THE ANGLO-SAXON AS PARIAH

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Editor’s Note: This is the introductory chapter of Andrew Fraser’s book, The WASP Question: An Essay on the Biocultural Evolution, Present Predicament, and Future Prospects of the Invisible Race, published by Arktos Media in July, 2011. Fraser retired from his position as Associate Professor in the Department of Public Law at Macquarie University in Australia in the midst of controversy over his views on immigration and race differences.

This book seeks to explain why WASPs (a subtly, perhaps deservedly derogatory acronym coined sometime in the late Fifties to denote White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) rarely rise to the conscious, principled defence of their collective biocultural interests, even in the face of obvious aggression from their racial, ethnic, and religious rivals. One expects to find Anglophobia among other ethnic groups, most notably perhaps the Irish and Jews; such antagonism is the natural and ordinary consequence of inter-ethnic competition. WASPs, however, simply absorb such hostility; they, too, hold their ancestors responsible for uniquely monstrous crimes against humanity. Accordingly, self-loathing WASPs no longer look to an ethnoreligious community of memory as the indispensable source of collective meaning, value, and purpose.

Indeed, the few proudly Anglo-Saxon patriots scattered around the world are now political pariahs. By contrast, the thoroughly deracinated WASPs who eschew atavistic tribal loyalties are generally well-adjusted, other-directed characters eager to go with the flow. Few such “organization men” and even fewer “liberated” women possess the psychological independence necessary to flout convention and think for themselves, much less to express genuine solidarity with their co-ethnics, past and present. Denouncing and despising every explicit expression of in-group solidarity among their own kith and kin, WASPs have lost their collective soul. In an age of diversity, they are the invisible race. But their fate is not foreclosed; neither the gene pool nor the spirit of the Anglo-Saxon race is doomed to extinction.
Over the next century, a saving remnant of Anglo-Saxon Protestant ethnopatriots, outcasts from a society in which the normal has become abnormal, will become a highly visible minority. Sooner or later, they will step out of the shadows to speak for a people reborn, an ethnonation like any other, requiring its own place in the sun.

Admittedly, such a prophecy is counter-intuitive. In present circumstances, any WASP who tries to revive older traditions of “British race patriotism” immediately breaches the bounds of acceptable political discourse. Paradoxically, pariah status is now an essential precondition to the rediscovery of collective identity among people of British ancestry. Useful comparisons can be made between the newly emancipated Jewish parvenu in Europe during the nineteenth century and the novel situation facing WASPs who have become strangers in their own lands. Upwardly-mobile Jews such as Karl Marx’s father in Germany often foreswore open solidarity with their own race and religion so as to gain admission to polite society and the professions. Only a few isolated individuals insisted that the emancipation of the Jews must amount to more “than an opportunity to ape the gentiles;” they sought instead the “admission of Jews as Jews to the ranks of humanity.” In rejecting the “opportunity to play the parvenu,” such men became “conscious pariahs.” Today only a small minority of WASPs dare to become conscious pariahs by refusing to renounce their racial particularity. According to the Jewish scholar Hannah Arendt, this is an intolerable state of affairs. In her view, it is a fundamental truth of the human condition that an individual of any nation or race can enter the “world history of humanity only by remaining and clinging stubbornly to what he is.” The systematic denial of that truth reveals the spiritual emptiness at the heart of modernity: The “normal,” well-adjusted and utterly deracinated liberal WASP passing in polite society as a cosmopolitan and enlightened “citizen of the world” is actually “no less a monster than a hermaphrodite.”

The question arises: Why are so few WASPs willing to cling any longer to who they are. The answer lies in the Anglo-American tradition of constitutional patriotism, a civil religion that transformed the abnormal renunciation of in-

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group solidarity among Anglo-Saxon Protestants into the touchstone of political normality.

In her private and social life, Hannah Arendt clung stubbornly to the particularistic bioculture and historic folkways of the Jewish people even as she publicly prescribed a thoroughly secular and cosmopolitan tradition of civic republicanism for her adopted country. She dismissed as fanciful the notion that America is or ever was a Christian republic. She claimed that the religious roots of the American republic are to be found not in “the Christian faith in a revealed God” nor in “Hebrew obedience to the Creator who was also the Legislator of the universe.” If the founders “can be called religious at all,” Arendt argued, it was only in “the original Roman sense” of the word “religion.” According to Arendt, Roman religion had little to do with participation in the divine; it was more concerned with a pious respect for the halo of time shrouding the origins of the republic. One wonders, however, whether Arendt ever made the conscious calculation that the ethnic interests of her fellow Jews are best served by detaching the American republican tradition from the Anglo-Saxon blood and Christian faith of the nation’s founding people.

