Dec 12, 2010

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Secession is a Bad Idea for Whites

Secession is a Bad Idea for Whites

Is secession a good idea for whites? No.

A good way to see this is to analyze the military, political and social problems that Harold Covington's Pacific Northwest secession movement would face. He suggests that Whites gather in Idaho, Oregon and Washington and use guerrilla warfare to form an independent homeland that is free of non-Whites.

He describes the homeland and the guerrilla warfare, in The Brigade, a tense, suspenseful thriller (Harold A. Covington, The Brigade [Bloomington, Ind.: Xlibris Corporation, 2008]).

The first critical problem with the homeland is that it would be too weak to survive. There are several test cases for this. These are small countries, not much different in size from the Pacific Northwest homeland.

The three Baltic countries, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have a combined population of just over 8 million people, similar to the number that the Pacific Northwest homeland would have. (Today the combined population of Idaho, Oregon and Washington is under 12 million.)

Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia once were parts of the Russian Empire. They seceded after the collapse of the Romanov dynasty, during the period of confusion, weakness and disorganization that the Russian Revolution caused. Joseph Stalin annexed all three of these countries in 1940. All it took him was a few meetings and phone calls. See Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

Finland is another good test case. Like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, it was part of the Russian Empire until it collapsed. Then Finland seceded, too. Finland, a larger country than Estonia or Latvia or Lithuania, was able to hold off a Soviet invasion for a while during the Winter War of 1939-1940.

Finland started with some big advantages. It had a large territory. It had deep snow and dense forests that confined Soviet invaders to roads. It had soldiers who could travel cross-country on skis, surround road-bound columns of Soviet troops and kill them. It had an excellent submachine gun which its soldiers used against Soviet invaders armed with outdated bolt-action rifles. It had an army with great courage and patriotism. Plus, Stalin had recently annihilated his army officer corps in a bloody purge.

Finland still had to sue for peace after a few weeks.

So, how powerful must a secessionist movement be in order to survive? How much industrial power must it have? How much territory? How many people?

Here in North America, the Northern conquest of the South is a definitive test of the possibility of secession.

By 1860 the South had lost control of the Presidency. It had also lost control of the House of Representatives because the voting population of the North was larger than the voting population of the South. The South still retained control of the Senate by a narrow margin, because the number of senators depended on the number of states.

Southern planters feared that, if they lost control of the Senate, the North would prevent them from expanding slave agriculture to any new states. They also feared that the North would outlaw slavery, once it took control of the Senate. See Marc Egnal, Clash of Extremes The Economic Origins of the Civil War (New York: Hill and Wang, a division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).

Southern plantation agriculture wore out the land. Planters abandoned worn out land and resettled new lands, further west. This made it very important to them that they could freely bring their slaves to new states.

Unable to solve this political problem, the South seceded. Lincoln decided that he must have his tariffs, so he called for 70,000 volunteers and launched what is so far the bloodiest war ever fought in the Western Hemisphere. The South was enough weaker than the North that it could not afford to make political or military mistakes. But it made them.

Four years of bloodshed proved that the South was not strong enough to secede without the permission of the North. It steadily and gradually lost, militarily, a battle that it had already lost politically before it seceded. Had the South been strong enough to secede without permission, it would also have been strong enough to defend its political interests without seceding.

Secession is an attempt by the politically weaker of two parties to solve, by leaving the field, a political problem that it is too weak to solve, either politically or militarily.

Only the weaker party in a political conflict would want to secede. Only the stronger party would be strong enough to secede without the permission of the other. However, the stronger party would not want to secede because it could force the weaker party to do whatever it wanted.

Covington suggests that military disaster at some distant part of the empire might make the United States too weak to hold on to the Pacific Northwest in the face of guerilla warfare. Maybe so. But this would give the homeland the kind of temporary safety that a Thanksgiving turkey enjoys.

Any place where a secessionist might want to live would be too valuable for the larger, stronger party to give up.

