PAN-EUROPEAN GENETIC INTERESTS

ETHNO-STATES, KINSHIP PRESERVATION, AND THE END OF POLITICS MICHAEL RIENZI

Thite gentiles of European descent, unlike all other groups, seem to demand objective, rather than subjective, justification for ethnoracial preservation. Thus, white racial nationalists have long desired to see an objective work that justifies a defense by whites of their racial interests. The wait is now over.

Dr. Frank Salter, a political ethologist with the Max Planck Society, Department of Human Ethology, has recently published just such an analysis.¹ As we are well aware, typical discussions about these topics usually center around issues which Dr. Salter terms "proximate," e.g., economics, crime and security, culture, etc. Completely lacking in such discussions is concern for what can be termed the "ultimate" interest: "genetic continuity." It is this ultimate interest which is the focus of Salter's work, the central question of which is asked in the very first sentence: "Does ethnic competition over territory pay off in terms of reproductive fitness?"

Crucial for the survival and propagation of an ethny is a definite territory in which to live and successfully reproduce. According to Salter: "The special quality of a defended territory is that it insulates a population from the vicissitudes of demographic disturbances...." Thus, the acquisition and defense of territory became an integral part of the tribal strategy of humans. In the long run, only territory can ensure survival, and human history is replete with conflicts of groups expanding and contracting, conquering or being conquered, migrating or being displaced by migrants. The loss of territory can result in ethnic diminishment or destruction, with the consequent negative effects on the native's genetic fitness interests. To objectively measure the extent of this negative genetic impact, a quantitative analysis is required.

Salter's quantitative analysis of ethnic genetic interests depends on the concept of genetic kinship, a relative term which defines genetic relatedness as compared to the genetic background of a random population. Thus, even though all humans share many genes, genetic kinship measures the genetic similarities and differences above and beyond this general gene sharing. Kinship values can be either positive or negative; if individuals (or groups) share more genes than is typical of the population, then the kinship is positive; if they share fewer genes than on average, then the kinship is negative.

Genetic kinship can be mathematically derived from studies of the genetic variation between populations. The genetic data that form the basis of Dr. Salter's quantitative analysis of ethnic genetic interests derive from the work of Cavalli-Sforza,² which examined gene frequencies of various alleles from a broad range of human populations. These genetic data, interpreted mathematically in terms of genetic kinship, can be used to determine the extent to which alien immigration harms ethnic genetic interests. Salter examines groups of 10,000 people and asks: What would be the effect of displacing 10,000 natives by 10,000 immigrants? To bring the point home more clearly, Salter expresses losses of genetic ethnic interest in terms of losses in "child equivalents." In other words, Salter is asking: for any given individual of the native population *x*, what is the number of lost children that would equal the loss of his ethnic genetic interests caused by immigration of 10,000 people of ethny *y*?

Salter begins by considering the English as the native population, and examines the effects of the immigration of 10,000 Danes, an ethny very similar genetically to the English. Displacing 10,000 Englishmen with 10,000 Danes results in a loss of genetic interests equal to 167 children for every person of English descent! What if the immigrants were Bantus—a group very genetically dissimilar to the English—rather than Danes? The genetic cost to a single Englishman of the immigration of 10,000 Bantus is the equivalent of 10,854 lost children! What if the level of immigration were larger, more in tune with the massive displacement of Western peoples observed today? The English population is roughly 50 million. If 12.5 million of these were displaced and replaced by an equal number of Bantus, the loss would be equivalent to 13 million children! Salter emphasizes that this loss is not somehow reduced by being spread over the entire native population. The loss applies to every member of the native populace.

To further illustrate these points Salter then determines the number of immigrants of group *y* necessary to reduce the genetic interests of a random member of native group *x* by one child equivalent (see table on page 43). For Europeans, an average of only 1.1 African or 1.7 Northeast Asian immigrants is sufficient for the loss of one child equivalent—a powerful and personal argument against racially alien immigration. Salter states that within-group charity is potentially adaptive and that self-sacrificial "heroism" directed at preserving one's group genetic interests can be adaptive as well.

