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EDITOR'S NOTE

A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES THE OCCIDENTAL QUARTERLY

The following "Statement of Principles" summarizes the core beliefs and values that encompass the editorial outlook of The Occidental Quarterly. The "Statement" below will appear in subsequent issues of TOQ.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union major fissures have appeared in what is usually called "American conservatism." Chief among these is the conflict between "paleoconservatism" and "neoconservatism." Now a new, third school is emerging from the former. *The Occidental Quarterly* is an expression of that school and its exponents. To a greater or lesser degree, this constellation of ideas adheres to at least the following commitments:

1. The West is a cultural compound of our Classical, Christian, and Germanic past.

2. Race informs culture; it is the necessary precondition for cultural identity and integrity. In 1950 whites represented 30 percent of the world's population. If current trends persist, this number will plummet to 8 percent by 2050. In the United States, whites are projected to become a minority of the national population within fifty years. The result will impoverish not only their descendants but the world in general, and will jeopardize the civilization and free governments that whites have created.

3. America is part of the West and, as both a political and cultural order, is not "based on a creed" or "derived from a proposition." America is neither a "universal nation" nor an "experiment" concocted by ideologues. America is the unique and irreplaceable product of centuries of specific racial, historical, and cultural identities. America and its cultural and political identity will endure only so long as the identities that created it and sustain it endure, and when they die, America will die. We do not wish this to happen and will work to ensure it does not.

4. The European identity of the United States and its people should be maintained. Immigration into the United States should be restricted to selected people of European ancestry.

5. The perfectibility, let alone the equality, of man is not possible and is not a legitimate political aspiration. Political efforts to achieve or enforce perfectibility and equality invariably demand an unacceptable degree of coercion and result in unnecessary and unjust pain, suffering, and social disorder.

6. The political and personal freedoms of the American order—including our rights of free expression and association—are in jeopardy from ethnic and ideological enemies and must be preserved.

7. Federal decentralization and territorial separation should be recognized as legitimate and humane means of preventing and resolving divisive social, ethnic, and racial conflicts.

8. The quality of life rather than constant and perpetual increase in the material standard of living should be the emphasis of social and economic policy and public concern.

9. Imperial expansion, military crusades, and similar adventures to promote “global democracy” and “human rights” should be rejected.

10. The intervention of foreign states (Israel and Mexico, as well as others) in the internal politics and decision-making of the American people must be rejected.

The Editors and Publisher

November 11, 2003

WHO ARE THE WAR AGITATORS?

THE FIGHT FOR AN INDEPENDENT DESTINY AND AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN WORLD WAR II

CHARLES A. LINDBERGH

Col. Charles Lindbergh remains, for many Americans, one of the nation's greatest heroes and patriots. A staunch opponent of America's entry into World War II, he became one of the most popular speakers at America First Committee gatherings across the country, addressing crowds of his concerned countrymen numerous enough to fill Madison Square Garden in New York City and Soldier Field in Chicago.

*On September 11, 1941, Col. Lindbergh gave perhaps his most provocative speech to an America First Committee rally in Des Moines, Iowa. The central focus of this talk was a marked departure from his other addresses, for it identified three primary interest groups that were pressuring America into war: the British, Jewish organizations, and the Roosevelt administration. As official biographer A. Scott Berg points out in *Lindbergh*:*

Lindbergh had long told himself that the moment American entry into the war seemed inevitable, he would drop a bombshell. He would publicly name "the groups that were most powerful and effective in pushing the United States toward involvement in the war." Having agreed to speak at another America First meeting, in Des Moines, he realized his engagement there would provide that moment. He penciled draft after draft of his most provocative speech yet, one bluntly titled, "Who Are the War Agitators?"¹

*The reaction to Lindbergh's speech and the fallout that was to beset the America First Committee are well documented in Ruth Sarles's *A Story of America First* (edited by Bill Kaufman), reviewed elsewhere in this issue of TOQ. Berg rightly lends the speech some much-needed perspective:*

In the end, Lindbergh had reduced his comments about the Jews to three paragraphs. They were the only public comments he ever made during the Great Debate in which he mentioned them. Although he felt he was showing his sympathy for a long-persecuted tribe, each additional sentence would be used to burn the brand of anti-Semite deeper into his public persona....