Arendt, of course, is far from being the only political theorist to draw a bright line between the Christian faith and classical republicanism. JGA Pocock, a New Zealand-born WASP, is perhaps the most accomplished historian of the Atlantic republican tradition. He, too, distinguished between Christians who include the whole of humanity in their quest for eternal life and civic humanists. For the latter, the republic was universal only in that “it existed to realize for its citizens all the values which men were capable of realizing in this life;” it remained “particular in the sense that it is located in space and time.” Both Arendt and Pocock presented the classical republic as a secular association of persons “formed with a view to some good purpose.” Race and religion play little or no role in the work of either writer. Arendt concentrated on the abstract categories of work, labor, and action in her analysis of the constitution of the public and private realms in the Athenian polis. In effect, she discovered the prototype of the “proposition nation” in the city states of pagan antiquity. In fact, she

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offered her modernist rendition of civic humanism as an antidote to the primeval urge to discover the divine in the blood and spirit of a particular people. She found a ready market for that prescription within the WASP intelligentsia. Certainly, both Arendt and Pocock exercised a profound influence on my own intellectual development. Having fallen under the sway of their purely political civic humanism, I was ill-prepared to comprehend the scale of the immigration disaster unfolding before my eyes in Australia, Canada, and the United States.

Arendt sought to liberate political theory from the biological imperatives of natural necessity while providing a secular alternative to the alleged “wordlessness” of apolitical ethnoreligious communities grounded in Christian charity. Accordingly, she rejected the “German-inspired nationalism” that regarded “a nation to be an eternal organic body, the product of inevitable natural growth of inherent qualities,” and explained “peoples, not in terms of political organizations, but in terms of biological superhuman personalities.” Renouncing “all neoromantic appeals to the volk,” Arendt “maintained that one’s ethnic, religious, or racial identity was irrelevant to one’s identity as a citizen, and that it should never be made the basis of membership in a political community.” Arendt was no less hostile to the theological image of the nation as “the incarnation of a divine absolute on earth,” observing that “America was spared the cheapest and most dangerous disguise the absolute ever assumed in the political realm, the disguise of the nation.” She recognized, of course, that the price homo Americanus paid for that release was severance from the blood and faith he shared with his kinfolk in the Old World.

As a callow legal scholar steeped in both the chronic ethno-anaemia characteristic of the Canadian WASP and the civic culture of the American Republic south of the border, I, too, was proof against romantic appeals to the Volk. Indeed, in the earnestly bilingual and bi-

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cultural atmosphere of Canada in the late 1960s and early 1970s, I was simply bewildered by the ethnic grievance-mongering of newly empowered Québécois activists billing themselves as “the White niggers of America.” It was perhaps natural to seek succor in Arendt’s irenic vision of a political religion brought down to earth, one capable of creating public spaces in which the civic virtues of a self-selecting aristocracy would transmute the raw facts of social plurality into a common world transcending “the life-span of mortal men.”

My first encounter with Arendt’s civic humanism came through two books, *The Human Condition* and *On Revolution*. I was only dimly aware of Arendt’s Jewish identity; she barely mentions Jews or Judaism in either work. In retrospect, however, her political philosophy was inseparable from her identity as one of many German Jewish intellectuals transplanted to America as political refugees. It was easy for Arendt to conclude that a pariah people such as the Jews were safer in a pluralistic republic founded upon universal principles of constitutional law than in an organic nation grounded in the racial identity of a gentile majority.

To her credit, Arendt sought to hold Jews to the same standards she set for the American republic. She criticized Zionists repeatedly, both because they accepted the idea of “the Jew in general” as a biological creature and because they tied the goal of a Jewish homeland to an absolutist political theology of sovereignty. She insisted that “The real goal of the Jews in Palestine is the building up of a Jewish homeland. This goal must never be sacrificed to the pseudo-sovereignty of a Jewish state.” Zionists, she believed, ought to recognize the rights of the Arabs already living in Palestine; turning the Palestinians into another pariah people in their own country could never be justified. Indeed, she held up America as a model for the sort of polity that should be created in Palestine. It now seems clear that we were both doomed to disappointment; modern political and social life is utterly resistant to a revival of classical republicanism for reasons that are both biological and theological.

