Since colonial times Southerners had used imported African slave labor. Consequently they lived symbiotically with the most genetically different of Earth’s peoples.[23] Slavery continued after the Revolutionary War and became increasingly important as commercial cotton cultivation spread westward through the Gulf Coastal region at the start of Scots-Irish hegemony. The resultant Cotton Kingdom, ruled by a mix of Southerners from the old Atlantic coastal colonies and Scots-Irish from the interior, sought expansion into Latin America by conquest, while New England, which then valued ethnic, cultural, and religious homogeneity, opposed it.

The South was thus the region most tolerant of what is now called racial diversity. New England, for example, tended to liken all Indians to the dangerous heathens that nearly destroyed it in 1675.[24] Such attitudes led John Chivington, a clergyman and Union officer who defeated a Southern invasion of the New Mexico Territory at the Battle of Glorieta Pass in 1862, to perpetrate one of America’s most notorious massacres of peaceful Indians at Sand Creek in 1864. Confederates, in contrast, made Cherokee Indian Stand Watie a brigadier general in their army.[25] New England was also extremely hostile to newly arriving Irish Catholics, and many of its political leaders began careers in an Anti-Masonic Party opposed to Masonic religious tolerance. But because blacks were rarely seen outside the South, it was easy for them to be idealized in New England.[26]

The new Republican Party became the political vehicle for restoring New England’s hegemony by attacking slavery, but its support was initially limited to Greater New England, both the original coastal region as well as an area south of the Great Lakes settled by immigrants moving west from there.

That changed rapidly, however, when New England’s publishing dominance influenced public opinion through publications like Uncle Tom’s Cabin that demonized Cotton Kingdom whites and idealized its blacks. Calls from a small cadre of abolitionists for slaves to revolt and kill whites created great fear among southerners. They had already suffered through Nat Turner’s murderous slave revolt in 1831, and abolitionist John Brown’s abortive attempt to touch off another revolt at Harper’s Ferry in 1859 raised their fears to fever pitch.[27] Meanwhile, crude southern propaganda that justified slavery’s expansion by idealizing it as good for everybody raised widespread fears that it threatened the freedom of people who did not own slaves.

By 1860 enough Scots-Irish and German Midwesterners voted Republican to enable Abraham Lincoln to narrowly win a four-way race. In reaction, the Cotton Kingdom seceded from the United States to become the Confederacy, and the war that followed divided the once hegemonic Scots-Irish for more than 100 years.[28]

New England hegemony and Republican Party dominance was nearly continuous for the next 72 years, even though the Democratic Party of pre-war Scots-Irish hegemony still occasionally won national elections. Former Confederates, who won freedom from Republican occupation and local black rule through an eleven-year insurgency, found common ground as Democrats with urban Irish Catholics, who had themselves resisted discriminatory New England hegemony in the major New York City anti-war revolt of 1863.[29] Greater New England, however, was now largely free to economically and culturally dominate America. Regional centers of economic power like Chicago’s meat packing and manufacturing industries, Pittsburgh’s steel industry, Cleveland’s oil industry, and especially New York City’s commercial, financial, and railroad dominance arose throughout Greater New England. Its tycoons paid homage to New England’s traditional cultural hegemony by building opulent mansions in its heart at Newport, Rhode Island and by mimicking New England mores.

But even New Englanders began to question the consequences of the Civil War’s power shift as tycoons enriched themselves by depressing wages through mass immigration to the east coast from Southern and Eastern Europe and to the west coast from Asia. Meanwhile, railroad monopolies preyed on German and Scandinavian farmers in the Midwest by keeping costs high for the manufactured goods they bought and low for the crops they sold. Expansion into the third world, once anathema to greater New England when sought by the Cotton Kingdom, was now embraced as Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines were quickly added to an American Empire. Trusts and corporations gained new quasi-governmental powers, enabling them to increasingly encroach on elected local governments. The extremes of wealth and poverty these policies created caused the last quarter of the nineteenth century to be called the Gilded Age.[30]

Progressivism and Populism

Gilded Age excess met widespread popular resistance. Under often Irish Catholic leadership, labor began to organize in the face of fierce plutocratic resistance. A populist movement by immigrant and Scots-Irish farmers fighting predatory northeastern financial domination led to the foundation of the Populist Party, which was soon incorporated into the Democratic Party by the great Scots-Irish leader William Jennings Bryan. At the same time, Greater New Englanders created a Progressive movement to restore regional values by fighting the destructive effects of plutocratic policies encouraging corruption, imperialism, economic exploitation, and mass immigration. Populism was thus a bottom up movement among those living outside and harmed by the regional power core, while Progressivism was a top down movement inside it seeking to blunt power’s hardest edges.[31]

Both reacted to the increasing prominence of America’s Jewish population. Jews first immigrated to the United States in significant numbers from Germany before the Civil War and quickly became prominent in commerce. By the Gilded Age many of them had become tycoons who contributed significantly to its excesses, just as its importation of cheap labor brought a second and much larger wave of Jewish immigrants to America from the Russian Empire. In response, many populists began explicitly criticizing Jewish excess from below, just as progressive elites were attempting reform from above.[32]

Populism and progressivism both contributed to creating the Socialist Party, the primary voice of America’s first true left. Its social connection to populism was evident in the presidential election of 1912 when its candidate received his highest vote percentage of any state in heavily Scots-Irish Oklahoma, where two years later a Socialist gubernatorial candidate got nearly 20 percent. Left support swiftly disappeared in such Populist regions, however, as the Socialist Party and its later direct offshoot the Communist Party increasingly became vehicles for urban Jewish upward mobility.[33] (Most Russian Jews arriving in the United States during the Gilded Age were initially extremely poor, and many had previously participated in socialist and other leftist organizations that had violently confronted Russians and their government.[34] Consequently they were pre-adapted for socialist activity.) Thirty years later, Woody Guthrie was valued by the Left as much for his rarity as an Oklahoma Communist as for his music.

The First World War and the Great Depression

In 1912 Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, became president for eight years when regular and Progressive Republicans split. Wilson’s roots were northern Scots-Irish, but he experienced the South’s brutal invasion by northern troops as a child and worked in Greater New England-dominated academic culture as an adult. Consequently his sympathies were more with English-descended northern and southern elites than the Scots-Irish center, and he was more a Progressive than a Populist despite his Democratic affiliation. He appreciated the importance of race, however, and social separation of whites and blacks was maximal in his administration. He is most remembered for bringing America into World War I despite a peace platform, which was largely motivated by his sense of ethnic solidarity with British elites. His decision almost certainly saved the British from defeat.[35]

At the war’s end, largely Jewish-led Communist revolutions seized power briefly in Germany and Hungary and for nearly a century in Russia. None of these turned out well for Jews as a whole, however, and all generated intense anger because of indiscriminate killing of non-Jews. Their brief victory in Germany provoked an anti-Jewish revolution, ultimately causing their worst demographic disaster since Bogdan Khmelnitsky freed Ukrainians from Polish and Jewish domination in 1654. Even in Russia a wily Georgian Communist Josef Stalin broke their power by 1927. The left did not successfully revolt in the United States, however. It barely survived repression falling hardest on its rural non-Jewish former populist factions at the Wilson administration’s end. The American left has consequently persisted into the twenty-first century as a Jewish-dominated movement that would otherwise be scarcely recognizable to its post-World War I activists.[36]

In 1921 Greater New England Republicans returned to power in a landslide made possible by millions of previously politically inert German-Americans and other European immigrants in the populist heartland who had been angered by the war against their ethnic kin in Europe and by intense government-orchestrated discrimination at home.[37] Lingering Greater New England progressivism finally ended mass immigration and brought ethnic stability, but financial excess led to economic disaster in 1929.[38] The resulting misery returned the Democrats to power for another twenty years.

Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal politically united white Americans more than at any time since the pre-Civil War White Republic, even as blacks remained socially separate. Corporate excesses were curbed and organized labor encouraged. Economic inequality among whites began to decline significantly for the first time since the Gilded Age. A balance between protecting private property and encouraging public purposes was achieved, resulting in infrastructure of lasting value and quality. A national élan consequently developed that helped win the Second World War.[39]

The New Deal had a dark side as well, however. Scientific research on racial diversity was virtually ended because of conflict with its ideology of equality and its association with German National Socialism. Communists and their close allies, still overwhelmingly Jewish, were welcomed into the New Deal as full participants, even while working openly as agents of the Soviet Union.

The Second World War and After

Roosevelt also secretly maneuvered to subvert a strong peace movement and draw America into World War II on the Soviet side against Germany, despite great public opposition. Anglo-Saxon ethnic solidarity honed during World War I, anti-German pressure from an increasingly influential Jewish community, and Soviet sympathy among the left all helped blind Roosevelt to the nuances of mid-twentieth century European power politics. Germany was consequently demonized while the Soviet Union, a regime surpassing it in brutality and mass murder, was idealized. World War II thus ended with Europe’s eastern half enslaved for another 44 years.[40]

National Socialist Germany officially embraced racial research and ethnic nationalism, but paradoxically it ultimately subverted its racial nationalism by emphasizing minor linguistic differences at the expense of authentic kinship. It consequently treated genetically nearly identical Slavic neighbors like the Poles with brutality while allying with the Japanese, who sought to ethnically cleanse Oceania of whites. Its defeat had the long-term result of tarnishing ethnic nationalism into the next century so even defense against mass non-white immigration remains difficult.

Roosevelt’s death near the war’s end transferred the presidency to his Vice President Harry Truman, who was not expected to do well politically. As in the aftermath of the First World War, a German-American reaction in the populist heartland, and an Irish Catholic one in the urban northeast, shifted control of congress to the Republicans for the first time since 1931. Truman soon faced revolts in his party from pro-Soviets led by Henry Wallace because of hardening relations with Stalin, and from southern Democrats under Strom Thurmond for weakening social separation of blacks and whites. Despite expert opinion that he would fail to survive this perfect political storm, Truman won the election of 1948 because of his strong roots in America’s Scots-Irish heartland.[41]

Republicans finally gained the presidency in 1952, when the party’s Greater New England wing and its candidate Dwight Eisenhower outmaneuvered Robert Taft, the candidate of the party’s heartland populist wing, which included many World War II skeptics who viewed the Soviet Union rather than Germany as the main enemy. In that year’s election Eisenhower easily triumphed over Democrats who were now reduced to their southern and urban base.

Following the election, the Taft wing’s last champion, Senator Joseph McCarthy, representing the German-Irish anti-Communism of Catholic “old immigrants,” was quickly suppressed with the blessing of Eisenhower, who used Truman’s Cold War with the Soviets as a cover for building America’s postwar empire. Governments unfriendly to American corporations in Iran and Guatemala were soon covertly eliminated. Efforts to end American Communist influence, which flourished under Truman despite his occasional resistance, ended for good under Eisenhower with the fall of McCarthy. Paradoxically, as American opposition to anti-communism increased domestically, the continuing Cold War intensified opposition to communist states abroad. New Deal policies limiting domestic corporate power and promoting relative income equality continued long past the depression, however, so the Eisenhower years of the 1950s are still fondly remembered as a time of unprecedented happiness and prosperity.[42]

The Democratic Party slightly expanded its traditional base to win the close election of 1960, but just a few years later its nature changed significantly. By 1964 the civil rights movement, a concerted attack on traditional southern race relations, was elevated to its primary issue. In response, the South, which was the party’s strongest region until 1960, became its weakest region in 1964 and every subsequent election. By 1968 in the name of reform a movement led by Jews like Allard Lowenstein as well as some Greater New Englanders attacked and permanently stripped power from the party’s traditional northern Irish-led urban labor base, a split exemplified by the televised confrontation at that year’s Democratic convention in Chicago between Richard Daley, its Irish mayor, and Connecticut’s Jewish senator Abraham Ribicoff. By 1972 Daley wasn’t even permitted to attend the next convention. In the same year, the charismatic George Wallace inspired a momentary flare-up of white nationalist resistance, winning the Democratic Party primaries in northern industrial Michigan and Maryland, before he and his campaign were crippled by one of the gunmen who changed so much in American politics in the 1960s.[43]

Part 2 of 4

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[23] Oppenheimer, The Real Eve.

[24] Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Phillip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Knopf, 1998); Phillips, The Cousins’ Wars.

[25] Patricia Faust, ed., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).

[26] A. J. Reichley, The Life of the Parties: A History of American Political Parties (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

[27] Henry Mayer, All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998).

[28] Phillips, The Cousins’ Wars.

[29] Barnet Schecter, The Devil’s Own Work: The Civil War Draft Riots and the Fight to Reconstruct America (New York: Walker, 2005).

[30] Phillips, The Cousins’ Wars; Kevin Philips, Wealth and Democracy: A Political History of the American Rich (New York: Broadway Books, 2002).

[31] Fischer, Albion’s Seed; Phillips, The Cousins’ Wars.

[32] Fredrickson 2002; Benjamin Ginsberg, The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

[33] Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis of American Communism (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1961).

[34] Nora Levin, While Messiah Tarried: Jewish Socialist Movements, 1871–1917 (New York: Schocken, 1977); Howard Sachar, A History of the Jews in America (New York: Knopf, 1992).

[35] Phillips, The Cousins’ Wars.

[36] Howard Sachar, A History of the Jews in the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 2005). Cf. Ginsberg’s The Fatal Embrace.

[37] Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics, 2nd edition, revised (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1956).

[38] Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[39] David Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (New York: Oxford, 1999); Robert Reich, Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life (New York: Knopf, 2007)

[40] Conrad Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 2003); Patrick Buchanan, Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War: How Britain Lost its Empire and the West Lost the World (New York: Crown, 2008); S. Courtois, N. Werth, J. Panne, A Paczkowski, K. Bartosek, and J. Margolin, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (Cambridge: Harvard, 1999).