Lindbergh had bent over backward to be kind about the Jews; but in suggesting the American Jews were "other" people and that their interests were "not American," he implied exclusion, thus undermining the very foundation of the United States.²

*The distorted image of Lindbergh that lingers is of a man who was rabidly anti-Semitic. Writers such as Gabriel Schoenfeld have fed this misperception over the years. In his recently published book, *Jude: The Return of Anti-Semitism*, Schoenfeld argues:*

This burgeoning movement received a powerful boost from the hero Charles Lindbergh, who, having become a prominent isolationist and a leading figure in the America First Committee, described the Jews as a sinister force pushing the U.S. into war...³

In the fourth of our "Classics Corner" series, we reprint Lindbergh's Des Moines, Iowa, speech so that the reader can decide whether or not Lindbergh's emphasis on Jewish involvement toward intervention can correctly be viewed as a "sinister force." Lindbergh's warning against U.S. military intervention, when the nation's best interests take a backseat to special interests, remains equally valid today given the well-documented, high-pressure leverage of neoconservative influence on the Bush administration's decision to preemptively invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power under the guise of protecting the U.S. against future acts of terrorism.

It is now two years since this latest European war began. From that day in September 1939, until the present moment, there has been an ever-increasing effort to force the United States into the conflict. That effort has been carried on by foreign interests and by a small minority of our own people, but it has been so successful that, today, our country stands on the verge of war.

At this time, as the war is about to enter its third winter, it seems appropriate to review the circumstances that have led us to our present position. Why are we on the verge of war? Was it necessary for us to become so deeply involved? Who is responsible for changing our national policy from one of neutrality and independence to one of entanglement in European affairs?

Personally, I believe there is no better argument against our intervention than a study of the causes and developments of the present war. I have often said that if the true facts and issues were placed before the American people, there would be no danger of our involvement.

Here I would like to point out to you a fundamental difference between the groups who advocate foreign war and those who believe in an independent destiny for America. If you will look back over the record you will find that those of us who oppose intervention have constantly tried to clarify facts and issues; while the interventionists have tried to hide facts and confuse issues.

We ask you to read what we said last month, last year, and even before the war began. Our record is open and clear, and we are proud of it. We have not led you on by subterfuge and propaganda. We have not resorted to "steps short of" anything in order to take the American people where they did not want to go. What we said before the elections we say "again, and again, and again" today. And we will not tell you tomorrow that it was "just campaign oratory."

Have you ever heard an interventionist, or a British agent, or a member of the administration in Washington, ask you to go back and study a record of what they have said since the war started? Are these self-styled defenders of

democracy willing to put the issue of war to a vote of our people? Do you find these crusaders for foreign freedoms advocating the freedom of speech, or the removal of censorship here in our own country?

The subterfuge and propaganda that exist in our country is obvious on every side. Tonight I shall try to pierce through a portion of it to the naked facts which lie beneath.

When this war started in Europe, it was clear that the American people were solidly opposed to entering it. Why shouldn't we be? We had the best defensive position in the world; we had a tradition of independence from Europe; and the one time we did take part in a European war left European problems unsolved, and debts to America unpaid.

National polls showed that when England and France declared war on Germany in 1939, less than 10 percent of our population favored a similar course for America.

But there were various groups of people here and abroad whose interests and beliefs necessitated the involvement of the United States in the war. I shall point out some of these groups tonight, and outline their methods of procedure. In doing this, I must speak with utmost frankness, for in order to counteract their efforts, we must know exactly who they are.

The three most important groups who have been pressing this country toward war are the British, the Jewish and the Roosevelt administration. Behind these groups, but of lesser importance, are a number of capitalists, Anglophiles, and intellectuals who believe that their future and the future of mankind, depends upon the domination of the British empire.

Add to these the communistic groups who were opposed to intervention until a few weeks ago, and I believe I have named the major war agitators, not those sincere but misguided men and women who, confused by misinformation and frightened by propaganda, follow the lead of the war agitators.

As I have said, these war agitators comprise only a small minority of our people; but they control a tremendous influence.