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For those prepared to heed its lessons, the last fifty years have taught us a great deal about the intractable biocultural reality of racial differences and the consequent limits on pluralism in a modern republican polity. Certainly, the bloody and interminable conflict between Zionists and Palestinians suggests a certain naiveté in Arendt’s view that “the very category ‘Jew’ is a human convention masquerading as a biological fact.”8 On the other hand, she had good reason to fear that the political theology of sovereignty would exacerbate racial, religious, and ethnic conflict in a self-proclaimed Jewish state ruling a multi-ethnic society. Meanwhile, experience in the “Anglo-Saxon countries” strongly suggests that European man alone bears the spirit of civic republicanism, a tradition still largely alien to other races and peoples.

The civil rights revolution combined with the reverse colonization of the West by the Third World has undermined the very possibility of a common world presumptively shared by the citizens of a republican polity. The corporate welfare state celebrates diversity, and thereby fosters, deepens, and strengthens the myriad biocultural divisions between men and women, homosexuals and heterosexuals, blacks and Whites, Jews and Christians, Muslims and the entire Western world. It has become an axiom of postmodern politics that the perspective of any one group is incommensurable with that of others. Representation of individuals must give way therefore to the representation of groups. The common good has been deconstructed as an illusion conjured up by powerful and privileged groups to protect their own particular interests.

Between-group competition is now an inescapable and ubiquitous feature of life for WASPs in a multiracial society. Unfortunately, even as racial and ethnoreligious tensions spill over into a low-intensity civil war, well-meaning but ineffectual WASPs remain resolutely blind to both the biological and the theological dimensions of their collective identity.

NATION OF NATIONS

The major premise underlying this book was best articulated by Harold Cruse, easily the most incisive black nationalist thinker of the Sixties. Cruse recognized what most Americans of Anglo-Saxon ances-

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8 Pitkin, Attack of the Blob, 72.
try are still loath to admit; namely that America is “a nation of nations,” (an observation now equally applicable to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.)³ He identified Anglo-Saxons, Negroes, and Jews as the main players in the inter-ethnic struggles shaping the (re)distribution of prestige, power, and resources in American society and politics.

For my purposes, Cruse’s most important insight is the following deceptively innocuous but explosively unorthodox proposition: American WASPs require and deserve explicit recognition as an ethnocultural group comme les autres—as an ethnonation in itself, if not yet for itself.¹⁰ Unfortunately, as Cruse knew all too well, America is a nation that habitually lies to itself. Moreover, WASPs are the worst offenders. America is indeed a polyethnic nation of nations but Anglo-Saxon Protestants have—ever since the foundation of the Republic—refused to incorporate that patently obvious reality into their political, constitutional and theological discourse. The myth of the proposition nation has a long history.

In the well-ordered multinational America of Cruse’s dreams, each of the major ethnic groups would “produce a native radical-intellectual trend, which trends should complement one another.”¹¹ In effect, intellectuals provide each ethnonation republic with a corporate identity; every people acquires its own legal personality empowered to invoke as it is bound to respect three fundamental constitutional conventions of the multiracial republic: mutual recognition, consent, and continuity.¹² On Cruse’s theory, it is the civic duty of every Anglo-Saxon, Negro, and Jewish intellectual to participate in the collective consciousness of his ethnonation. In practice, members of the Jewish intelligentsia alone volunteered—eagerly and often—to serve as the common (if rarely contrite) conscience of their proudly


¹⁰ Cf., Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 173: “Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle, of which we have noted only a few phases, this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself.”


ethnocentric people. Highly educated Jews take their communal responsibilities seriously, ceaselessly working to promote a powerful spirit of in-group solidarity among their co-ethnics. As a consequence, the American Jewish community is not just a nation in itself; it is also an ethnic group famously ready, willing, and able to act for itself. In pursuit of their self-proclaimed mission to heal the world, Jewish activists moved quickly and decisively to forge an alliance with black Americans against an allegedly common foe, America’s hegemonic WASP elites.¹³

The vast majority of American Negroes followed Jewish advice to forswear black nationalist strategies, as advocated, inter alia, by Booker T Washington, Marcus Garvey, and Harold Cruse. Such counsel may have been “good for the Jews” but Cruse was convinced that it poisoned the well-springs of political, cultural, and economic autonomy in black America. Negroes are now an ethnonation for itself only in the degraded sense that their leaders clamour incessantly to increase their entitlements under the federal Leviathan’s racial spoils system. A race so (dare one say, slavishly) dependent upon governmental largesse hardly counts as a nation in itself.