[41] Michael Barone, Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: The Free Press, 1990); Lubell, The Future of American Politics.

[42] Barone, Our Country; Brinkley, The Unfinished Nation; David Halberstam, The Fifties (New York: Villard, 1993).

[43] Barone, Our Country.

Dominique Venner
Le Siècle de 1914: Utopies, guerres et révolutions en Europe au XXe siècle
Paris: Pygmalion, 2006

“To recreate a new aristocracy is the eternal task of every revolutionary project.” –Guillaume Faye

At the beginning of twentieth century, peoples of European descent ruled the world. They made up a third of its population, occupied half its landmass, controlled Africa, India, Southeast Asia, and parts of coastal China; their industry and technology, along with their philosophy, science, and art, had no rival; the world was theirs and theirs alone.

A century later, all was changed: Peoples of European descent had fallen to less than 9 percent of the world’s population; their lands were everywhere inundated by non-Whites; their industry and technology outsourced to potential enemies; their state, social system, and media taken over by parasitic aliens; and, in the deepest demographic sense, they faced the not-too-distant prospect of biological extinction.

To understand this catastrophic inversion requires some understanding of the period responsible for it. We’re fortunate that after a lifetime studying its key movements, Dominique Venner, our greatest identitarian historian, has set out to chart its biopolitical contours.

Before the Deluge

As a historical (rather than a chronological) period, the twentieth century begins in 1914, with the onset of the First World War, whose devastating assault on European existence shook the continent in every one of its foundations, destroying not just its ancien régime, but ushering in what Ernst Nolte calls the “European Civil War” of 1917-45 or what some call the “Thirty Years War” of 1914-45. For amidst its storms of fire and steel, there emerged four rival ideologies — American liberalism, Russian Communism, Italian Fascism, and German National Socialism — each of whose ambition was to reshape the postwar order according to its own scheme for collective salvation. Our world, Venner argues, is a product of these contentious ambitions and of the ideological system — liberalism — that prevailed over its rivals.

Before the war of 1914 political ideologies lacked the “religious” fervor of their twentieth-century counterparts. Europe then was more than a geographic assortment of different peoples and states identified with different political creeds. It constituted a single biocivilization (a Race-Nation), whose ethnonational variants embodied alternative facets of the genetic-spiritual legacy bequeathed by the Greeks, the Aryans, and the Cro Magnons. Not a single great phenomenon experienced by any one European people, it followed, was not also experienced by the others: From the megalithic culture of the stone age, to medieval chivalry, to the rise of nationalism. In the modern period, the ties of blood and spirit linking the different European nations took institutional form in the Westphalian state system of 1648, which, with the exception of the revolutionary period (1789-1815), limited their numerous wars and conflicts to family disputes.

The greatest casualty of what contemporaries called the Great War would be the destruction of this system — and of the aristocratic elites who were its incarnation.

On the war’s eve, the aristocracy still represented that historic body whose function was to command, to fight, and to defend. In fact, in one form or another, it had always dominated European life — at least since the Aryans, that offshoot of the White race whose existence was premised on the rule of the “noble.” Though property-based and attached to the permanances of family, tradition, and rank, the pre-war aristocracy bore little resemblance to the decadent hereditary ruling class of liberal historiography. For Venner, it was, as an ideal type, an ever-renewing estate infused with the spirit of honor, duty, and loyalty to what was highest in White existence. As such, it typified its people’s essence, associating nobility with those who put their people’s interests before their own.

Except for republican France and Switzerland, all of Europe’s pre-war monarchical and imperial states were governed by aristocrats, whose Prussian spirit exalted simplicity, austerity, duty, and political incorruptibility. Against the leveling aspersions cast by liberals and democrats, Venner emphasizes the aristocracy’s dynamic, modernist, and genial character — opposed in essence to bourgeois democratic societies, which subordinate everyone to money (the realm of the Jews).

Cataclysm

No one in 1914 quite understood the type of the war they had gotten into. All the general staffs anticipated a short, decisive engagement like the “cabinet wars” of the eighteenth and ninteenth centuries — not realizing it might resemble the American War of Succession, whose closing stages anticipated the “Second-Generation War” of 1914 (a generation of war based on massed firepower, where “artillery conquers, infantry occupies”).

Though a traditional conflict between rival states at the start, by 1917, once the United States entered it, the war had been transformed not just into an industrial and social mobilization of unprecedented scope, but into an ideological crusade between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Worse, the democratic crusaders wouldn’t let the war end the way previous European wars had ended, when the jus publicum europaeum of the Westphalian system mitigated White strife and ensured the integrity of rival states. In the absence of this noble restraint, Europe was mutilated at its core: Nine million combatants were killed, the Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, and Romanov empires shattered, and an even greater hecatomb prepared for the next generation.

In the glow of this holocaust, Woodrow Wilson, the American champion of an anti-aristocratic, anti-European “democratism,” stepped upon the Old World’s stage to proclaim a new order based on liberal governance, free markets, and the egalitarian principle that the sovereign individual takes precedence over community, culture, history, and (in time) race — an order whose underlying principle rested on the rule of money — and, though Venner doesn’t say it, on money’s Chosen Ones.

The untenable Wilsonian settlement of 1918-19 collapsed soon enough, but it was hastened, in some cases provoked, by its ideological rivals. For Wilson’s plutocratic democracy did not go unopposed. In Russia, Communists proposed a more radically egalitarian version of his liberal utopia, a version whose methods differed from America’s market principles, but nevertheless upheld the same raceless materialist commitments born of Enlightenment liberalism. In Germany and Italy, a defensive Europeanism gave rise to more forthrightly anti-liberal ideologies to challenge the anti-Aryan or Jewish ethic of American capitalism and Russian Communism.

In this spirit, Mussolini’s Fascists called for a strong state exalting “authority, order, and justice” to unite Italian producers and soldiers in a national destiny free of the community-killing forces of liberal individualism and Communist collectivism. In a different way, Hitler’s National Socialists fought for a racial order, a Volksgemeinschaft, to overturn the Diktat of the Wilsonian peace, beat back the liberals’ assault on the body and spirit of the nation, and return Germany to its rightful place on the world stage. Both these movements opposing the anti-White subversions of the Wilsonians and Leninists did so, despite their plebeian-Caesarian politics, in a spirit akin to Europe’s ancient warrior aristocracies, whose tradition exalted personal power and regalian purpose.

Wilson’s Democratism

The focus of Venner’s history is the interwar struggle between liberalism, Communism, Fascism, and National Socialism. The focus in this reading is Wilson’s liberal democratism, whose “mission” it was to champion the plutocratic democracy of American capitalist enterprise, as it endeavored to wipe the historical slate clean of its European (especially its German and Catholic) accouterments.