Against the determination of the American people to stay out of war, they have marshaled the power of their propaganda, their money, and their patronage.

Let us consider these groups one at a time. First, the British. It is obvious and perfectly understandable that Great Britain wants the United States in the war on her side. England is now in a desperate position. Her population is not large enough, and her armies are not strong enough to invade the continent of Europe and win the war she declared against Germany. Her geographical position is such that she cannot win the war by the use of aviation alone, regardless of how many planes we send her. Even if America entered the war it is improbable that the Allied armies could invade Europe and overcome the Axis powers.

But one thing is certain. If England can draw this country into the war she can shift to our shoulders a large portion of the responsibility for waging it, and for paying its cost. As you all know, we were left with the debts of the last European war and unless we are more cautious in the future than we have been in the past we will be left with the debts of the present one.

If it were not for her hope that she can make us responsible for the war financially, as well as militarily, I believe England would have negotiated a peace in Europe many months ago, and be better off for doing so.

England has devoted and will continue to devote every effort to get us into the war. We know that she spent huge sums of money in this country during the last war in order to involve us. Englishmen have written books about the cleverness of its use. We know that England is spending great sums of money for propaganda in America during the present war.

If we were Englishmen we would do the same. But our interest is first in America and, as Americans, it is essential for us to realize the effort that British interests are making to draw us into their war.

The second major group mentioned is the Jewish. It is not difficult to understand why Jewish people desire the overthrow of Nazi Germany. The persecution they suffered in Germany would be sufficient to make bitter enemies of any race. No person with a sense of the dignity of mankind can condone the persecution of the Jewish race in Germany. But no person of honesty and vision can look on their pro-war policy here today without seeing the dangers involved in such a policy both for us and them.

Instead of agitating for war, the Jewish groups in this country should be opposing it in every possible way, for they will be among the first to feel its consequences. Tolerance is a virtue that depends upon peace and strength. History shows that it cannot survive war and devastation. A few farsighted Jewish people realize this and stand opposed to intervention. But the majority still do not. Their greatest danger to this country lies in their large ownership and influence in our motion pictures, our press, and our government.

I am not attacking either the Jewish or the British people. Both races, I admire. But I am saying that the leaders of both the British and the Jewish races, for reasons which are as understandable from their viewpoint as they are inadvisable from ours, for reasons which are not American, wish to involve us in the war. We cannot blame them for looking out for what they believe to be their own interests, but we also must look out for ours. We cannot allow the natural passions and prejudices of other peoples to lead our country to destruction.

The Roosevelt administration is the third powerful group which has been carrying this country toward war. Its members have used the war emergency to obtain a third presidential term for the first time in American history. They have used the war to add unlimited billions to a debt which was already the

highest we had ever known. And they have used the war to justify the restrictions of congressional power, and the assumption of dictatorial procedures on the part of the president and his appointees.

The power of the Roosevelt administration depends upon the maintenance of a wartime emergency. The prestige of the Roosevelt administration depends upon the success of Great Britain to whom the President attached his political future at a time when most people thought that England and France would easily win the war. The danger of the Roosevelt administration lies in its subterfuge. While its members have promised us peace they have led us to war heedless of the platform upon which they were elected.

In selecting these three groups as the major agitators for war, I have included only those whose support is essential to the war party. If any one of these groups—the British, the Jewish, or the administration—stops agitating for war, I believe there will be little danger of our involvement. I do not believe that any two of them are powerful enough to carry this country to war without the support of the third. And to these three, as I have said, all other war groups are of secondary importance.

When hostilities commenced in Europe, in 1939, it was realized by these groups that the American people had no intention of entering the war. They knew it would be worse than useless to ask us for a declaration of war at that time. But they believed that this country could be enticed into the war in very much that same way we were enticed into the last one. They planned, first, to prepare the United States for foreign war under the guise of American defense; second, to involve us in the war, step by step, without our realization; third, to create a series of incidents which would force us into the actual conflict. These plans were, of course, to be covered and assisted by the full power of their propaganda.