The Pacific Northwest, in particular, is far too valuable to secede in peace. It has valuable hydroelectric power, in a world hungry for cheap energy. The Columbia, its most important river, is 1,243 miles long. Puget Sound gives the Pacific Northwest well-sheltered, world-class harbors. It has a major naval base. Nuclear submarines silently travel its waterways.

What tactics would the United Sates use to keep anyone from forming any independent homeland in such a valuable place, without its permission?

Anything.

Writing in a neocon publication, US Army Colonel Ralph Peters (Ret.) said, “The point of all this is simple: Win. In warfare, nothing else matters. If you cannot win clean, win dirty. But win.”

Anyone who hopes to secede from the United States should expect it to use the same tactics that it has used before, whichever ones promise to work, whatever they might be.

What are these tactics?

Guatemala is a model case. Niall Ferguson, writing in The War of the World, described what happened there after a carefully-planned CIA coup d'etat that overthrew a democratically-elected Guatemalan government. (Niall Ferguson, The War of the World Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West [New York: Penguin, 2006], 610-617.)

Paramilitary death squads, the Mano Blanca, roamed the cities and countryside. In the 30 years after the 1954 coup, some 40,000 people disappeared. Mayan Indian tribes were relocated and forced into “strategic hamlets.”

Ferguson says hundreds of villages identified as 'red' were obliterated and their inhabitants tortured, raped and murdered. Surrounding forests were burned. He says there was mass slaughter of civilians. By the end of the 1990s the death toll had reached around 200,000. Because there were so many Mayan victims a UN commission deemed that these deaths were genocide.

Afghanistan and Pakistan are two more models that we can use to predict what the United State government would do to secessionists. Eric Margolis, writing in World News Daily Information Clearing House, said that “Pakistan finally bowed to Washington's angry demands last week by unleashing its military against rebellious Pushtun tribesmen of North-West Province . . .”

He said, “The Obama administration had threatened to stop $2 billion US annual cash payments to bankrupt Pakistan's political and military leadership and block $6.5 billion future aid, unless Islamabad sent its soldiers into Pakistan's turbulent NWFP along the Afghan frontier.” Pakistani armed forces used heavy artillery and gunfire from helicopters to kill Pushtun civilians.

Results came quickly.

Andrew Buncombe, writing in The Independent, said that as many as 2.4 million people fled Swat Valley. One man, aged 90, said that,” because there had been no warning to leave, when the gunfire erupted around them they gathered what they could carry and fled.”

The speed of the displacement, as helicopter gun ships fired on civilians fleeing the Swat Valley, reached 85,000 a day.

This terrorist tactic-firing heavy artillery at little villages and then pursuing fleeing villagers with gunfire from helicopters-could empty out every village and small town in the Pacific Northwest in a few weeks.

Where would refugees go after they were driven from secessionist villages and towns? They would go to camps, drawn there by promises of food, shelter and safety.

Most of these camps would be open-air prisons like the Gaza Strip, or the city of Fallujah, in Iraq, or the concentration camps where the British Army put Boer women and children during the Boer war. There would be harsh control of the perimeters of these camps, using earthen or concrete walls, razor wire, guard dogs, electrified fences, towers, mine fields and high-powered search lights.

All of these tools have been perfected and used. Any guerrilla fighters who remained outside the camps would be pressured to surrender when the women, children and old men in the camps began to die after being deprived of food, water, medicine and sanitation.

Torturers and assassins would visit the camps to cull interesting prisoners. They operated this way during the Phoenix Program in Vietnam. The founder of the Phoenix program, CIA officer William Colby, told a Congressional committee in 1971 that the Phoenix operation had killed 20,587 Vietcong suspects in two years (Hayden, 2008).

Writing in Small Wars Journal, Lt. Col. David Kilcullen advocated a world-wide Phoenix program. He went on to become chief strategist in the State Department's counterterrorism office in 2005 and 2006 and was chief adviser on counterinsurgency operations to General Petraeus, in planning the 2007 US troop surge in Iraq.