For example, Salter points out that "an act of charity or heroism" performed by an Englishman that prevented 10,000 Danes from replacing 10,000 Englishmen would be worth it even if the Englishman sacrificed his life and with it the potential of having a family of up to 167 children. Preventing replacement by Bantus would justify a far larger sacrifice. It is therefore very clear that activism performed to avoid ethnoracial displacement is very normal and adaptive, and is entirely justified by a rational analysis. Indeed, it is multicultural surrender which is pathological and abnormal.

What about the intra-European situation? What are the genetic costs of intraracial immigration and displacement? In general, the trends are, as expected, that
Europeans share more genetic kinship with other Europeans than with nonEuropeans, Europe being, as Salter states: "a generally racially homogenous
region." Of course, within Europe, geographically close populations tend to be
even more similar, by another order of magnitude. Germans and Swiss are
closely related, so it would take 125 Swiss immigrants to reduce a German's
genetic interests by "one child." If we continue to look at Germans, we can see
that the same effect will occur with 83.7 Belgians, 78.5 Dutch or Danish, 57.2
Englishmen, 33.3 Italians, 18.5 Spaniards, or 9.1 Greeks. In summary, Salter
states: "Immigration between ethnies of the same race can still be maladaptive for
the receiving population, but the threshold is typically 10 to 100 times that of
inter-racial immigration."

Salter notes that Americans of European descent are a declining proportion of that nation's population, due to immigration and other factors, and that this is a clear and serious diminishment of the ethnic genetic interests of Euro-Americans. In addition, this problem is being exacerbated by racial miscegenation, which may actually benefit the genetic interests of the non-White migrants coming to America, for they are diluting the native gene pool while the gene pools of their own racially exclusive homelands remain intact. In fact, Salter notes that the genetic damage done by the post-1965 immigration to America "has decreased white genetic interests more than all American war losses combined." What Salter observes is that white Americans have, in the name of multiculturalism, engaged in a "unilateral withdrawal from ethnic competition," with devastating results for their genetic interests.

What does Salter suggest as a possible solution? Not surprisingly he brings up the possibility of ethnoracial states, a form of "universal nationalism" in which each ethnic state makes shared ethnicity a requirement for citizenship, and where the state "unambiguously serves the ethnic interests of the majority." This is opposed to the current fad of wave-the-flag "constitutional patriotism" (the nation as an "idea"). Salter rightly sees such raceless 'patriotic" schemes as "a formula for reconciling ethnic majorities to their own demise," while serving minority and elite interests. Thus, such ethnoracial state models are the only real way for Western majorities to promote their ethnic interests in America, Europe, and Australia. In general, for this plan to work, both internal (class) and external (nation vs. nation) conflicts would need to be equitably resolved to make way for viable ethnoracial states. But the costs would be worth the result, in the form of states which truly represent the Salter's vision of ethnic-based "universal interests of their populations. nationalism" is a vision of ethnic and racial progress of great potential benefit.

Salter's work can be summarized as follows. Ethnies (and races) are large reservoirs of genetic interest for members of these groups. Ethnic genetic interests are thus real and of fundamental importance. Genetic kinship can be

quantitated and the harm to any person's (or group's) ethnic genetic interests resulting from alien immigration can be calculated. Immigration of even closely related groups has a negative impact on genetic interests; this detrimental influence increases rapidly with increased genetic distance between the immigrant and native populations. Putting this detrimental impact in the form of "child equivalents" is a particularly powerful way of demonstrating these effects. Peoples of European descent are being ill-served, on a fundamental, genetic level, by non-European immigration and the ideology of multiculturalism. The formation of ethnic-based national states is the most efficient way of safeguarding ethnic genetic interests.

We can then ask how the concepts behind ethnic genetic interests can be incorporated into a reasonable approach to pro-white, pro-western activism.

If we take as an example a German activist, at first glance it would seem best that he invest all his time and energy in promoting specific German ethnic interests, or perhaps the interests of Germans and other Germanic Europeans. However, two points can be made.

First, this German activist also shares, to varying degrees, significant genetic kinship with non-German European ethnies; thus, he would have some degree of ethnic genetic interest in those peoples as well. If Germans survive, but all other persons of European descent became extinct, this German activist would suffer a large loss of genetic interest.