Out theaters soon became filled with plays portraying the glory of war. Newsreels lost all semblance of objectivity. Newspapers and magazines began to lose advertising if they carried antiwar articles. A smear campaign was instituted against individuals who opposed intervention. The terms fifth columnist, traitor, Nazi, anti-Semitic, were thrown ceaselessly at any one who dared to suggest that it was not to the best interests of the United States to enter the war.

Men lost their jobs if they were frankly antiwar. Many others dared no longer to speak. Before long, lecture halls that were open to advocates of war were closed to speakers who opposed it. A fear campaign was inaugurated. We were told that aviation, which has held the British fleet off the continent of Europe, made America more vulnerable than ever before to invasion. Propaganda was in full swing.

There was no difficulty in obtaining billions of dollars for arms under the guise of defending America. Our people stood united on a program of defense. Congress passed appropriation after appropriation for guns and planes and

battleships, with the approval of the overwhelming majority of our citizens. That a large portion of these appropriations was to be used to build up arms for Europe, we did not learn until later. (That was another step.)

To use a specific example; in 1939 we were told that we should increase our air corps to a total of 5,000 planes. Congress passed the necessary legislation. A few months later, the administration told us that the United States should have at least 50,000 planes for our national safety. But almost as fast as fighting planes were turned out from our factories, they were sent abroad, although our own air corps was in the utmost need of new equipment.

Today, two years after the start of war, the American army has only a few hundred thoroughly modern bombers and fighters, less, in fact, than Germany is able to produce in a single month. Ever since its inception, our arms program has been laid out for the purpose of carrying on the war in Europe far more than for the purpose of building an adequate defense for America.

Now at the same time we were being prepared for a foreign war it was necessary, as I have said, to involve us in the war. This was accomplished under that now famous phrase, "steps short of war." England and France would win if the United States would only repeal its arms embargo and sell munitions for cash, we were told. And then a familiar refrain began, a refrain that marked every step we took toward war for many months... "[T]he best way to defend America and keep out of war," we were told, was "by aiding the Allies."

First, we agreed to sell arms to Europe; next, we agreed to loan arms to Europe; then, we agreed to patrol the ocean for Europe; then, we occupied a European island in the war zone. Now we have reached the verge of war.

The war groups have succeeded in the first of their three major steps into war. The greatest armament program in our history is under way. We have become involved in the war from practically every standpoint except actual shooting. Only the creation of sufficient "incidents" yet remains and you see the first of these already taking place, according to plan—a plan that was never laid before the American people for their approval.

Men and women of Iowa: Only one thing holds this country from war today. That is the rising opposition of the American people. Our system of democracy and representative government is on test today as it has never been before. We are on the verge of a war in which the only victor would be chaos and prostration. We are on the verge of a war for which we are still unprepared, and for which no one has offered a feasible plan for victory—a war which cannot be won without sending our soldiers across the ocean to force a landing on a hostile coast against armies stronger than our own.

We are on the verge of war, but it is not yet too late to stay out. It is not yet too late to show that no amount of money, or propagandage, or patronage, can force a free and independent people into war against its will. It is not yet too late to retrieve and to maintain the independent American destiny that our forefathers established in this new world.

The entire future of America rests upon our shoulders. It depends upon our action, our courage, and our intelligence. If you oppose our intervention in this war, now is the time to make your voice heard. Help us to organize these meetings, and write to your representatives in Washington.

I tell you that the last stronghold of democracy and representative government in this country is in our House of Representatives and our Senate. There we can still make our will known. And if we, the American people, do that, independence and freedom will continue to live among us, and there will be no foreign war.

ENDNOTES

1. A. Scott Berg, *Lindbergh* (London: Macmillan, 1998), 425.
2. *Ibid.*, 426.
3. Gabriel Schoenfeld, *Jude: The Return of Anti-Semitism* (San Francisco: Encounter, 2004), 102.

The Lost Philosopher



The Best of Anthony M. Ludovici

EDITED BY
JOHN V. DAY

In the first decades of the twentieth century, Anthony Mario Ludovici (1882-1971) was one of Britain's most celebrated intellectuals.

One of the first and most accomplished translators of Nietzsche into English and a leading exponent of Nietzsche's thought, Ludovici was also an original philosopher in his own right.