Wilson’s crusading democratism stemmed from the dominant Puritan strain of America’s national tradition. Having settled their New Israel far from the morally compromised Europe they had fled and having identified their election with economic success, the Puritans defined themselves not in terms of their ancestor’s blood and heritage, but (once the spirit of capitalism overwhelmed their Protestant ethic) in terms of the Lockean “pursuit of happiness” — the very notion of which was alien to any sense of history and destiny. Such a Hebraic form of Christianity imbued the Wilsonians with the belief that their system was not only more virtuous than that of other peoples, but that it made them immune to their failings. (Though formally a Southerner, Wilson’s approach to Europe followed in the steps of earlier Northeastern Yankee elites, whose secularized Puritanism, in the form of Unitarian/Social Gospel humanism, motivated their century long assault on the religious and racial practices of the American South.)

The clash between aristocratic and democratic values — between Europe and America — reflected, of course, a more profound clash. Venner explains it in terms of Oswald Spengler’s Prussianism and Socialism (1919), which argues that the sixteenth-century Reformation produced two opposed visions of Protestant Christianity — the Calvinism of the English and the Lutheran Pietism of the Germans. The German vision rejected the primacy of wealth, comfort, and happiness, exalting the soldier’s aristocratic spirit and the probity this spirit nurtured in Prussian officialdom. English Protestants, by contrast, privileged wealth (a sign of election) and the external freedoms necessary to its pursuit. This made it a secularizing, individualistic, and above all economic “religion,” with each individual having the right to interpret the Book in his own light and thus to justify whatever it took to succeed.

Given England’s influence on America’s formation, Venner sees an analogous process at work in the United States. In the twentieth century, this process took the form of a money-driven variant of Calvinism, whose impetus has been to enfranchise those Puritan/Jewish/liberal/New Class projects that have been such a bane to white existence in the twentieth century: Those projects proposing a rupture with the past, the destruction of historic identities, and the creation of a new world where everything was possible — a new world where Jerusalem takes precedent over Athens, where the Brotherhood of Man is proclaimed with ethnocidal conviction, and America is celebrated as an anti-Europe.

So armed, the Wilsonians set out to destroy Europe’s ancient empires and aristocracies.

The New World

The war’s Wilsonian settlement (premised on the lie of German war guilt) left the traditional order in ruins, but, of even greater consequence, it prepared Europeans for future catastrophes, preeminently the Second World War (1939-45) — which would subject them to Soviet and American occupation and to a Judeo-corporate system intent on de-Europeanizing them by re-programming their morals and mentalities, deconstructing their thought and art, decolonizing their Asian and African empires, and eventually opening their gates to the Third World. The destruction of Europe’s aristocratic heritage had, in effect, been prelude to the ensuing assault on its blood and spirit.

Before the US entered the new world war set off by the failures of the Wilsonian peace, the promulgation of the Atlantic Charter (August 1941) called for another liberal crusade. In this spirit, the Charter’s democratic principles envisioned a postwar order based on monied interests, Anglo-American commerce, and liberal democracy — the foundations of which have become the present anti-White system. As an alliance combining the democratists’ most starry-eyed ideals and hard-headed interests, the US led coalition (the “United Nations”) aimed at destroying not just German Nazism, but the German nation, whose Prussian spirit rebuked everything the Wilsonians represented.

Eisenhower’s “Crusade in Europe” was accordingly waged with a ferocity unknown in European history. The two extra-European powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were thus each ideologically committed to uprooting whatever remained of Europe’s living heritage. Their “anti-fascist” crusade was especially intent on criminalizing the Entente powers and the European values they embodied. The Nuremberg trials following the war would be the most conspicuous example of this crusading anti-Europeanism, but so too was the Allies’ effort to hunt down, silence, or kill their wartime opponents and to level Europe’s inherently anti-egalitarian order. (In France alone, 600,000 people were imprisoned following the “Liberation” and more than 40,000 summarily executed.)

Broken, demoralized, occupied, Europe in 1945 was ripe for re-education. The occupying powers’ culpablizing crusade would be especially effective in overcoming resistance to the new liberal utopia, even after the former allies embarked on their so-called Cold War (1947-89). Revealingly, American democratists were qualitatively more subversive than their more racially-conscious Russian counterparts. In the western half of the postwar’s US-SU Condominium, the culpabilitization of defeated Germany was extended to all of Western and Central Europe. (In the language of our little black brothers and sisters, original sin now became “a white thing.”) Europeans were henceforth expected to do penance for having once been powerful and creative, for having founded empires, for privileging rank, nobility, and valor, but above all for having been White and favored their own interests at the expense of Jews and other non-Europeans. The very idea of a White or European identity would, in fact, be treated hereafter as a pathology.

Japan, by contrast, suffered no such culpabilitization — not only because it experienced less of it, but also because Japanese culture refused to accept the victors’ image of itself. The culpabilitization of Europeans was so effective not simply because of the occupiers’ unchallenged power, but because it converged with a secularizing Christianity (a Judeo-Christianity?), whose Concordant with Caesar’s realm now sought to turn Europe’s former self-confidence into a form of self-loathing. The “irony” of this culpability (if irony is the word) was that the Europeans’ alleged guilt was a fraud: They had had no monopoly on so-called “crimes against humanity.” (The Anglo-American carpet bombing of civilians and the indiscriminate destruction of Europe’s great cities, the mass population transfers, the organized starvation campaigns, the unprecedented horrors associated with Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki — nothing of this affected the anti-European balance of Allied justice or brought Russian, English, or American war criminals into the dockets).

The Iron Cage

Following the Cold War, in which Europeans were mere spectators, a new view of history was programmed for popular consumption: The view that saw the history of twentieth-century Europe in terms of its struggle for the cause of Holy Democracy, with its market utopia of general prosperity, the limitless liberties of its private life, the glories of its occupiers’ Semitically fabricated mass culture, and its rainbow mixture of diverse races and cultures.

Accordingly, the Soviets’ command economy and totalitarian controlled society gave way after 1989 not to utopia, but to a system animated by the forces of consumption, bureaucracy, spectacle, and sex. For though the democratists’ methods differed from those of the Communists, they too aspired to a raceless economic paradise and, to that end, now resort to totalitarian measures to criminalize, demonize, or pathologize whoever opposes their subversions.

In 1920, in his most famous book, Max Weber pointed out that a modernity subject solely to the market’s economic criteria engenders a ruthless rationalization of human life — what he called “the iron cage.” Venner argues that since 1945 Washington has imposed its version of the iron cage on Europe.