Those enjoying the WASP lifestyle, on the other hand, represent a national group only in itself. Americans of British ancestry have never constituted an organic whole prepared to act for itself. Cruse predicted that the USA would pay a heavy price for the failure of WASP intellectuals (and their Negro counterparts) to recognize, promote, and defend their distinctive ethnonational identity. Cruse took it for granted that, in a multinational republic, every self-respecting, morally upright racial, religious, and ethnic group will shoulder its collective responsibilities in the process of identity politics.

Jews were quick to grasp the proffered opportunity vigorously to defend their distinctive ethnocultural, economic, and political interests. Jewish leaders demanded and received public recognition of their right to a front row pew in the sacramental shrine of the Constitutional Republic. Accordingly, a triumvirate of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish worthies now typically presides over the ceremonial expression of America’s constitutional faith. And because corporate membership in the religion of the Republic carries certain privileges, it became axiomatic that Jews must consent to social and economic policy

decisions affecting their group interests. Finally, Jewish intellectuals enlisted private, corporate, and governmental support to ensure their continuity as a self-governing ethnonation. Unfortunately, they have not always accorded reciprocal recognition to the biocultural interests and constitutional claims of other ethnic groups. On the other hand, neither Anglo-Protestant nor Catholic Americans have been particularly adept, much less highly principled players in the game of inter-ethnic competition.

In *The Slaughter of Cities* E Michael Jones describes the successful campaign by WASP and Jewish elites to cleanse American cities of Catholic ethnic enclaves. Relocated to the suburbs, Polish, Irish, Italian and other Catholic ethnic identities were flattened into a homogeneous Whiteness supposedly shared with Protestants and Jews. Like Cruse, Jones believes that America would be a better place today if Catholic ethnic intellectuals—not least of all those in the Church—had done their job, thereby enabling each of those distinctive ethnic groups to survive in and for itself. Instead, Catholic ethnics like WASPs and Negroes before them fell lock, stock, and barrel for utopian promises of health, wealth, and personal power marketed by the corporate welfare state as the American Dream. That Faustian bargain exacted a heavy price, spiritually if not materially, from America’s constituent ethnonations.

This book is not, therefore, a narrowly ethnocentric piece of pro-WASP advocacy. On the contrary, it mounts an attack on my co-ethnics; namely the American WASPs who for over two centuries now have waged a reckless, revolutionary, and relentless cultural war on the ethnoreligious traditions which once inspired the Anglo-Saxon province of Christendom to greatness. American WASPs and their unruly ancestors have done much for which they ought to fear the wrath of God. Their salvation may depend upon their willingness to renounce not just the statist idolatry rampant in the religion of the Republic but also the enchantments of Mammon for which they have sold their collective soul. It is well past time for WASPs to accept the responsibilities and burdens of ethnonationhood. In return, they will earn the right to bear, once again, the ethnonym of their illustrious Anglo-Saxon ancestors.

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America’s constitutional faith has been not good for the WASPs—or any other population group. In the medium- to long-term, even highly successful Jews will suffer if the WASP disease goes untreated. Anglo-Saxon Anglophobia is a spiritual disorder whose morally debilitating symptoms are highly contagious. Should WASPs fail to regenerate their historic ethnonation, such morbid ethnomasochism is sure to bring out the worst in other racial, religious, and ethnic groups.

Already America’s rainbow republic exhibits dangerously high levels of Jewish hubris, Negro criminality, and Hispanic/Mexican aggression, as well as chronic moral decay within a rootless Catholic “faith community” desperately searching for its lowest common denominator in the mobile mass of the global multitude. The ethno-pathology which laid *homo Americanus* low has spread to Anglo-Saxon Protestants outside the United States. Whether they realize it or not, the mental and physical well-being of WASPs in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and even in England, is inextricably bound up with the fate of their co-ethnics in America.

Educated WASPs everywhere are remarkably resistant to suggestions that they, too, are an ethnic group. They prefer to imagine themselves as autonomous individuals. Sometimes — if the thorny issue of race comes up—they will, reluctantly, self-identify as “Whites;” but mostly WASPs regard themselves as “plain vanilla” Americans, Australians, Canadians, and Britons. WASPs around the world disapprove of ethnonationalism — especially when it rears its ugly head among their own kith and kin. This book offers intellectual support to recovering WASPs in their inner spiritual struggle to overcome their ethnologically peculiar but politically correct and etymologically sound strain of homophobia.

