By Guillaume Faye | 10 Comments | 
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Call to Young Europeans
Translated by Greg Johnson, with thanks to Michael O’Meara
From Réfléchir & Agir, no. 9 (Summer 2001).
To avoid repeating myself, I must first point out the statement that I made at the beginning of the manifesto Why We Fight. Now let us summarize, following this statement, some suggestions referred to in this manifesto. Because of our historically unprecedented situation, I recommend a strategy inspired by certain revolutionary leaders whose names need not be mentioned.
1. First off, it is important to unify, on a European scale, all the identitarian forces of resistance around a doctrine and a basic revolutionary program.
Ignoring the secondary ideological or emotional quarrels which are often merely the expressions of petty nationalisms and family or sectarian disputes, we should follow Lenin’s counsel to “settle our quarrels after the revolution.” For pity’s sake, it is necessary to cease the oh-so-delicious internal disputes (the rumors, excommunications, and paranoias) and to reserve our blows for the real enemy. We concentrate on the essential, on what brings us together, because we are confronted with an absolute emergency (the Erntsfall, theorized by Carl Schmitt). Look at the Moslems: they cease fighting one another as soon as it is a question of carrying out the Jihad against the infidel.
2. For us the common and main enemy (the one who invades concretely, physically) is the alien colonization and settlement under the banner of Islam; obviously, one can share certain common values with the enemy, but one should not fall into the trap of feeling any sympathy for him. The enemy, moreover, profits from collaborationists — from those good European ethnomasochists who are the most dangerous to us. As for the common adversary (which seeks to weaken and dominate us), it is the United States, the objective ally of the former.
3. Our movement — which is one of radical (and not “extremist”) thought — has a true monopoly on revolutionary dissidence, since we are the only ones who seek a total inversion of the dominant values and civilizational forms (Nietzsche’s Umwertung [transvaluation]).
4. The three pillars of an ideology and project of European unity are (1) awakening an ethnic consciousness that makes defending our common biological heritage, our race, the top priority; (2) the regeneration of ancestral values, the forgetting of which is the main cause of today’s tragedies; and (3) the creative assertion of an all-inclusive and revolutionary European political doctrine.
5. As indicated in the excellent title of your magazine [Réfléchir & Agir], reflection is fundamental, but by the same token it is also necessary to act. But how to act? What is to be done? This is always the key question. We must form a European network of resistance, solidarity, and action around a common ideological program. This should not exclude, but include politics. It is too late now to win power by the ballot box and parliamentary democracy. It is necessary to make the following bet. It is risky like any bet, but it is our only chance in this twilight age: in the next ten to fifteen years there is likely to be a major crisis (“chaos”) which will take the form of an ethnic conflict of great magnitude, probably based on economic impoverishment; this could change the mentality of the masses, who are today force-fed like geese by our neo-totalitarian mass media.
It is a matter, then, of anticipating the “post-chaos,” of preparing for the coming storm by constituting a European network — horizontal, web-like, informal, polymorphic — of revolutionary minorities, a network of solidarity, a European international of resistance and propaganda. “The Network” should not take any name or institutional form. It is what I call the strategy of the cobra. It must stretch, in a clandestine but unshakeable manner, from Portugal to Russia, connecting cadres or elected officials of political parties, associations and circles of all natures, individuals, publishers, businessmen, financiers, net surfers, media people, etc. With three objectives: general agitprop, formation and recruitment, and the acquisition of media. In a word, it must prepare us for the inevitable confrontation. It is a matter of being ready and powerful for that day when the hurricane comes, the hurricane which is our only chance, our only lever to move the world. We also have to stop thinking that “the system is invincible.” It is strong only because of our current weakness and disorganization. Finally, it is necessary to forsake this psychopathic cult of defeat, of the “last stand.” The only people who win are those tragic optimists who think of themselves as the “first stand.”