This has especially been the case in the European Union (EU). Though the idea of unification was an old one, Wilson’s heirs favored a model geared not just to Europe’s democratic re-education, but to its transformation into a US economic protectorate, closely integrated into the transnational super-structures which Washington and New York set in place during the course of the Cold War. The Marshall Plan, for example, dictated greater economic cooperation and integration centered on US regulated international trade, while Jean Monnet, the principal architect of the “common market,” was a Wall Street insider, friend to New York Jewish banking interests. Then, after America’s cat paw, Britain, entered the EU in 1972, Europe’s homegrown democratists (”the American Party” which has governed Europe since 1945) gave themselves over entirely to the liberal project, turning Europe into a free-trade zone subject to purely economic consideration. In this spirit, they now define Europe in anti-political (i.e., liberal) terms indifferent to all those historic, traditionalist, and national barriers obstructing the race-mixing imperatives of their monetary reign.

Venner calls the global order born of post-1945 Wilsonianism a “cosmocracy.” The cosmopolitan plutocracy of this cosmocracy, which became globally hegemonic after Communism’s collapse, makes the nation state obsolete, denationalizes its elites, and racially mixes incompatible peoples and cultures in the name of an abstract, quantitatively-defined Humanity indifferent to the survival of European peoples. Heir to liberalism’s inherent cosmopolitanism, as well as to Communist internationalism and the Judeo-Christian distortion of White identity, the collective culpabilitization that has been used since 1945 to manipulate the European conscience remains one of the cosmocracy’s most important supports. For to deflect criticism and squelch resistance, liberals and ex-Communists (whose chief distinction is their indifference to race, breeding, and every qualitative ascriptions resistant to the Judeo-liberal conception of democracy) need only appeal to their “anti-hate” laws and “human rights” to silence whoever challenges their inquisitional reign.

Having been guilty of the Holocaust, colonialism, and other so-called forms of racism, Europeans are now expected to open their arms to the refuse of the overpopulated Third World. The colored invasion now transforming Europe is gradually compelling Europeans to awake to what is happening to them and to take steps, however tentative at this point, toward the Reconquest of their imperiled homeland. But no one in their “democratic” ruling elites — these bloodless executors of that transnational super structure whose Hebraic spirit champions the interests of the Bilderbergers and Trilaterals, the established parties, the MSM, the NGOs, and the universities, whose guiding arm is the Jewish dominated banking system headquartered in New York, and whose principal geopolitical orientation is the Washington-London-Tel Aviv axis — no one in these elites has the slightest understanding of what is happening under their very noses, seemingly oblivious or indifferent to what the importation of millions of Africans and Asians means to Europe.

Fortunately for Europe’s scattered remnant (and it was a remnant that reconquered Spain), the cosmocracy is creating a crisis of such massive proportion that it is likely to provoke a catastrophic collapse that will give Whites one last chance to regain control of their destiny.

The Beginning that Stands Before Us

Europeans after 1945 fell into dormition, losing all consciousness of who they were as a people. Like Germans after the original Thirty Years Wars (1618-48), their thirty-year blood expenditure left them totally depleted, forcing them off the historical stage and into the arms of everything that today threatens their existence.

Dormition, though, is not death. This seems especially the case in that the democratists’ utopia has come to rest on increasingly uncertain foundations. Its objective failures, I think it is fair to argue, are more and more imposing themselves on the collective consciousness, while, subjectively, Europe’s once cowed and beaten nations are gradually beginning to reject the democratists’ cosmopolitan agenda, as national-populist parties snip away at the authority of the established regime. The rebellion of May 2005, in which the French, then the Dutch electorates, rejected the proposed EU constitution — and did so against all the concerted forces of the existing system — was a revenge of sorts on May 1945 and on the Judeo-liberal vision of a Europe indifferent to its own genetic-cultural heritage. Other, more meaningful rebellions have also begun to stir.

Bad as things have become, there is thus still reason for hope. Venner stresses that history never ends — wars are never decisively won. Fukuyama had no sooner proclaimed “the end of history” — the undisputed triumph of Wilson’s market model of world order — than Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations predicted that the end of the Cold War’s ideological strife would lead to even more apocalyptic conflicts.

Few defeats, then, are irredeemable, but only as long as the defeated remain heroic: For our vision of the past (our vision of who we were) inevitably shapes what we are to become. Venner’s study is cause, though, not for optimism, but for caution and circumspection. Every European of good stock, he claims, cannot but admire the reckless heroism of Homer’s Achilles, but the greatest Homeric hero is Ulysses — Ulysses of the thousand guises, who used all his patience and cunning to regain his home.

Historically, resistance, reconquest, and renaissance are the Ulyssean work of small groups bound by the asceticism of ancient military orders and inspired by a will for action, thought, and decision. Not coincidentally, the struggles such groups wage create new aristocracies, for war is the most merciless of the selective forces. Only this, Venner believes, will enable us to regain our lands and all that we once were.

As Europeans enter the twenty-first century, one thing alone seems clear: The future will not resemble the present. The unimaginable is already waiting in the wings. But though history is full of the unforeseeable, the forces of culture, race, and history never cease to weight on a people’s destiny, as they intersect with present circumstance to affect the future’s course. In this Venner finds hope. For his Europe (which has existed for 30,000 years) is the Europe whose spirit struggles for all that is noble.

From VNN, February 21, 2007

In Dominique Venner’s historical essay, Ernst Jünger: Un autre destin européen, the subject is presented as une figure ultime, a European archetype provisionally absent from Europe today, but nevertheless one rooted in the depths of the European spirit — and destined, thus, to re-appear should Europeans ever re-awake to re-assert themselves in the world.

Somewhat like a seismograph, the successive stages of Jünger’s long life (1895-1998) seemed to register the successive twentieth-century epochs of which he was its most emblematic representative.

In the period 1914-18, when Europeans worshiped the gods of war, he was a great warrior.  After the defeat of 1918 and the shame of Weimar, he served as an eloquent proponent of the Conservative Revolution’s resistance to the Wilsonians “new world order.”  Then, after looking to Hitler to deliver the Germans from their travails, he found that their presumed deliverer threatened an even more devastating travail, becoming, then, a precocious critic of the NS dictator.

During the Second World War, when French and other Europeans living under the swastika hoped for a united Europe, Jünger, stationed in Paris with the Wehrmacht, was their champion.  Following the war, when Europeans sought a new humanism to re-animate their exhausted civilization, Jünger’s Der Friede (The Peace, 1944), with its thoughts on spiritual regeneration amidst the ruins, was its exemplar.  Finally, as the postwar expectations turned to a subduing sense of powerlessness, born from the occupation of the two extra-European continental blocs, his later work prescribed an autonomous, almost indifferent detachment from the prevailing powers.

Spanning these varied epochal roles, there were, in Venner’s view, two different Jüngers: the rebellious one of his youth (whom Venner extols) and the Olympian one of his maturity (with whom he is less sympathetic).

The first, true to pre-1945 Europe, was dominated by Mars and the radical anti-bourgeois spirit of the German 1920s.

The second Jünger begins with On the Marble Cliffs (1939) and develops during the course of WORLD WAR II, as he assumed a more artistic, contemplative course — less Nietzschean than Goethean.  This is the Jünger who adapted himself to Europe’s post-1945 prostration.