**ANGLO-SAXON ANGLOPHOBIA AND THE NEW TRIBALISM**

WASPs are the canary in a multiracial mineshaft. Cracks and fissures snake around them as the transnational corporate welfare state digs ever-deeper into the precious stocks of social capital accumulated over centuries in the “Anglo-Saxon countries.” Predictions of global anarchy are rife as nations break down into warring races and tribes. Ironically, bereft of a powerful sense of collective identity, WASPs face a future of individual isolation even as “the quest for the memory and spirit of the specific ethnic past has once again been renewed.” It seems likely, according to Kotkin, that a new “tribalism...forged by globally dispersed ethnic groups” will shape the twenty-first centu-
This book comes to a similar conclusion: Adapting themselves to the chaotic challenges of the twenty-first century, prudent WASPs will re-invent themselves as a global network of Anglo-Saxon tribes.

The only alternative to the self-conscious reconstruction of Anglo-Saxon ethnohistory, indeed of an Anglo-Saxon ethnotheology, is ever-deepening demoralization. The secular-minded WASP is now a tragi-comic figure, the object of both pity and contempt. Unless WASPs somehow recover the tribal spirit of early Anglo-Saxon Christians they will sink still further into ignominious impotence. A once-proud people will have been swept aside without a fight, just another sad story of defeat and dispossession ending not with a bang but with a whimper. But they may yet find their way back to an alternative future. During the first Dark Age, the Church served as the seedbed of the English nation; in our New Dark Age WASPs may discover that their salvation, on earth as in heaven, lies in a return to the Old Faith of medieval Christendom.

In Deuteronomy 26: 16–19, God recognized Old Covenant Israel as his “special possession.” Biblical prophecies of a New Covenant creation were fulfilled in AD 70 when Christ came “on the clouds of heaven with great power and glory” (Matthew 24:30) to oversee the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple. The covenant world of the rebellious and stiff-necked Jews who had rejected Christ perished along with the physical structure of the Temple. A new heavens and a new earth appeared in which every nation (ethnos) was invited to enter into the Kingdom of God. The rulers of the pagan tribes of Anglo-Saxon England jumped at the chance. Alfred the Great and other Anglo-Saxon kings gladly recognized Jesus the Christ as their Lord. Their subjects soon conformed to the ways of the King of Kings.

By keeping his commandments, England became the Christian prototype of a holy nation; indeed the nascent English nation aspired to be a new Israel. In return, God raised England “high above all the nations which he has made,” if only for a time. Contemporary WASPs must follow the example set by their remote ancestors in bringing “praise and fame” to God. By so doing, they can be reborn as “a people holy to the Lord.” Unfortunately, most WASPs today remain wedded to secular humanism, the civil religion which underpins the

political economy of the modern state. So long as that bloodless faith survives, the lost souls of the invisible race fall under a collective life sentence of spiritual servitude.

WASPs are dead not just to their ancestral Christian faith but to the civic virtues essential to the constitutional health of the body politic. Forty years ago, Cruse charged that the then “dominant and representative” White ethnic group, “the Anglo-Saxons and their Protestant ethic” had abdicated “their creative and intellectual responsibilities to the internal American commonweal.” Nothing since then has overcome the spiritual bankruptcy and ideological hubris, the “threadbare cultural heritage,” associated with the steady hollowing out of Anglo-Saxon prestige, power, and influence. The three-cornered ethnic competition between Negroes, Jews, and old-stock Anglo-Americans continues unabated, but with the addition of many new protected minorities an ever-expanding diversity industry now honeycombs the structures of state and corporate power.

In the business of inter-ethnic competition, there must be winners and losers. Cruse was not surprised when upwardly mobile Jews quickly stepped into the gaping intellectual vacuum left unattended by feckless WASPs; before long, he predicted, Jews would “dominate scholarship, history, social research, etc.” WASP weakness was a critical factor in the vector of forces generated within the “fateful triangular tension” between Anglo-Saxons, Negroes, and Jews. Cruse was right to warn Anglo-Saxons that their “group must produce its representative radical-intellectual trend; or else social progress in America will be ethnically retarded, if not checkmated.” Well ahead of his time, he stressed that in at least one crucially important dimension the biocultural phenomenon of race is, indeed, a “social construct.”