Without a graduate degree or university professorship (indeed, without any need of them), Ludovici went over the heads of academia and directly addressed the educated public, supporting himself entirely by his writings.

In nearly forty books, including eight novels, and dozens of shorter works, Ludovici set forth his views on metaphysics, religion, ethics, politics, economics, the sexes, health, eugenics, art, modern culture, and current events with a clarity, wit, and fearless honesty that made him famous.

After World War II, however, Ludovici fell rapidly into obscurity. Why? Because Ludovici was a passionate, principled defender of aristocracy and conservatism and a fierce, uncompromising critic of egalitarianism in all its manifestations: Christianity, liberalism, Marxism, social-

ism, feminism, multiculturalism, crass commercialism, a debased popular culture, and the denial of biological differences between individuals and races, as well as the envious hobbling of the gifted and the sentimental coddling of the mediocre and botched.

Thanks to this volume, however, the lost philosopher has been found again, and far from seeming antiquated, his ideas are even more radical, relevant, and challenging in our day than in his own.

The Lost Philosopher collects Ludovici's thoughts on nine topics—Religion, Conservatism, Liberalism, Men and Women, Eugenics, Health, Education, Economics, and Art—in the hope that our times might catch up to Ludovici's philosophy.

Praise for *The Lost Philosopher*:

"Of all unjustly ignored authors, Anthony M. Ludovici is certainly the one who today most deserves to be remembered. In his works, as imposing in quantity as in quality, this profoundly original philosopher never ceased to offer opinions on the most various subjects (from religion and education to art, eugenics, and the relations between the sexes) that are perfectly opposed to contemporary 'political correctness.' Even those who will disapprove of his remarks will be able to recognize their prescient character. For collecting in this volume the most significant pages of Ludovici's works, John V. Day without a doubt deserves the gratitude of all free spirits."—Alain de Benoist, author of *On Being a Pagan* (Ultra, 2004)

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TWO MODELS OF WHITE RACIALISM:

A PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION OF A CHANGING MORALITY

GIL CALDWELL

How would white men of previous centuries or even those of earlier decades of the twentieth century view contemporary presentations of the case for racialism? As surprising as it may seem to some, in all probability they would have seen recent racist apologetics as hopelessly infected with many of the central assumptions of multiracialism. This is due in no small measure to the fact that, although it may be possible (albeit rare) to dissent from widely accepted public policies, it is far more difficult to reject the assumed and often unstated philosophical assumptions of the age. This presents racialists with a particularly difficult task. Conceding their opponents' core beliefs before engaging in theoretical battle is akin to wrestling with a handicap: all right for legendary wrestlers like Haystacks or Andre, but poor strategy for lesser men.

For example, in the past half-century we have seen a consistent movement away from the advocacy of segregation (which was always far from "separate but equal" in reality), apartheid, colonialism, and general political disenfranchisement of nonwhites, toward the far less harsh positions of racial separatism (including acceptance of "black nationalism") or the "level playing field" of the libertarian minded.

These latter positions would have seemed curious to white men of earlier times who, by and large, had little philosophical or moral problem with conquest, slavery, imperial domination, economic exploitation or in America's early days, official exclusion of nonwhites and at times non-Christians, from any participation in the legal or governmental process.¹ As George Fredrickson, a critical student of the early Republic's racial attitudes, writes, "In the United States, a true 'Herrenvolk democracy' emerged during the Jacksonian period, when the right to vote was extended to all white males and denied to virtually all blacks, including some who had previously voted under a franchise restricted to property holders."² This was echoed in the post-reconstruction South in the absolute political and social supremacy of whites.³ Even in the North non-whites were routinely excluded from housing, employment, education, and other areas via a host of legal, semi-legal, and informal barriers. In Fredrickson's words, "Emancipation could not be carried to completion because it exceeded the capacity of white Americans—in the North as well as in the South—to think of blacks as genuine equals."⁴

Despite the fact that many in the racist movement see themselves as firmly holding the fort against changing social views on race, this is far from reality. Instead they have recast their views so as to fit comfortably with certain modern notions of universal and reciprocal morality. These notions they have absorbed, probably largely unconsciously, from the general culture.⁵