For Venner the two seemingly contradictory Jüngers symbolize the alternative destinies to which Europeans have been subject in the twentieth century.

1. Das Elternhaus

In a youth nurtured by a thoughtful father and a tender mother, Jünger learned French, Greek, and Latin, read greatly, developed what would become a life-long interest in entomology, and sank deep roots into his family’s intimate familiarity with European history, culture, and science.  This early cultivation of his spirit — which had nothing to do with the prestigious schools he attended and, in fact, was pursued as an alternative to what he took to be the philistine routines of bourgeois society — would make him one of the preeminent High Culture representatives of European Man.

The man of high culture was also a man of action.  This was suggested early on, for every summer during his boyhood, Jünger and his younger brother, Georg Friedrich (later a respected writer in his own right) spent at their country house in Northwest Hanover (Rehburg), where they devoted themselves to wandering through forests and marches remote to human habitation, day in and day out, like wild Indians one with nature.

These boyhood adventures, combined with copious reading of travel and adventure stories, assumed a certain resonance in this age of colonialism.

Thoughts of faraway places, like savage Africa (a primitive continent devoid of civilization, virtually peopleless, and symbol of a new European adventure) could not but capture the young Jünger’s imagination, which was already seeking out mythic realities and archaic truths as an alternative to bourgeois reasonableness.

In November 1913, he ran away from home, to France, to join the French Foreign Legion — less for the sake of the warrior’s vocation, for which he would later be known, than for that of the high adventure he hoped to find in Africa, as a slaver or an explorer.

His father eventually collected him in Algeria — after bribing him with a promised expedition to Kilimanjaro, if he would only first return home and complete his university studies.

The young Jünger, though, did not have long to wait for another adventure.

In August 1914, on the third day of what we now know as WORLD WAR I, he enlisted with a regiment of Hanoverian fusiliers: “The war seized us like an intoxication.”

Intoxication soon gave way to a sobering familiarity with the war’s harsh, primeval violence.

Wounded for what would be the first of more than seven times in April 1915, his father convinced him to take a commission (perhaps not realizing that lieutenants had the highest rate of mortality).  But typical of his spirit, he refused his father’s request to assume a position in the rear, away from the danger, and, in fact, became a “shock trooper,” the bravest and most imperiled of the war’s foot soldiers.

Through its stern trials and murderous punishments, the war would give form not merely to the highly decorated soldier, the youngest ever to receive the Pour le Mérite, Germany’s highest military accommodation, but also to the writer and thinker to whom Venner pays homage in his essay.

2. Fire and Steel

In In Stahlgewittern (Storm of Steel, 1920), which made him one of the most celebrated German writers of his age, and in other war-related works written in the Twenties (The Battle as Inner Experience, Fire and Blood, Copse 125, etc.), Jünger recognized every soldier’s right to kill his enemy and to be killed by him.

There was no hate or rancor in Jünger’s view of the enemy, for he honored both his rights and his heroism.  His disdain was reserved solely for pacifists, who, in their detachment not just from the state, but from the people of whom they themselves were an organic part, insisted on seeing only the horror of war, as if man’s highest duty was to flee the pains and torments that come with virile resolution, failing, thus, to understand that man’s destructive impulse is an essential facet of his nature, the verso of his creativity.

Between two civilized peoples, war (whose cruelty and absurdity Jünger never ceased to emphasize) tended to exalt, test, and extenuate a people’s values.  As such, he saw it as the supreme spiritual experience, as clashing “psychic powers” engaged and tested themselves against one another.  His was not the typical nationalistic, imperialistic, or militaristic apology for war, but an affirmation of raw life free from the “human, all too human” (Nietzsche) world centered on bourgeois optimism and its denial of death and destruction.

Jünger was indeed less concerned with what war was fought over, than with how it was fought.

Amidst destroyed villages and desolate fields ruined by battling armies, Jünger argued that one must stand like granite.  The fields and villages could always be restored or rebuilt, but the time and destiny of those who fought would never return.  Like Homer’s Hector, Jünger’s soldier unhesitantly rises to his fate, determined to make his death a beautiful one.

Courage for Jünger became man’s principal virtue and danger a chance to engage life at its highest, most primordial level.

This sense of struggle — and of death as the end we all face — implies that every generation must play its part, as it engages the fate bestowed to it.

Certain writers with similar experiences of the war (like Drieu La Rochelle or Céline) believed the values of courage and heroism had been trivialized in modern industrialized war . . . but not Jünger, who refused to submit to the weight of matter and machine.

The nature of twentieth-century war (dieser Scheisskrieg) simply demanded a greater will and audacity.

In reference to his own experience, he contended that a person’s psychic energy could prevail over the titanic forces of modern technology.

This was less a romantic rejection of technology’s awesome powers than a recognition that his submission to war’s imperatives created the opportunity for new experiences of personal elevation and individual authenticity.  He wrote in In Stahlgewittern that it was never a question of the scale and might of the forces opposing them, but of the courage and conviction of the men behind these forces.

In a similar vein, Venner makes a revealing comparison between Jünger’s Das Wäldchen 125 (Copse 125) and Drieu’s La Comedie De Charleroi (1934), both of which focus on incidents situated within one of the major WORLD WAR I battles.  Though Drieu in his novel looked back on the war from the perspective of the victors, the horrors and futilities dominating his view seem to suggest that he was among the vanquished, while Jünger’s work, in emphasizing the Homeric vitality of the German soldier, conveys, paradoxically, a sense of victory and triumph, despite Germany’s actual defeat.

The revolutionary nationalist Franz Schauwecker expressed it in this way: The war gave form to the “German mystique.”  “We fought the entire world . .  . In losing the war, we nevertheless won.  For even with defeat, we won what was needed for future victories.”  That is, they acquired not just the knowledge but the will to dominate the whole world.

Focusing on archaic conceptions of struggle that prefigure new forms of creativity, such ideas are obviously remote to contemporary notions of enlightened self-interest, which have come to frame the meaningless orientations of our age.

Great historical movements, it follows, cannot be explained in terms of pure causality.

The mytho-historic vision worked out in Jünger’s subsequent books would cause him to suppose that a people’s life is ultimately subject to another force, another reality — dictated by man’s confrontation with destiny — that is, with what man is fated to be if he is to be himself.

Resisting in this way the materialist interpretation of war, as well as the dominant nihilism, Jünger privileged the primacy of the spirit, as it engages the forces seeking to deny man his destined fate.

It’s this heroic resistance to what denies the European his destiny, which makes Jünger such an exemplary figure for Venner.

3. The Conservative Revolution

Following World War I, all Europe was in intellectual revolt against the old order.  This was especially so in Germany.

The nationalist, anti-liberal intellectual effervescence of the 1920s, which Armin Mohler christened the “Conservative Revolution” (arguably the most fertile movement of twentieth-century thought) was no counter-revolution, but a revolutionary, profoundly Maistrian movement — seeking not a restoration, but a transcendence.