Justin Raimondo reported that high officials at the top of the United States Government have operated an assassination ring. He says that Defense Secretary Gates, acting under the authority of President Obama, has appointed the operational l

eader of this assassination ring, Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, to head U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

It is a huge piece of good luck that government strategy and tactics would make secession impossible. Secession would be a terrible, self-inflicted disaster.

Secession gives the enemy the location of a small, compact target where it can land a fatal blow. It lets the enemy organize its own territory without interference and then use all of the resources of that territory for aggression.

Secession always means the voluntary loss of valuable territory. It loses strategic depth for fighting a war. It loses rivers, ocean front and harbors. It loses road grids and railroad networks. It loses power stations and hydroelectric dams. It loses minerals and arable land. It loses defensible terrain features such as mountain ranges. It loses industrial plants and built up areas.

Secession also loses people. For example a Pacific Northwest homeland would leave out most members of the largest White ethnic group — Germans. They mostly live in a huge semi-circle of land in the middle of the United States, with its diameter on the Canadian border. Their key cities are Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis.

A Pacific Northwest homeland would also leave out most of the next-largest white ethnic group–the Irish. Oregon and Idaho are not even mentioned on the Wikipedia list of the twenty states with the largest population of Irish-Americans. Washington State has the 20th largest number of Irish-Americans.

And so it goes with all whites, whether they call themselves just plain Americans or mention descent from a specific white ethnic group. All whites are important. So any population transfer to implement any secession plan, of any sort, would be impossible. And that's a good thing because secession would create hostile borders that would splinter families, kindreds, and ethnic groups.

There are three good, recent models for this: Berlin was partitioned into East- and West Berlin. Germany was partitioned into East- and West Germany. Korea was — and still is — partitioned into North- and South Korea. All of these have had — or still have — hostile borders that featured guard towers, road barriers, barbed wire, death strips enforced by mines, machine guns and guard dogs, passport & visa requirements, body searches and other snooping, as well as confiscations, arbitrary arrests and mysterious disappearances.

Borders destroy social capital. Population transfers from one place to another also destroy social capital. There are two different cases here. In the first case, a border partitions an area, leaving a population divided in two, with large numbers of people passively staying in place. In the second case, numbers of people respond to special appeals to move to an area that plans to secede.

People who would be willing to move, as single individuals, to some distant place where a movement is afoot to secede are especially likely to be loners, High Plains drifters — people not tied down by strong emotional commitments to others. They are especially vulnerable to exploitation by agent provocateurs, because so many of their interactions are with strangers.They can be entrapped by honey pots. Their social networks are likely to be relatively impoverished and easily penetrated by malicious strangers. Collections of them are likely to lack small unit cohesion.

People who stay in one place for several generations are likely to be embedded in a rich network of social relationships. Groups of these people have Einheit, the mutual trust and common outlook built by shared experience. They have agreed frameworks for doing things. They have a capacity for deep emotional attachments to each other. Their social arrangements are based on ancient acquaintance, so they are hard for malicious strangers to penetrate and exploit. People who stay in one place have rich mental maps of their physical and social territory. The value of their social networks is very high.

This makes them difficult for a social parasite to exploit.

A lot of thought and effort has been spent to destroy the social networks of American whites, to ruin our Einheit, make us flee from the centers of our cities and turn us into atomized individuals or tiny nuclear families. The key to this destruction has been alien control of the mass media.

Decades of hate speech about whites, in the mass media, has enraged Negroes and made them more and more bold in attacking whites. Mass media participated in these attacks by motivating them, giving them ideological cover, and carefully concealing their nature and full extent from whites. Monopoly ownership of mass media made it impossible for whites to organize a hue and cry to prevent further predation.

As a result, unorganized, individual white families fled from violent crime near the centers of cities to suburbs on the distant outskirts. They abandoned center-city land worth as much as a million dollars an acre, in today's dollars, for land at the outskirts worth ten-thousand dollars an acre today. The economic loss to whites from this one factor alone is in the trillions of dollars. Typically whites sold sound, sturdy old houses on extremely valuable center-city land and bought brand-new houses on small parcels of nearly-worthless semi-rural land. Then their new houses began to depreciate to zero, while the land that they had abandoned in the center city skyrocketed.