Second, serious practical questions also come to the fore. Could Germans make it alone? If Germany obtained a nationalist government, but the rest of the white world was still in the throes of liberal multiracialism, could this German ethno-state long survive? Furthermore, isn't it possible that non-Germanic persons of European descent could make important contributions to German ethnic survival, either as part of a general European program, or as part of specific assistance to German nationalists? Thus, it would seem that a German activist would be well served by balancing his more narrow German-specific approach with a broader pan-European approach. But how much investment should be put into each type of activism? How much ethnic-specific activism and how much broader pan-racial activism should be performed? Is there any ideological framework which could help with these decisions? Could such a framework also assist in helping Euro-Americans of various ethnic backgrounds balance out their ethnic genetic interests?

IDEOLOGY OF ETHNICITY

As we shall see, pan-European activism, properly constructed, can be a powerful methodology for maximizing the ethnic genetic (as well as overall) interests of both the European peoples as a whole, and of the more specific ethnic groups which make up this whole. We will also examine some of the basic ideological concepts that can be incorporated by a pan-European movement for the promotion of both broad-based Western interests, as well as narrower ethnic concerns.

What needs to be developed is an "ideology of ethnicity," an ideological framework in which ethnic concerns, ethnic genetic interests, and the work of Dr. Salter are considered the foundation upon which the activist structure is built. Ethnic concerns absolutely must be considered in addition to general racial concerns. Indeed, the overall survival of whites would be cold comfort to a German or Italian or Russian activist if the particular ethny of that activist were greatly diminished or completely eliminated. On the other hand, Euroethnic activists must also consider that they do indeed have genetic, and other, interests in European ethnies besides their own, albeit at variable and more diffuse levels. Thus, both the whole (white European race) and the parts of the whole (various European ethnies) are important. Therefore, an ideology of ethnicity would assist in informing activists and groups as to what strategies to pursue: those which maximize ethnoracial interests by properly balancing both the narrower (ethnic) and broader (racial) perspectives. Such avenues of activism must incorporate provisions for ethnic as well as racial survival.

An "ideology of ethnicity" can tell us not only what we should do, but what we absolutely must *not* do. For example, an individual who promotes multiracialism (e.g., of Europeans and non-Europeans) for someone else's ethny is promoting the genetic equivalent of mass murder (genocide). An individual who advocates splitting up someone else's ethny is promoting the break-up of a family unit on a mass scale; the damage done to that ethny is also the genetic equivalent of mass murder. Thus it is obvious that any such proposals, regardless of whether they originate from the "anti-racist left" or the "racialist right," must be absolutely eschewed. In summary, an ideology of ethnicity would bring issues of ethnic genetic interests to the forefront of debate, and begin a process in which ethnic concerns become an important part of movement activism. Therefore, the development of an ideology promoting ethnic genetic interests and racial preservation is of paramount importance for pro-white activism.

In addition to a focus on the ethny, there are solid reasons to also emphasize a broader, more "pan-racial" view of ethnic interests. Just as someone can pursue their genetic interests by helping more distantly related co-ethnics in addition to their immediate family, so can genetic interests be promoted by helping ethnic groups which are relatively genetically related to oneself, albeit more genetically distant than are more closely related ethnies. Given the degree of genetic relatedness among Europeans, a Swede could further bolster his genetic fitness by helping Spaniards, and an Italian could further improve his genetic fitness by helping Norwegians—as long, of course, as this more broadbased support does not impair the more ethnic narrow concerns. Time, money, and energy have to be invested in such a way as to provide maximal returns of ethnic genetic interest, given different situations.

A practical reason to take a broader approach is that a narrower approach may not be effective in many circumstances. Some European ethnic groups, especially in their homelands of Europe, have population bases smaller than those of big cities in larger, more densely populated nations. It would be very difficult for these small European populations, acting alone, to make an impact on world historical issues. Even European populations many times larger, and even subracial groupings of European groups, are still numerically dwarfed by the populations of emerging powers such as China, India, and the Islamic world.