When such a network exists, it will be time to pass to the next, properly political, stage, which is impossible to plan for today. Let us begin, then, by building our network with patience, determination, and professionalism. And let us cull from our ranks the incompetents, mediocrities, hotheads, and kooks. For such a network, united around a clear and common doctrine, must above all constitute a rigorous elite. From Resistance to Reconquest, from Reconquest to Revolution.
Guillaume Faye
Guillaume Faye is one of the leading thinkers of the European New Right. He is the author of Le système à tuer les peuples (Paris: Copernic, 1981), La NSC: Nouvelle société de consommation (Paris: Editions du Labyrinthe, 1984), Les nouveaux enjeux idéologiques (Paris: Editions du Labyrinthe, 1985), Le Guide de l’engueulade (Paris: Hors collection, 1992), L’Archéofuturisme (Paris: l’Æncre, 1998), La colonisation de l’Europe, Discours vrai sur l’immigration et l’Islam (Paris: L’Æncre, 2000), Pourquoi nous combattons. Manifeste de la résistance européenne (Paris: L’Æncre, 2001), Avant-guerre: Chronique d’un cataclysme annoncé (Paris: L’Æncre, 2003), La convergence des catastrophes (sous le pseudonyme Guillaume Corvus, Paris: DIE, 2004), Le coup d’état mondial, essai sur le nouvel imperialisme américain (Paris: l’Æncre, 2004), and La nouvelle question juive (Chevaigné: Les éditions du Lore, 2007).
Good advice, all of it, and all of it should be incorporated into the coming American New Right.
Most interesting to me is the direct reference to Camus in the last sentence. Under’s Camus’ editorship, the motto of the newspaper Combat post-liberation was “From Resistence to Revolution.”
The ‘revolutionary leaders’ Faye mentions are probably Jean Thiriart, a former Communist who fought in the Waffen SS and then, after the war, formed the Young Europe group, one of the first and most interesting of the postwar ‘European nationalist’ formations.
Charlemagne Division?
Most interesting. I need to know more about him.
I doubt that Jean Thiriart was a Waffen SS veteran. Neither Kevin Coogan’s Dreamer of the Day (New York: Autonomedia, 1999) nor Christophe Bourseiller’s La nouvelle extrême droite (Monaco: Éditions du Rocher, 2002), both of which examine Thiriart, say anything about this. I presume that Michael O’Meara was thinking of another Belgian, Roger Degueldre, who led the Delta Commandos of the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète and who probably was a Waffen SS veteran. Such a background would explain why he joined the French Foreign Legion after the Second World War and why he was taciturn about his past. It’s not the kind of thing that one would put on a résumé in Belgium or France after the Second World War.
Apparently there was an uproar in France several years ago when a mayor of the Front National proposed to erect a monument to Degueldre.
In memoriam.
It’s only right that someone should remember . . .
And I do. And I am therefore willing to transcribe an excellent article on Degueldre by Dr. William L. Pierce for this website.
Thiriart’s book, Un Empire de quatre cents millions d’hommes, l’Europe (Paris: Avatar Éditions, 2007), appears to be a “most impressive programmatic formulation” of a European imperium, just as O’Meara has described it in one of his articles. I have only started reading this book, which I got only last week, but I am already very impressed by it. Thiriart’s prose is extremely forceful, logical, and concise. To be sure, the extreme Jacobinism of some of Thiriart’s proposals can be unsettling, but some form of Jacobinism is surely necessary. The state should be turned from an instrument of national oppression and degradation into an instrument of national liberation and regeneration. As Maurice Bardèche said:
“[L]es grands prêtres des idéologies savent parfaitement que tout movement national authentique est presque toujours jacobin et qu’il rejoint par cela seul les aspirations profondes de tout élan ouvrier authentique qui est presque toujours autoritaire. La démocratie ploutocratique est chez nous une invention de la bourgeoisie. La nation quand elle pense en terms de force se souvient instinctivement de la Montagne et de Napoléon. Elle aime se voir musclée et rageuse. Image qui rejoint celle que d’ouvrier se fait de sa victoire, fusil au poing sur une barricade. Ils ont raison. Ni le travail ni la nation ne peuvent triompher sans écraser par la force les intérêts privés qui s’opposeront à leur suprématie. Leur victoire a pour condition un césarisme, qui n’est le symbole de la servitude ouvrière, mais, au contraire, le signe de sa puissance.” (Les temps modernes [Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1956], pp. 207-208.)