Race is a biological reality but not every racial difference represents the automatic, physical expression of particular gene pools. In fact, the social construction of race is always a work in progress, a job that can be done well or badly. A people can use its God-given genetic capital for good or for ill. WASP intellectuals deserve to be chastised severely; they refuse to pay attention to the peerless skill with which American Jews crafted a collective identity solidly anchored in the ancient moral imperatives of tribal loyalty. Well-schooled WASPs also turn a blind eye to shortfalls in the performance of non-European peoples. Con-

17 Ibid., 468, 483.
spicuous displays of altruism directed toward out-groups are valuable status markers for educated WASPs indifferent to the claims of ingroup solidarity. The “selfish gene” has become incarnate in WASP intellectuals who routinely defect to the other side(s) in the game of identity politics.

Over the past century, the sheer ubiquity of such opportunistic behavior produced the terminal crisis of the Anglo-Saxon intellectual. Anglo-Saxon Protestants were on the ropes by the mid-Sixties. The collapse was not confined to the USA. Cruse probably never took much notice of Canada where Anglo-Saxons did manage, for a time, to create a native, conservative intellectual trend, under the aegis of the British monarchy. But, there too, Anglo-Saxonism had taken several body blows by 1965. That year marked the publication of George Grant’s *Lament for a Nation*, a book mourning the defeat of an English-Canadian nationalist movement grounded in ancestral loyalty to British institutions rejected by the American Revolution. Around the same time, Britain’s entry into the European Common Market broke the grip of “British race patriotism” on the politico-cultural imagination of opinion leaders in Australia and New Zealand, as well as on the English themselves.18

Anglo-Saxon Anglophobia is a mysterious affliction, becoming pandemic among WASPs in tandem with the rise of managerial multiculturalism. Official multiculturalism destroyed the common civic culture that WASPs absorb with their mother’s milk. Apart from WASPs, it is now normal for virtually every significant social group to conceive its racial, religious, ethnic, gender, or lifestyle interests in accordance with the tribal logic of identity politics. WASPs stand outside the new tribalism. They cling instead to the scrupulously secular, color-blind, and gender-neutral norms of civic nationalism. WASPs don’t “do” identity politics; their sense of belonging is based not on blood but on citizenship. Nor, needless to say, do they regard ingroup solidarity as a sacred obligation. Unsurprisingly, therefore, in the second half of the twentieth century, Australia, Canada, New Zea-

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land, the UK, and the USA ceased to be Anglo-Saxon countries, spiritually if not demographically.

**IN SEARCH OF AN ANGLO-SAXON VOLKSGEIST**

What is at work here is arguably a collective not an individual neurosis. In search of the deeply repressed *Volksgeist* of a disappearing people, we traverse the mundane domain of sociobiology—to establish that religion has secular utility—before ascending into the headier realm of Christian ethnotheology—to establish that a religion of secular utility is bad for the Anglo-Saxons.

Our story begins with the emergence of the English people as a socially cohesive ethnoreligious community; it also tells of their overseas expansion. The entire narrative recounts an ongoing historical process in which genes and culture co-evolve; throughout, the biocultural evolution of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, “at home” and in the diaspora, is evaluated in accordance with the orthodox Christian doctrine of nations. In other words, we look for the spirit animating the laws of God and man as it shines through or recedes from Anglo-Saxon biocultures widely separated in space and time.

The spirit of Anglo-Saxon Christendom manifested itself most publicly in laws and constitutions. This book rests upon a historiographical axiom laid down by Walter Ullman: “The history of jurisprudence is the history of civilization.” Medieval Europe created a legal civilization, nowhere more obviously or successfully than in its Anglo-Saxon province. The English, like other Christian peoples, “were given their religion, their faith, their dogma in the shape of the law.”\(^1^9\) Accordingly, this book assumes that there is no better introduction to any period in Anglo-Saxon history and no more reliable mirror of their character than a study of the law enacted and practiced, first, in their island homeland and, now, throughout what remains of the civilization established by the British diaspora.

Another overarching theme revolves around the quest for the tragic flaw in the Anglo-Saxon character. How did a once-heroic people bring about their own downfall? Was the fatal flaw somehow encoded in their genes or their culture, or even both at once? My thesis is the social psychology of the Anglo-Saxons evolved in three stages, in a process of “punctuated equilibrium.” The primitive, magicoreligious

influences on the social character of the early Anglo-Saxon tribes were suppressed, first, by formal institutions (embryonic states and the Church) that fostered the dominant “tradition-directed” character type of medieval England; second, by the development of an “inner-directed” character adapted to the early modern bourgeois market economy; and, third, by the emergence of the “other-directed” character type among WASPs in the service of the modern corporate welfare state.