In a future likely to be dominated by massive ethno-racial power blocs, persons of European descent need to maximize their power base, while at the same time preserving their more specific ethnic and national interests. In addition, pan-European cooperation, by increasing the pool of competent activists and other human and material resources, and by focusing these resources where they can do the most good, can significantly enhance the efficacy of ethnoracial activism. There is no logical reason for a Swedish activist to refuse assistance from a Spanish activist, or vice versa, as long as both sides adhere to an "ideology of ethnicity" that respects their more specific ethnic interests. It must also be noted that a nationalist victory in only one or a few white nations would probably not be stable; in the long run if the rest of the white world is liberal and "multicultural," the nationalist states will be in constant danger. The most stable situation for any white racial nationalist would be to see his ethny preserved in the context of broad racial survival. For example, a German Germany in a European Europe would be the most stable situation for German ethnic survival; a German Germany in a non-white Europe would be untenable. How then to best balance narrower with broader activist concerns? Studying the work of Frank Salter, as well as that of Kevin MacDonald,³ can we discern an answer to this question?

One way to look at this problem is to view pan-European activism as concentric circles of ethnic interests. The primary interest would be genetic kinship. However, we may consider that phenotypic, cultural, and other concerns will also be very important in influencing rankings of groups within the circles. For example, some Slavic groups (e.g., Russians and "Yugoslavs"/Serbs) have a greater ethnic affinity than what would be predicted solely from genetic kinship distance. Thus, non-biological ethnic factors must be considered, although the genetic interests would always be the primary, underlying, fundamental consideration.

At the core of these concentric circles is the ethny or ethnies with which the individual most closely identifies, to which ethnic kinship is greatest. Outside of this circle would be other larger, more diffuse circles of genetic, phenotypic, and cultural ethnic interest, including various closely related ethnic groupings. In most cases, there would be a general trend for the outer circles to be more genetically distant from the inner circles and from the central ethnic core, even when taking non-biological factors into account. The final, outermost circle would encompass all of the European peoples as a whole, given that Europeans have more genetic kinship with other Europeans than with members of other races, and also share, to varying degrees, similarities of phenotype, culture, ancestries, and history. These various concentric circles would overlap across

the wide spectrum of European ethnies, with the core ethnies being completely separate entities, and the outer shell of general European interests being held in common.

Thus, a Swedish activist would put priority on assisting Swedes as his inner core ethnic interest, followed closely by other peoples of Scandinavian descent. A broader core would be Northwest Europeans, particularly Germanics, and the broadest circle would include all peoples of European descent. A Russian would have as his inner core Russians, followed by a broader core of Ukrainian, Polish, and White Russian Slavs, followed by other Slavs and other related groups, and then general Europeans. An Italian would have an Italian inner core, a "Latin"/Southern European broader core, an even broader South/ Central European circle, with again, all Europeans as the broadest circle of ethnoracial interest. A person of mixed European ethnic ancestry could have as his inner core of interests those ethnic groups from which he is descended, followed by an outer circle of other related groups, then general Europeans, etc. The pattern is clear. How to divide one's energy and attention among these circles or cores of interest would depend on the particular situation. As long as investing energy in the outer cores of interest does not deflect from the interests of the inner cores, then there is really no fundamental conflict. In many cases, inner core ethnic interests can be complementary to broader European interests, and both can be pursued at the same time. In cases where there is a conflict, the needs of the innermost cores should predominate and be given maximal attention and priority.

Given the dangerous world historical situation the overall European racial group finds itself in, it is in the interest of all Euro-ethnic parties to find common ground to resolve conflicts in a reasonable manner. In other words, if the propagation of intra-European ethnic conflict endangers the survival of all European ethnic groups, then such conflict endangers the narrow core interests as well as the broader interests. Thus, settling these conflicts in an expedient and rational fashion is beneficial to all. Some aspects of "game theory," which is out of the scope of this essay, may apply, in which all participants attempt to find a solution that maximizes the interests of all parties. Such an approach would be rational given European genetic kinship. Unfortunately, ethnic conflicts sometimes become so intense that they begin to become less rational, a trend that peoples of European descent need to avoid as they attempt to pursue their varied interests.