Even the nether reaches of neo-Nazism are not free of this process. Whereas one finds in the writings of many Hitler sympathizers of the immediate postwar (such as Savitri Devi⁶ and George Lincoln Rockwell⁷) an acknowledgment of the Holocaust but also an advocacy of it or indifference to it, today the neo-Nazi position has completely reformed. Ernst Zundel and similar figures always say that the Holocaust is a "vile lie placed upon the German people." Zundel "refuse(s) to allow the German people [to] go down in history as mass murderers."⁸ Zundel's anonymous biographer relates in *Ernst Zundel, His Struggle, His Life* that "Ernst Zundel vowed in a symbolic act, standing and touching the Wailing Wall in Israel in 1968, that he would lift the blood libel of the Holocaust from the German World War II generation and free their children from the curse that is fraudulently peddled 'Holocaust.'"⁹

Neither Rockwell, Devi, nor many of the SS prisoners the latter encountered during her imprisonment in Germany, had any compunctions of this sort. Even as late as 1980, Professor Revilo Oliver, writing under his frequently used pen name of Ralph Perrier, put forth the older position, albeit with a revisionist twist. "Suppose that the Jews' characteristically big lie were the truth – that the Germans really had made a desperate attempt to rid themselves of their parasites by killing six million of them. If the Germans had done that, what of it? Why should Aryans be concerned about that effort at national sanitation?"¹⁰

The last defenders of racial inequality in Africa, Rhodesia, and South Africa were (unlike their predecessors in the initial postwar period) always at pains to tell the world that their systems were temporary. This is in stark contrast with the earlier leaders.¹¹

Consider the statement of H. F. Verwoerd, South African prime minister from 1958 till 1967: "I wish to state unequivocally that South Africa is a white man's country and that he must remain the master here." Or "On the basis of an inherent superiority, or greater knowledge, or whatever it might be, the European must remain master and leader."¹² On the other hand, the later leaders claimed to be working toward "power sharing" and eventual "equality." This is the constant theme of Ian Smith's autobiographical *The Great Betrayal*. There he describes the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence of November 11, 1965, as one in which "there would be no diminution of African advancement and prosperity." It was all a matter of time. His policy was "to bring the African into government on a basis *acceptable to them*."¹³ The temporary delay toward racial equality was simply "in order to ensure that the people fully understood the complicated democratic system."¹⁴ To Cecil Rhodes and the *Voortrekkers* these sentiments would have been incomprehensible.

FEAR OF DENYING EQUALITY

In short, by advocating either an egalitarian separatism or “level playing field,” many racialists have accepted the fundamental dogmas of their opponents that all men are, by virtue of their humanity, “entitled” to certain political and social “rights.” One must search long and hard in movement literature today to find a clear advocacy of a dual moral standard, differentiating between the in- and out-group, or of the right to wield power and domination over the out-group.¹⁵

The examples of colonialism and expansion are instructive in this regard. A white man of the nineteenth century, be he an Afrikaner *Voortrekker* or an American settler, would not feel the need to explain his invasion and conquest of black or Indian lands and subsequently either exiling the natives or forcing them into subservient status.¹⁶ In the case of the Trekkers of the 1830s Great Britain’s freeing of their native slaves was a major factor in the decision to launch the march to the north. Of course, if things could be done peacefully, that is, if the nonwhites surrendered their land without struggle, they might be treated with some kindness. Often though, even this was not the case.¹⁷

However, after the Second World War, a change came over white racial consciousness. The causes are varied. Certainly widespread revulsion at the crimes attributed to the Nazis played a role. More simply, the Allied victory meant the widespread execution and persecution of racialists in Europe and outlawing of political parties with racist affinities as well as prohibition of racist views. In America the defeat of Nazism and the political and cultural triumph of the Democratic leftism (even among Republicans) made it very difficult for racialists to continue the public expression of their perspectives. Thereafter racialists tended to present supremacy and separatism as good for nonwhites as well as whites. This need to always note that racist policies were always good for all races, although somewhat intended for leftist consumption, was also internalized. Thus, segregation or apartheid was invariably justified as good for blacks and often as desired by them.