Represented by the young Thomas Mann, Oswald Spengler, Werner Sombart, Carl Schmitt, Ernst von Salomon, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Gottfried Benn, Martin Heidegger, and Jünger, among others, the Conservative Revolution was shaped by two major influences: German romanticism in its rejection of arid eighteenth-century rationalism and Nietzsche in his revolt against the nihilism spawned by modern existence.

Against the demobilizing cult of reason enthroned by the Enlightenment, source of all people-killing materialisms, the Conservative Revolution sought to rally the vital forces refusing to abide by liberalism’s bloodless dominion.  This anti-liberalism drew on what Jünger called “heroic realism” (which, being purely irrational — and hence “unrealistic” — ignores the overwhelming odds against it for the sake of something higher in itself).

History, Spengler said, is the history of those who don’t calculate.

If, for example, the Irish had rationally accessed the situation facing them, they would have succumbed to the genocidal yoke of the British Crown, becoming thus a people without a history.

Jünger’s heroic realist “resigns” himself to his fate, as he rushes to it to affirm all that is distinct to his spirit.  Like Spengler, Jünger saw history not as the Enlightenment’s march of progress, but as the manifestation of the willful, instinctual life force animating the possibilities inherent in life’s ultimately inexplicable forms.

Rejecting liberalism’s illusory beliefs in its alleged mastery of history, history becomes for him a manifestation of those vital elemental forces superior to those that come from liberalism’s reign of quantity.

Jünger sympathized with that Conservative-Revolutionary tendency which Mohler called “national revolutionary,” specifically to its Nationalist Bolshevik wing, which upheld the Lutheran-Prussian tradition, with its distinct mix of Germanic and Slavic elements, oriented to the East and against the West (in contrast to Bavarian and Austrian Catholics, who, like Hitler, took the opposite stance).

Thomas Mann wrote at the time that a greater bond links the Germans to the Russians than to the French and to the other nations born of Rome.

In this view, Germany and Russia, unlike the liberal Franco-Anglo-American realm, had avoided the bourgeoisie’s “slave world” (Nietzsche), whose obsessive materialism has since inundated the junked-clogged market societies now dominating us.

It was this Prussian Russophilia of National Bolshevism, which is what set its principal proponent, Ernst Niekisch, against Hitler.

Based not on an affinity for Leninism, but on a proposed anti-liberal alliance of Proletarian Russia and Proletarian Germany against the Capitalist West, National Bolshevism — not to be confused with the tendency Mikhail Agursky describes in The Third Rome or with certain other tendencies that today identify themselves with this moniker — represented an alternative to Western decadence that was arguably less infected with the liberal virus than was Hitler’s particular derivation of National Socialism.

During the Weimar period, nationalists were in fact much closer to Communists (who categorically rejected the bourgeois order of the Wilsonians) than to liberals or socialists.  Collaboration between the revolutionary-nationalist right and the German Communist party (KPD), the largest, most militant Communist party outside Russia, occurred, accordingly, in numerous direct and indirect ways.

(National Bolsheviks, as such, rejected the conservative argument that Russian Communism, or more accurately said, Russia under Communist rule, was merely a product of a demonic Jewish enterprise.  Even Hitler, fierce anti-Bolshevik that he was, esteemed German Communists who defected to his ranks in ways he never did for socialist or liberal defectors — for Communists were not only in open rebellion against the liberal decadence of the West, but, in their self-sacrifice and conviction, were imbued with the same exemplary, soldierly courage.)

For National Bolsheviks, Russian Communism was only superficially Marxist.

They thus sought a Russo-Prussiancentric Europe — which they saw as preferable to Hitler’s notion, inspired by the crusading imperialism of his lapsed Habsburg Catholicism, of a German-dominated Russia.

Despite understanding that socialism (in favoring a social order oriented to the nation’s higher welfare rather than to individual self-interest), was simply another side of nationalism, these nationalists nevertheless realized that Marxism was incapable of fighting capitalism, because it was, at root, an offshoot of the same Enlightenment materialism.  The Marxist values of class struggle had, indeed, ended up perpetuating bourgeois values, for its central axis was a rationalist, calculating, and thus very Jewish conception of class as a purely economic category — whose highest rational goal, not means, was to understand and possess the world as a resource from which wealth and riches could be had and to which all questions of being were never posed.

Nationalists, by contrast, saw workers as an organic part of the nation, who needed to be integrated into and made to feel a part of its natural hierarchy.

Workers were not members of some macro-economic category — “the international proletariat” — as Marxists supposed.  There was only one proletariat, that born of the bourgeois-dominated nation, and, under a true nationalist regime faithful to the archaic spirit of Prussia’s heroic nobility, this stratum would be transformed into a healthy producer estate (the traditional base of the Aryan social pyramid), ceasing thus to be the alienated, ostracized, and oppressed class that the bourgeoisie had made of it.

To be continued

On September 3, 2009, a debate sponsored by Intelligence Squared, at the Methodist Central Hall Westminster, in London, considered the question: “Resolved: Churchill was more a liability than an asset to the free world.”

Speakers for the motion: Pat Buchanan, Nigel Knight, political scientist and economist at Churchill College, Cambridge, and Norman Stone, historian and professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara.

Speakers against the motion: Antony Beevor, historian and author of the best-selling book Stalingrad; professor Richard Overy, historian, author of many books and articles on the Second World War and the Nazi regime; and Andrew Roberts, historian, who has spent 20 years writing, researching, and broadcasting about Churchill and the Second World War.

We publish below Pat Buchanan’s opening statement:

To borrow from Mark Antony’s funeral oration, we of the affirmative are not here to praise Mr. Churchill — but to bury him.

But, first, let us concede the greatness of the man.

In that finest hour of the British nation, 1940, Winston Churchill was indomitable, an inspiration to men everywhere. He was the Lion who gave Britain’s roar of defiance in the face of Hitler’s Germany. For that, he will be honored by peoples everywhere — and forever.

And if we judged him on that year alone, there would be no debate. There would be unanimity.

But Churchill’s career did not last a single year. It lasted half a century. And, over that half century, no other career of a Western statesman was more calamitous for his country and his civilization than that of Winston Spencer Churchill.

More than any other British leader, in 1914 and 1939, Churchill lusted for war and pushed his country to turn two European wars into world wars, so Germany might be destroyed.

Both times, he succeeded.

And history records that those wars, that together took the lives of perhaps a hundred million Europeans, were the mortal blows that advanced the death of the West.

And it was Winston Churchill who led the West in its advance to barbarism. . . . Read the whole article.

These two fratricidal wars — like the original ones among the Greeks of Antiquity — pretty much accomplished the complete and possibly fatal wreck of our race and civilization.

Patch survived a horrific service in the trenches of Flanders as a machine gunner in which he suffered severe wounds.