What about a specific ethnic example? Let us assume a Spanish activist who holds to the idea of "a Spanish Spain in a European Europe." If Swedish nationalists were in a position to help achieve Spanish ethnic goals, this Spanish activist could boost his genetic interests by helping the Swedes. However, in order for this to be truly adaptive for the Spaniard, the Swedes would have to be willing to reciprocate if the situation was reversed, and the Swedes could also need to share the attitude that "every European people has the right to

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exist." If, however, the Swedes were extreme Nordicists and planned to dump non-whites living in Sweden onto "the inferior non-Nordic Spaniards," it would not be in the interests of a Spanish activist to support those Swedes.

Likewise, if a Spaniard had the idea that his countrymen should have the right to migrate to Scandinavia and displace Swedes, then such a person would not be a useful associate for a Swedish ethnic-racial nationalist. The obvious requirements of reciprocity and granting the right of survival to others are fundamental here. Mutual respect for the ethnic interests of other persons of European descent, incorporation of an ideology of ethnicity and concentric circles of interest, and reciprocal assistance are the key components that would make pan-European activism a powerful and effective vehicle for achieving both narrower ethnic and broader racial goals.

PAN-EUROPEAN DIASPORA

In his manuscript, Salter recommends ethno-states as a solution to the "genetic fitness problem" faced by Western majorities threatened by replacement immigration. Salter also states a need for balance between the "smaller is better" rationale (closer genetic kinship) and the "bigger is better" rationale (economic and military power to defend ethnic interests). How can these issues be resolved?

In theory, this need not be a problem in a Europe in which ethnic nationalists have achieved their goals. The nation-states of Europe are in general already built around ethnic identity, or, in those cases in which certain European nations can be viewed as really multi-ethnic, further separation into more ethnically homogenous units could be easily achieved. Arrangements could be made in which the various nation-states maintain their local autonomy and control immigration and their population make-up. National/ethnic hostilities and border problems between European states would need to be resolved in a fair and peaceful manner to avoid the sort of fratricidal bloodshed which would reduce European genetic fitness and further decrease the representation of European genes and phenotypes in the world. European ethno-states, while maintaining pure local autonomy and ethnic homogeneity, could form a Euro-racial union (along with diaspora European ethno-states abroad) for the purposes of military/economic competition with non-Western power blocs.

The situation in the European diaspora, particularly in America, is more complex. America is home to a wide variety of European ethnic groups, often living among each other, and often intermarrying to a considerable extent. In general, these groups tend to get along well at the present time. Perhaps the general relatedness of these groups, the intermarriage which has already taken place among them and which is continuing, as well as alliances forged through the future ethnic struggles, will prevent intra-European ethnic

conflicts from becoming a problem on the American continent. However, intraracial ethnic groups do have real interests. Thus, one cannot dismiss the possibility that some Euro-Americans may feel a need to assert more specific and narrow ethnic needs, especially if the overall threats to racial survival have been successfully dealt with. As regards these narrower concerns, we can ask: under what circumstances in this endeavor may a Euro-American group feel that a situation is maladaptive, and therefore consider ethnic separation? One can postulate that a group (or groups) in America will be concerned that in the event of a pan-European victory—defined as ensuring the continued existence of all peoples of European descent, most likely through racial separatism—they would lose their unique ethnic/genetic identities through submergence within the larger racial group. The concerns may be with being outbred, and/or with losing genetic (or phenotypic) distinctiveness through mixing with other European ethnic strains. Of course, these concerns may be voiced in ways other than reductive genetic arguments; for example, rather than talking about loss of genetic identity the talk may instead be about loss of a particular phenotype, loss of culture, loss of a "way of life," loss of a general "identity," etc., although in the ultimate analysis these comments are usually the surface manifestations of underlying genetic concerns. To meet these concerns, reasonable ethnic compromises are required to meet the needs of all Euro-American groups—including people of mixed European ethnicity—without coercion or hostility. Given that a degree of genetic kinship runs through all of these groups, and given the need to present a solid front to those who belong to other genetic fitness "concentrates" (Asians, etc.), ethnic concerns can be and should be dealt with in a calm and equitable manner. One can imagine several scenarios for Euro-Americans:

First, a Euro-American state could be made up of all Euro-Americans (or at least those who wish to live in such a state), fully separate from non-Europeans. Even in this situation, one can imagine that a heightened sense of ethnicity and race may promote the formation of various, more homogenous ethnocommunities within such a state.