The loss of social capital shows up in the reduced roaming radius that parents allow their children. A while ago, I talked with an older white man who probably was 65- to 70-years-old at the time we talked. He said that, as a 12-year-old boy, he rode his bicycle four or five miles to a hardware store. There he bought a 12-gauge shotgun for himself. Then he held it on his bicycle's handlebars and rode home. Nobody thought anything about it, he said.

This would never happen now.

The loss of social capital also shows up in the loss of informal play. Mothers drive their children from one carefully-protected, formally-scheduled activity to another.

White flight — the individual search for safety from ethnic cleansing — has spread from cities to whole states. For example, whites are fleeing ethnic cleansing in California.

Secession is white flight extended to multi-state regions. Flight to a promised Pacific Northwest homeland, for example, is white flight to a multi-state region.

No matter how large the region to which whites flee, it cannot work. A key reason is that white people are wealth, like herds of cattle or flocks of sheep. White people provide valuable habitat and nourishment for parasites of all kinds. So these parasites follow us everywhere.

South Africa is a fine example. The first major permanent white settlement anywhere in Africa started in 1652 when the Dutch East India Company built a supply station for its ships in the vicinity of present-day Cape Town, South Africa. At that stage the nearest Bantu tribes were more than 1,000 kilometers from the Cape.

By the time the British occupied the Cape for the first time in 1795 it had a white population of about 26,000, an estimated Cape Colored population of 20,000 and a slave population of around 30,000.

During the lifetime of the Republic of South Africa Bantu colonists also flooded South Africa, drawn by labor contracts.

South African farmers — the Boers — fled from British control. Everywhere they went, the British followed them and annexed their territory as soon as they had done the hard, dangerous work of settling it. The Boers and their territory were too valuable for the British to leave alone.

In the beginning South African whites had a chance to create an all-white country of their own. However, relying on non-white labor gave white habitat away to non-whites. It gave non-whites a chance to out-breed whites and displace them.

The very slow, slow growth of the white population in the pre-Revolutionary thirteen colonies, of North America, is a measure of how hard and dangerous it is to convert wilderness to urban, improved habitat.

It took 150 years, from 1650 to 1780, for the population of the 13 colonies to grow from 4,600 to 2,780,000.That is an increase of only18,502 a year.

It took just 30 years, from 1970 to 2000, for the Hispanic population of the United States to grow from an estimated 9.6 million to an estimated 35.3 million. This is an increase of more 856,666 Hispanics a year, a mark of how free, easy and safe their increase is. http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic/hispanic.html

Early America offered slim pickings for Jews, except in the slave trade. There were an estimated 1,243 to 3,000 in the United States in 1790. When Whites finished the difficult, dangerous work of settlement, the Jewish population suddenly leapt from 230,000 to 280,000 in 1880 to 1,508,000 to 2,349,754 in 1910. This was just three years before they took control of the United States banking system with their Federal Reserve system. (http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/usjewpop1.html)

None of these millions of newcomers paid their share of the cost of developing a high technological civilization in North America. None had built any roads, laid any railroad tracks, or built any bridges, dams or tall sky scrapers.

We Whites have helped non-whites dispossess us by giving our habitat away for free, after developing it at such cost. If we keep doing this, we will be extinct.

We must stop helping non-whites dispossess us. We must stop running away. We must stop giving free habitat to those who seek to dispossess us. We must take back our land.

This essay was originally published on Sep 3, 2009

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  1. avatar
    blackacidlizzard said:

    So let me get this straight.

    Because we can not hope to defend against the military might of the American Empire, we should instead “take back our land”…

    From Empire America…

    Yeah, that big force about which you just went on for a thousand words describing how we have no hope of beating them.

    Does anyone else see the problem with this, or am I just crazy?

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