For most of his life he was reticent about the War and his service in it.

However, after his 100th birthday Patch began speaking out against the War and the hatreds it engendered.

His funeral was attended by thousands of mourners led by the Duchess of Cornwall.

His coffin, draped with a Union Jack, was carried into the 13th century Wells Cathedral 140 miles west of London by soldiers of The Rifles, the successor to Patch’s unit the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry.  Honorary pallbearers included 2 from France, 2 from Belgium, and 2 German soldiers in full uniform.

Patch would have heartily approved of the inclusion of the Germans.  On the 90th anniversary of the end of the War last November, he attended the remembrance service in London at which his message was “Remember the Germans.”

A German diplomat was a scripture reader at the Anglican service.

It is unfortunate that the service included the Pete Seeger ballad “Where Have All The Flowers Gone?”

A much more appropriate pacifist song would have been Eric Bogle’s “The Green Fields of France” not only because it was written by a Scot but also because it is directed to World War I and is a much better song with more thoughtful lyrics and a better tune.

“The Green Fields of France”
Eric Bogle

Well how do you do, Private William McBride
Do you mind if I sit here down by your grave side?
A rest for awhile in the warm summer sun,
I’ve been walking all day and I’m nearly done.
And I see by your gravestone that you were only 19
when you joined the glorious fallen in 1916.
Well I hope you died quick and I hope you died clean
Or, William McBride, was it slow and obscene?

Did they beat the drum slowly?
did they sound the pipes lowly?
Did the rifles fire o’er ye as they lowered you down?
Did the bugle sing ‘The Last Post’ in chorus?
Did the pipes play ‘The Flowers o’ the Forest’?

And did you leave a wife or a sweetheart behind?
In some faithful heart is your memory enshrined
And though you died back in 1916
To that loyal heart are you always 19.
Or are you just a stranger without even a name
Forever enclosed behind some glass-pane
In an old photograph torn and tattered and stained
And fading to yellow in a brown leather frame?

Did they beat the drum slowly?
did they sound the pipes lowly?
Did the rifles fire o’er ye as they lowered you down?
Did the bugle sing ‘The Last Post’ in chorus?
Did the pipes play ‘The Flowers o’ the Forest’?

Well the sun it shines down on these green fields of France,
The warm wind blows gently and the red poppies dance.
The trenches are vanished now under the plough
No gas, no barbed wire, no guns firing now.
But here in this graveyard it is still No Man’s Land
And the countless white crosses in mute witness stand.
To man’s blind indifference to his fellow man
And a whole generation that was butchered and downed.

Did they beat the drum slowly?
did they sound the pipes lowly?
Did the rifles fire o’er ye as they lowered you down?
Did the bugle sing ‘The Last Post’ in chorus?
Did the pipes play ‘The Flowers o’ the Forest’?

And I can’t help but wonder now Willie McBride
Do all those who lie here know why they died?
Did you really believe them when they told you the cause?
Did you really believe them that this war would end war?
But the suffering, the sorrow, the glory, the shame –
The killing, the dying — it was all done in vain.
For Willie McBride, it’s all happened again
And again, and again, and again, and again.

Did they beat the drum slowly?
did they sound the pipe lowly?
Did the rifles fire o’er ye as they lowered you down?
Did the bugle sing ‘The Last Post’ in chorus?
Did the pipes play ‘The Flowers o’ the Forest’?

Given that Bogle’s ballad mocks Wilsonian and British liberal manic fantasies about “War to End War,” it is unsurprising that “The Green Fields of France” is generally unfamiliar to Americans and shunned by American leftists and pacifists.  Such lyrics are blasphemies against the liberal establishment’s Holy Trinity of Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt, and American liberals are notoriously intolerant of secular atheists who mock their gods.

Our race has many strengths and many weaknesses.

One of those weaknesses is its love of family quarrels and fights.  White Christian Europeans just love to fight each other.  It is a sublimated subconscious form of racism, that causes whites to believe that only a victory over a kindred white nation is worthy of pride.

All over Britain today one sees the innumerable monuments commemorating victories over other whites.  Almost nowhere does one see a monument commemorating a victory over Sikhs, Hindus, Zulus, etc.

While I am not a pacifist as Patch became, I have to confess that I read history in vain to find any significant war America or any other European nation has fought since the Mexican American War of 1848 that did any good for our race.

Ethnomasochists, however, such as Tom Brokaw with his “Greatest Generation” feel otherwise.

Only wars against whites are good wars.

Globotrash: Mary Robinson and her preferred constituency

A similar example is the former President of the Republic of Ireland Mary Robinson who will be awarded the nation’s highest civilian honor, the Presidential Medal of Freedom, on August 12th.

It is illustrative of the irrelevance of White European Americans in our society that the only objection to bestowing this honor upon Robinson comes from Jewish groups who complain that she showed an “anti-Israel bias” because she did not do enough to shut down anti-Zionist remarks at  the UN Anti-racism Conference in Durban, South Africa.

These organizations (Anti-Defamation of B’nai Brith and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee) are not buying Ms. Robinson’s pleas that she did all she could, that she has been a critic of Palestinians and has a life long record of devotion to the fight against anti-Semitism.  She did not do enough.  Hence, she should not get the prize.

These concerns are being raised by members of the “American” Congress such as Representatives Eliot L. Engel of New York and Shelley Berkley of Nevada.

While even a hint of anti-Zionism might disqualify Robinson from winning America’s Presidential Medal of Freedom, apparently her explicit anti-Americanism does not.

Plaque commemorating the San Patricios, San Jacinto plaza, Mexico City.

For instance, in September of 1997, both Mary Robinson (in Dublin) and Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo (in Mexico City) marked the 150th anniversary of the end of the Mexican American War by honoring the San Patricio Brigade (“Saint Patrick’s Brigade”), a unit formed by Irish-American deserters who fought for the Mexicans against their former comrades in arms.

At the ceremony President Robinson spoke of standing shoulder to shoulder in solidarity with Mexicans against a common enemy: the Anglo-Saxons of Great Britain and their Anglo relatives in the United States.

Her remarks went almost completely unnoticed by the white-hating American media at the time and are of no concern today now that her “enemies” are in the process of presenting her with the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

The death of the last British soldier in World War I is a time for us to reflect and to resolve that we will do our utmost for what so desperately needs to be done.

Our utmost to foster a sense of our common heritage as European whites who need to remember as our forefathers did in medieval times that there is an overarching shared race and culture of all Europeans that binds us to each other even as we remain separate and proud members of different white nations.

Our utmost to insure that the racial family feuds fanned and exploited by our enemy and by self-loathing whites like Brokaw and Robinson are healed.

Our utmost to refute and put to rest inflammatory lies intended to accentuate and preserve such family feuds.

Our utmost to prevent any more brother wars between our kindred nations.

Let us all resolve and hope that eventually we will cease to endure a dysfunctional white racial family and that we can be members of a normal, functional racial family once more.