As we enter a period of deepening economic crisis, hitherto suppressed social and political tensions generated by the deliberate demographic transformation of the Anglo-Saxon countries seem certain to become more acute. Unmistakeable symptoms of acute racial polarization are already evident under the Obama administration in the USA. In this threatening atmosphere of political instability and economic insecurity, old-stock Americans, along with their co-ethnics in England, Canada, and Australasia, will be compelled, sooner or later, to join in the high-stakes game of identity politics. This book provides them with a game plan; it points, as well, to their greatest weakness—the disgraceful absence of the team spirit so central to the old-time religion of the fabled “island race.”

Ten years ago, John Higham, a prominent WASP historian, observed that the full story of the “shattering defeat” of his own ethnic group in the mid-twentieth century “has never been told.” Shortly afterwards, Eric Kaufmann set out single-handedly to fill that void with a masterful book on the rise and fall of Anglo-America. One reason for the previous absence of academic interest in the decline of American WASPs, Kaufmann remarked, is the unexamined presumption that it was “a demographic inevitability of only limited relevance to today’s debates about Whiteness and multiculturalism.”

The conventional wisdom holds that WASPs were bound to be overthrown, sooner or later, by subaltern ethnic groups. In rejecting the dominant interpretation, Kaufmann took a giant step forward. This book builds upon his approach.

In several important ways, however, it represents a radical departure from Kaufmann’s work. The most obvious difference between the two books is in their respective historical and geographic scope. Kaufmann confines his narrative and analysis to the rise and fall of

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**homo Americanus.** This book examines the ethnogenesis of the English nation; it also discusses the growth of the state and the companion system of political economy that powered English colonial expansion around the world.

Kaufmann and I agree that “the primary engine of dominant ethnic decline” is to be found in “cultural and ideological changes originating from within the Anglo-Protestant community.” But when Kaufmann celebrates the decline of the WASP, I decline to follow suit. Instead, this book laments the fall of Anglo-America (along with Anglo-Australia, Anglo-Canada, etc). Kaufmann sees in the “expressive individualism” of “the New York Intellectuals” positive signs that WASPs were reforming themselves over the course of the twentieth century. In my view, the rise of that cultural revolutionary movement signalled the onset phase of a malignant ethnopathology decked out in the rituals and trappings of a false religion. On my analysis, the cosmopolitan creed embraced by Kaufmann is a clear and present danger to the inclusive fitness of WASPs everywhere, not least of all because it severs them from their ethnoreligious roots in the ancestral homeland of Anglo-Saxon Christianity.

My interpretation of world-wide WASP decline, therefore, reflects what might be termed an “insider’s” perspective on Anglo-Saxon ethnohistory. Kaufmann, on the other hand, remains an “outsider” sympathetic to the demographic weight and biocultural interests of the Other, an interpretative stance explicitly linked to his ultracosmopolitan hybridity. He describes himself as “entirely secular and ‘new’ immigrant in origin: part postwar Jewish, part Chinese, part Hispanic.” Born in Hong Kong, Kaufmann holds Canadian citizenship and apparently passes for a White, North American “Anglo.” Wearing the latter hat, Kaufmann rejects the explicitly anti-WASP attitudes of the radical left; instead he upholds “the validity of both WASP and ‘American’ as important ethnic options,” open in principle to anyone. Significantly, however, he denies Anglo-Saxon Christians an exclusive proprietary claim to the WASP brand.

In advanced societies, Kaufmann believes, WASPs will become an upper-class status group in which Whites and Asians (as well as mixed Eurasians) remain overrepresented. Ancestral ties to the British Isles will matter little: “In terms of authenticity, light skin and Anglo

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21 Ibid., 4.
22 Ibid., 283.
cultural characteristics might serve to dignify WASP ancestry—however partial and distant.” In fact, he declares, “increasingly race and ethnicity is being superseded by transethnic cleavages based on status and ideology.” He predicts “that racial boundaries, as with ethnic boundaries, will continue to weaken, thereby generating a symbolically fluid, highly privatized, post-ethnic social environment.”

