who witnessed and rationalized the Ukrainian famine as "historical necessity." However, by World War II he had become, in historian Yuri Slezkine's words, a "leading ideologue of Russian patriotism," developing "an acute sense of hurt and injustice on behalf of Russia, Russian history, and the Russian word" as he attempted to rally the Russians to do battle with the Germans. As I noted there, "Russian patriotism had suddenly become useful—much as, I would argue, harnessing the patriotism and high regard for military service among Americans has been useful for Jewish neoconservatives eager to rearrange the politics of the Middle East in the interests of Israel" (pp. 63–64).

So it is certainly true that Jews are able to find a common cause with American whites. I just don't think it will extend to immigration policy any time soon. The following quotation from Sam Francis shows that he was quite aware of the hostility that neocons had toward traditional Western culture—"this notion of a Christian civilization" as Midge Decter so elegantly phrased it:

What neoconservatives really dislike about their "allies" among traditional conservatives is simply the fact that the conservatives are conservatives at all—that they support "this notion of a Christian civilization," as Midge Decter put it, that they oppose mass immigration, that they criticize Martin Luther King and reject the racial dispossession of white Western culture, that they support or approve of Joe McCarthy, that they entertain doubts or strong disagreement over American foreign policy in the Middle East, that they oppose reckless involvement in foreign wars and foreign entanglements, and that, in company with the Founding Fathers of the United States, they reject the concept of a pure democracy and the belief that the United States is or should evolve toward it. (p. 149)

And then there's neocon Ben Wattenberg, quoted in the same chap-

ter: "The non-Europeanization of America is heartening news of an almost transcendental quality" (p. 149).

So, yes, I do think that the Jewish community could form an alliance with whites. They already have, with the result that white soldiers are dying in Iraq to ensure the security of Israel, and the neocons are taking advantage of the Christian Zionists. Indeed, as noted in the chapter on neocons, because Jews are a small minority, they have become very adept at making alliances with non-Jews who can be persuaded that they have a confluence of interests. In America, Jews have made alliances with other ethnic groups and with elements of the white elite who seem to agree that the dispossession of their own people is a moral imperative. Unfortunately, it is highly questionable whether either the Iraq war or the fervent support of Israel by the Christian Zionists is in the interests of whites or even the US.

And beyond that, I really don't think that even the neocons, much less the dominant liberal/left mainstream Jewish community that retains such a large influence on the culture of the West, are going to work to end the non-Europeanization of America and the West even when it's clearly in the interests of Jews to do so. There's just too much emotional baggage to overcome. That's not to say that whites should reject Jews who are willing to act on the proposition that a white America is a Jewish interest. And it's fine for there to be differences of opinion on how likely it is that any significant portion of the Jewish community will actively promote the interests of whites. It's just that we have to be realistic about some of the deep wellsprings of Jewish psychology. Don't expect a stampede of Jews in the direction of pro-white sentiments anytime soon.

One thing is certain. If indeed the movement for a white ethnic/racial consciousness does get some traction and achieves some political power, Jews will certainly attempt to make alliances with it. But I do think that the traction will have to come from white people themselves without the aid of Jews.

Finally, Wolseley overstates my views when he asks: "Did the environment in which whites evolved really make them uniquely incapable of the ethnocentrism?" As he notes elsewhere, it's not a matter of being uniquely incapable of ethnocentrism, but of being relatively less ethnocentric, with the result that cultural forces pathologizing ethnocentrism among whites have been very effective.

The argument for this is in Chapter 9: "What Makes Western Cul-

ture Unique?" Because I am an evolutionist, the key issue as I saw it was how to understand the decline of extended kinship patterns, and it seems quite clear that extended kinship patterns declined much faster in the West than in other parts of the world, including China (but possibly not Japan—I have not studied Japan). Recall that the Germanic tribes that inhabited Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire had a clan-type social organization that was not individualistic, presumably the result of group-based resource competition stemming from an earlier period. Group-based competition for resources and extended family social organization therefore did occur in Europe, but the suggestion is that it occurred for less time than in Asia, where tribalism and consanguineous marriages were the norm.

The conclusion of the argument is that "these changes [toward individualism] occurred much more quickly and much more thoroughly than in other parts of the world" (p. 287), and that this suggests (note this is a fairly weak claim) that a biological tendency toward individualism deriving from European pre-history is part of the explanation. In Europe people naturally gravitated to a world of friends and neighbors and exogamous marriages based on personal attraction when the costs of extended kinship relationships exceeded the benefits. But the fundamentally collectivist, extended family social structure so typical of the rest of the world seems to be deeply engrained and not easily altered. Iraq is Exhibit A for this perspective.

That said, I certainly do not want to denigrate the importance of culture as an explanation. Much of my work, including quite a bit of *Cultural Insurrections* and the entirety of *The Culture of Critique*, has been on how culture can shape human behavior and how this works at the psychological level. I just don't think it's the whole story for why whites around the world seem unconcerned about their imminent dispossession from lands they have held for centuries.

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