Second, if the first option fails to meet the ethnic interests of particular Euro-American ethnies, then one can imagine a number of separate, fully independent Euro-American states, each more genetically homogenous than would be a general Euro-American state. Each state would contain one or several more closely related ethnies. Persons of mixed Euro-ethnic descent would live in that state which seems to best meet their own ethnic interests based on their specific ancestral make-up. Analogous to the European situation, it would be reasonable for these Euro-American states to form alliances for protection against non-European power blocs. In theory, relations between these states should be like relations between family

members living in separate households; everyone has their own space, but shares considerable genetic interests with each other and thus works together to promote "the common family good."

Third, the "best of both worlds option," could be a single Euro-American state which is "federated": composed of a number of smaller, locally autonomous units of more concentrated ethnic similarity. This option would have the strength of a large single state, while still allowing more genetically homogeneous Euro-American populations to cluster together.

Another alternative, and one that perhaps allows people the greatest choice for determining their best fitness options, is to combine options one and two: have both a general Euro-American state (ideal for those of mixed European ancestry and/or those who have married across Euro-ethnic genetic cluster lines) together with smaller, more homogenous Euro-American ethno-states for those persons and groups who feel their interests are not most efficiently served in a larger Euro-American state. All these states can be allied as discussed above. There are of course other alternatives, but the key is to allow all peoples of European descent the opportunity to optimize their ethnic interests in a fair and reasonable manner. All peoples of European descent must be given the option of separating themselves from non-Europeans, and intra-European separation must be guaranteed for those who believe their interests lie in even greater homogeneity. Again, as long as all of this is dealt with rationally, and without hurting general European interests in competition with other groups, then broad genetic fitness interests need not be sacrificed for narrower interests, or vice versa. Of course, non-Europeans can also set up whatever types of states they wish, to promote their own interests, but the European/non-European separation must be strictly adhered to.

What kinds of policies could a European ethno-state practice, other than the obvious policy of separatism? One could expect that an ethno-state would promote fertility, values that strengthen the family, as well as eugenics. Eugenics would raise the genetic quality of the group and make them more formidable competitors with other groups, hence raising fitness. On a more individual level, picking as one's mate someone of good genetic quality increases the chances of having children of high quality, enhancing their ability to compete and reproduce, and thus increasing genetic fitness.

In a hypothetical multiethnic European state (e.g., a Euro-American state), one may need to balance issues of genetic similarity and eugenic quality in maximizing genetic fitness in mating choice. For example, it may make more sense to marry an ethnically different genius of good health (phenotypes representing both good genes and a higher probability of producing competitive offspring) than a co-ethnic who is a sickly retardate. On the other hand, given a choice of relatively equal quality, the co-ethnic would be the sounder choice from the standpoint of genetic fitness and paternal kinship with future children. Of course, in reality, choices are rarely this easy, and people

rarely actually calculate, in a conscious sense, the inclusive fitness or genetic consequences of mating choice, although they well may do so indirectly by selecting for certain phenotypic markers of relatedness and fitness. This is of course not a comprehensive list of options, but a summary of examples that easily come to mind.

What to do now? We do not know when and if such ethno-states can be created. Thus we can ask: what to do now, as regards pan-European ethnic interests, under the current conditions of living in multiracial, multicultural states? Actually, many of the aforementioned methodologies can still apply, as demonstrated by the examples of the Jews, who have successfully defended their genetic ethnic interests for centuries as minorities in a varying array of A degree of separatism can be sought after—political and nations. geographical separatism preferred—but if that is not possible, then social separatism to the extent possible to achieve the goal of genetic separatism and survival is absolutely required. Fertility of the "in-group" can be bolstered, eugenic mating practiced, and various means of increasing genetic fitness pursued. Organization is an effective means of pooling resources for the common ethnic good, boosting inclusive fitness; thus one can envision groupserving, more collectivist structures being established to serve European ethnic interests (see: Kevin MacDonald's The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements, Praeger: 1998, Westport, CT).