Kaufmann’s optimistic take on the future of managerial multiculturalism is a dangerous illusion. WASP identity is more than the leading lifestyle preference of the rich and famous; it is the biocultural expression of a deep-seated ethnopathology. We need to take sociobiology seriously. Contemporary WASP behavior is profoundly dysfunctional in circumstances of economic scarcity, social disorder, and political instability. If they are to survive and prosper, Anglo-Saxon ethnoreligious communities must refuse to reward individuals engaging in conspicuous public displays of out-group altruism. No longer can they afford to impose a high social price on the practice of ethnic nepotism within their own tribal networks. Moral vanity of that sort is a sin; it is also a maladaptive mistake threatening the survival of an entire race.

Kaufmann believes that Anglo-Protestant culture can survive even if Anglo-Protestants cease to exist as a people. Of course, he is neither an Anglo-Saxon nor a Christian; nobody expects him to be moved either by the mystic moral magnetism of an ancestral faith or by the biological bonds of blood brotherhood to mourn the passing of a once-great people. It is quite another matter when prominent WASPs coolly contemplate the socially engineered extraction of the spiritual essence incarnate in the flesh and bone of their co-ethnics and its professionally managed transplantation into the dead heart of an ever-more alien nation. In such men, we see textbook examples of Anglo-Saxon Anglophobia. A case in point: a recent, best-selling book by the late Samuel P Huntington.

Unlike Kaufmann who is, at most, an honorary “Anglo” by virtue of his Canadian childhood, Huntington was an über-WASP directly descended from early New England colonists. Despite his antecedents, Professor Huntington appeared unconcerned for the future of his people, expressing confidence that enlightened public policies can en-

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23 Ibid., 309-311.
sure the ideological hegemony of Anglo-Protestant culture in America even as those carrying the genes of the first English settlers shrink to an insignificant and voiceless minority. The thesis of this book is clear and unambiguous: In the absence of a really existing Anglo-Saxon Christian people, the civilizing influence of Anglo-Saxon Christian culture will be extinguished. Anglo-Saxon Christians are already an endangered species; their ethnoreligious community may simply wither away, leaving behind only a few scattered remnants of the faithful.

In its blindness, the rest of mankind will barely notice the cosmic tragedy implicit in the death and destruction of a unique bioculture born in the sacred light of faith, hope, and charity. In recalling the birth of Old England’s *Volksgeist*, tracing its life cycle to its apparent end in modern America, and imagining its regeneration many decades hence, this book resurrects the long-since buried and forgotten corpus of orthodox Christian ethnotheology.

The *novus ordo seclorum* proclaimed at the creation of the American Republic was a major turning point in Anglo-American political and constitutional history; it also sealed the sorry fate of Anglo-Saxon Christendom. Until then, colonial Americans formed the vanguard of the Anglo-Saxon diaspora, thereby laying the biocultural foundation for a trans-Atlantic ethnonation. My argument, following in the footsteps of George Grant and his Loyalist forefathers, is that by renouncing their ancestral allegiance to throne and altar, American revolutionaries committed something worse than a political or constitutional blunder. It was a mortal sin to deny and disown sacred bonds of faith, blood, and honour. (I do not mean to imply that King and Parliament were as pure as the driven snow. Readers will find ample evidence below to discourage any such inference.)

This book reminds contemporary WASPs that their advanced state of decay is visible proof that the wages of sin is death—a theological truth that applies to bodies politic no less than to bodies natural. But the death of the WASP is not the predestined end of this story. Like the risen Christ, the Anglo-Saxon people will be born anew as they shed the desiccated skin of the worn-out WASP. The final part of this book suggests that such a miracle may come to pass through the twenty-first century revival of Anglo-Saxon identity politics.

Writing in 1992 when the prospect of a “progressively more integrated worldwide economic system” seemed unstoppable, Joel Kotkin was convinced that “dispersed groups such as global tribes,” along
with “their worldwide business and cultural networks” were “particularly well adapted” for success. Today, as we ponder the impending collapse of our ever more unsustainably complex socio-economic systems, tribal networks offer an even more attractive bolt-hole. Tribes—the “organizational cockroach of human history”—have shown themselves to be highly adaptive collective survival mechanisms. If only for such pragmatic reasons, WASPs might recall yet another age-old adage: charity begins at home. In the final analysis, however, home is where the heart is. Not so very long ago, the heart of the British diaspora remained “at home” in Old England. The natal narrative of that blessed realm can still provide much-needed inspiration to the postmodern rebirth of Anglo-Saxon tribalism.

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