I was writing from memory. Andrew Ellis may be right (though neither Coogan nor Boursellier are the last word on the subject). I was also wrong to describe his prewar politics as “Communist” — he was a ‘revolutionary socialist’. During the war, however, he joined both the Fichte Bund and the Amis du Grand Reich Allemand. For his collaboration with the Nazis, he was later condemned to three years of prison by the ‘Liberators’. Andrew Ellis is also correct in describing him as something of a Jacobin — as was Hitler.
A hat tip to Andrew.
Thiriart was not in Waffen SS. He did, however, train under Otto Skorzeny and was involved in going after the Resistance. He was jailed 3 yrs after the war as a collaborator.
Guillaume Faye is now one of the leader of a pro-yankee and pro-sionist group in France L’Alliance des libertés (see here http://fr.metapedia.org/wiki/Alliance_pour_les_libert%C3%A9s)
This group wants :
“L’Alliance pour les libertés (…) se félicite de la réintégration pleine et entière de la France au sein de l’OTAN tout en souhaitant que s’y développe un pôle européen de défense.
(…)
L’Alliance pour les libertés se reconnaît dans les valeurs essentielles de la civilisation judéo-chrétienne qu’elle se propose de défendre et de promouvoir.
L’Alliance pour les libertés appelle de ses vœux la constitution d’une nouvelle alliance occidentale regroupant en son sein les nations du monde libre dans une unité civilisationnelle à laquelle pourront s’associer les États démocratiques qui feront le choix du leadership occidental ; alliance politique globale capable de s’opposer au terrorisme, à l’islamisme, à tous les totalitarismes et, plus généralement, aux menaces planétaires multiples qui pèsent sur nos démocraties, qu’elles soient militaires, économiques ou énergétiques.
L’Alliance pour les libertés affirme son attachement à la communauté euro-atlantique et sa totale solidarité à l’égard de l’État d’Israël.
L’Alliance pour les libertés condamne le racisme, l’antisémitisme, le négationnisme et toute vision ethnique de la société.”
For us in Europe, Guillaume Faye is an enemy…
Christian Bouchet outlines some very disturbing developments. TOQ published a very critical review by Michael O’Meara of Faye’s The New Jewish Question. But many of Faye’s earlier writings are highly valuable, even though he may disavow them today.
I sent an earlier comment in response to Andrew’s, but apparently it was ‘lost’. He is correct. I was writing from memory and obviously got it wrong. Thiriart, I should add, was never a Communist, but rather a far-left socialist. During the war, however, he was a member of the Fichte Bund and les Amis du Grand Reich Allemand, which after the ‘Liberation’ earned him three years in prison. As Andrew also points out, he was a “Jacobin’ (in the way Hitler was) and overly sympathetic to the Third World.
I might also mention that there is also a good deal of bad blood between Faye and Bouchet and I usually take whatever they say about one another with a grain of salt. I have nevertheless learned from both, even though I find Faye’s new-found Zionism as objectionable as Bouchet’s Islamicism.
I share Greg Johnson’s attitude on how to deal with ‘apostates’.
In addition to the article cited by Greg, readers might also want to consult my 2006 piece “Guillaume Faye and the Jews” archived at VNN.