Ultimately, we will need our own communities, our own schools and daycare centers, our own educational materials for our children, our own social organizations for both welfare and entertainment, and our own political structures. It is paramount that we get more involved in politics, not only to provide political "cover" and protection for our other pursuits but also for propaganda and recruitment, as well as a stimulus for organization and to shake up the stagnant, anti-white status quo. While I do not believe that the electoral process alone holds the key to victory, if we can get to the point where viable and respectable political candidates speak openly about the need for white separatism, we would have turned the corner in our attempt to persuade whites of the legitimacy of pursuing their ethnoracial interests. We also need to do what the left did in the 1960s and 1970s, that is, "march through the institutions," so that pro-white individuals are in positions to help the movement grow, and provide the political and social cover for our varied pursuits. There may well be a significant number of effective strategies which can be employed by peoples of European descent, provided they realize they have genetic ethnic interests to defend.

In order to achieve any of the aforementioned goals it will require a substantial paradigm shift in the mentality of the so-called racial-nationalist "movement." An equitable pan-Europeanism, built on an "ideology of ethnicity" and "concentric circles of interest," needs to replace the more divisive

ideas currently extant. In his manuscript, Salter talked about "transparency of management" being a requirement for ethno-states; I believe such transparency is also just as required in the "movement." Leaders and organizations who are vague as regards what Euro-ethnies they do or do not represent and who are contradictory as to what is their actual "ingroup" need to be replaced by those who are honestly "transparent" on such questions. After all, if a person of group x supports an organization which is really hostile to the ethnic genetic interests of that group, this would be a significant loss of ethnic genetic interest for the activist. Comments such as "these issues will be resolved after a total white victory" are completely inappropriate; people need to know now where to invest their activist energies, and they need to know now where and how their specific ethnic genetic interests will be met.

As stated above, "total white survival" will not meet the ethnic interests of a person or group if their specific ethny or ethnies of ancestry are diminished or destroyed. These issues need to be resolved, and the best way to do so is via the ideological acceptance of everyone's ethnic interests, properly balanced against the overall interests of the race.

Another thing that needs to become transparent is hypocrisy vs. sincerity. Those who preach ingroup separatism coupled with outgroup multiracialism (hypocrisy), particularly when both ingroup and outgroup are ethnically European, must be eschewed in favor of those who promote the idea of ethnic interests for all members of the greater race (sincerity). Of course, an interest in specific ethnies must not eclipse the need for cooperation toward overall racial survival; the point to be stressed again and again is the need for balance. And, in the long run, the only way to find the required balance is through transparent honesty and mutual ethnoracial respect. It is through all of these ways of looking at activism that a true and productive pan-European movement will emerge.

It is likely that the twenty-first century will be the crucial one in deciding whether peoples of European descent will continue as genetic ethnic entities, and the issues discussed in this essay are likely to be fundamental in deciding this future.

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NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS BETWEEN NINE GEOGRAPHICAL RACES NEEDED TO REDUCE THE ETHNIC

GENETIC INTEREST OF A RANDOM NATIVE BY THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE CHILD

Immigrants/host	AFR	NEC	EUC	NEA	ANE	AME	SEA	PAI
A.C.								
Africans	1.3							
Non-Euro Caucasoids	1.1	8.5						
European Caucasoids	1.0	2.3	1.7					
Arctic Northeast Asians	1.0	2.1	2.0	3.1				
Amerindians	0.9	1.7	1.6	2.0	2.5			
Southeast Asians	0.9	1.7	1.4	2.4	1.6	1.3		
Pacific Islanders	0.9	1.4	1.3	2.1	1.4	1.1	3.2	
New Guineans & Australia	ns 0.9	1.4	1.3	2.1	1.6	1.2	1.4	1.9
	AFR	NEC	EUC	NEA	ANE	AME	SEA	PAI

END NOTES

- 1. "Estimating Ethnic Genetic Interests: Is It Adaptive to Resist Replacement Migration?" *Population and Environment* 24, no. 2 (November 2002), pp. 111-140. A more detailed review, by the current author, of this specific paper was published in *American Renaissance* 14, no. 2 (February 2003) www.amren.com.
- 2. L. L. Cavalli-Sforza, P. Menozzi, and A. Piazza, *The History and Geography of Human Genes* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
- 3. Kevin MacDonald, "An Integrative Evolutionary Perspective on Ethnicity," paper presented at the Meeting of the Association of Politics and the Life Sciences, Washington, D.C., September 3, 2000.