Besides Jean Thiriart and Roger Degueldre, Jean Schramme is another Belgian who might interest readers of this website. Although Schramme was not of the calibre of Thiriart or Degueldre, he was an unusually brave man, and was at the centre of the incredible events described as follows in Dillibe Onyeama’s book, John Bull’s Nigger (London: Leslie Frewin, 1974):
“In early 1967 . . . a major event took place in the former Belgian Congo. It was televised and hit the headlines of the British press. I’ve yet to overcome the shame I experienced at watching the Africans make the world wonder if they carried their brains elsewhere than in their heads. Here’s a brief background to the facts that led to the event. The presence of the wealthy Belgians in the Congo had long been an unwanted one, as it was felt they were sabotaging the country’s economy. This was evident from the massacres of Belgian citizens by Africans in the early and later stages of the 1960s. One influential African who had been friendly towards the Belgians, if you remember, was the late President Moise Tshombe: the same man who, in 1960, made an abortive attempt to separate the Congolese province Katanga as a national entity of its own, proclaiming himself its President. After the bloody civil war that ended in the recapture of Katanga, a settlement was reached–out of which Tshombe became Premier of the whole country in 1963 for three years before being overthrown and going in exile to Europe. In stepped Belgian Colonel Schramme. This elderly mercenary fighter was suitably nick-named ‘Black Jack’: as a small boy, he had watched his own parents shot dead by Africans, and it was subsequently reported that he vowed to kill as many blacks as he could. However, Schramme tried to restore the deposed Tshombe, as it would be in the interests of Belgian businessmen living in Katanga that he returned to power. This was where the main facts of the humiliating events I mentioned begin to unwind themselves. The pathetic size of Schramme’s army was a little over a hundred men–mostly white South African mercenary recruits, and a handful of loyal black supporters of Tshombe who voluntarily offered to fight free of charge. Schramme’s armaments consisted of just one tank and rifles for his men. Bearing in mind the fact that the Congolese army numbered 38,000 men, one must surely see Schramme as a real lunatic if he genuinely believed he could take Katanga without being blasted into orbit in the attempt. He was, however, determined to try and achieve his objective–regardless. But for America he may well have succeeded. On his route to Katanga lay Bukavu, a big, densely-populated town. The television showed a scene of pandemonium and uncontrolled panic among Bukavu’s inhabitants at the seemingly imminent bloodshed that would take place between Schramme and the troops of the Congolese army stationed there to engage Schramme. The television showed the inhabitants fleeing like jackals with their belongings, leaving the one thousand troops to face the music. One thousand troops!–with all the necessary arms and defensive positions to engage and rout Schramme’s Soldiers of Fortune. Schramme’s approach into Bukavu–down a road running into the hills–made him a sitting target. Yet, even before he was seen or heard, the Congolese troops started to get cold feet. Panic seized them too. They piled their weapons together on the ground ready to leave them and flee. And moments later, when the unseen enemy were finally heard, they took to their heels in consternation–allowing the triumphant mercenaries to walk in and occupy the ghost town. The television showed these details. I was in London at the time, on holiday from Eton. I watched this shameful display of cowardice in the little sitting-room of my host’s semi-detached residence. A number of his African colleagues from the embassy were present. I remember that at the end of the film a pregnant silence invaded the room; it seemed to last nine months, before the verbal barrage from the viewers opened up. The whites were so biased against Africans, they complained; always keen and prompt to belittle the Africans but rarely eager to recognise or show their merits. Nobody raised a word to condemn the Africans for their disgraceful act. I remained silent, trying to fathom how such an action could possibly be forgiven. It seemed unbelievable that Schramme struck terror into an army ten times greater for no other reason than that his men were white. And why the Africans decided to leave their weapons at his disposal before their withdrawal was another puzzle I couldn’t put together. My embarrassment intensified after I returned to Eton. For three weeks Schramme spent a ‘peaceful vacation’ in Bukavu. The Congo’s 38,000 troops were powerless against his hundred men. Powerless! The next thing you knew was that the country’s President, General Mobutu, was crying for American help to fight Schramme. America, which had close links with the Congo, quelled Mobutu’s fear by sending in fighters to drive Schramme out. That an army of 38,000 men couldn’t oust a hundred sparsely-armed intruders from their own territory without foreign aid was simply too pathetic for words. It makes you wonder why the Congo had an army at all.”