In Senator Herman Talmadge’s 1955 *You and Segregation* we read, “Each race has its own culture, its own heritage and its own talents. These are all developed best when the races are not mixed.”¹⁸

And even the more robust 1947 defense of repatriating blacks to Africa, Senator Theodore Bilbo’s *Take Your Choice Separation or Mongrelization*, couldn’t resist a bow to universalism: “Just imagine the degree of happiness and respectability that could be attained in an all Negro government for the black race.”¹⁹

In sum, the popular leftist/universalist notion that all men have moral obligations to all men, even those outside one’s tribe, nation, religion or race, had become incorporated into much of contemporary postwar racist ideology.

Even as this transformation was taking place, other racist thinkers were doubtful whether human conflict could be resolved for the betterment of all in every case. For example, James Burnham, noted conservative philosopher of the postwar period, believed that conflict is often ended only by the assertion of power and authority and that this assertion is not always good for or acceptable to all concerned.

In *Suicide of the West* Burnham wrote:

Disputes among groups, classes and nations can and should be settled by free discussion, negotiation and compromise when – but only when – the disputes range within some common framework of shared ideas and interests. When the disputes arise out of a clash of basic interests and an opposition of basic ideas, as is from time to time inevitably the case, then they cannot be settled by negotiation and compromise but must be resolved by power, coercion and, sometimes, war.²⁰

And, surprising as it may seem today, William F. Buckley Jr. himself advocated the old, racist morality at length in *Up from Liberalism*, calling for depriving Southern blacks of the right to vote. Basing his conclusions upon “the statistics evidencing median cultural advancement of white over Negro,” Buckley reasons that the issue is whether “the claims of civilization supersede those of universal suffrage.” He also argued that blacks would, if given the vote, “use it to levy even further (Negro facilities are for the most part paid for by dollars taxed from whites) against the propertied classes, which is [largely] composed of whites. I believe it is a man’s right to use his political influence to protect his property.”²¹

TWO VIEWS OF RACIALISM AND CONFLICTS BETWEEN THEM

Thus, it emerges that there are, in reality, two philosophies of racial loyalty. The first sees morality as care solely (or at least primarily) for one’s own. This was the view of traditional man. It was most definitely the view of the Old Testament, which called for the expulsion or extermination of the “nations of Canaan” by the Hebrews.²² The Talmud is a vivid example of an in-group morality which is most demanding when discussing moral obligations to Jews. On the other hand it prohibits doing anything for the welfare of others except as a practical means to limit Gentile hatred of Jews.²³ Any kindness or ethical behavior outside the tribe is good only so long as it advances the needs of the tribe. This is in-group morality at its purest.²⁴

This view would find nothing morally wrong with the white man’s conquest of the Indian or the enslavement of the African, and it would certainly see the denial of civil rights to nonwhites as the least any tribe might do to preserve its dominance and identity.²⁵

The more recent expressions of racialism would demand some degree of ethical even-handedness toward all men. They would view it as morally wrong to deprive an out-group, either as individuals or collectivities, of the “right” to

self-determination or the “right” to civil liberties. It is this latter view which lies behind the white racist embrace of Garveyism, the Nation of Islam, and other black-nationalist movements.²⁶ Marcus Garvey, a black-nationalist leader of the 1920s who advocated black return to Africa, has frequently been featured in the pages of racist journals.²⁷ In the late 1980s the “radical” National Front in England published an article by Abdul Wali Muhammad, the then editor of The Nation of Islam’s newspaper, *The Final Call*, which praised the Front and discussed the two group’s similarities. The article quoted Louis Farrakhan as saying that he “respected those who desired to keep their race white, just as we want to keep ours black.”²⁸

However, *Instauration*, a journal of the old racialism, was highly critical of this attempted embrace of black nationalism. The Nation of Islam’s calls for separation were seen as insincere. If they desired to truly live in black lands the opportunity was always there. Thus, *Instauration* saw the organization as simply another effort at agitation and parasitism.

The Black Muslims and the majority of their ethnic brethren – who agree with them and respect them we are told – have a freedom now denied to half the human race, the freedom to emigrate. But, motivated by a desire for the high standard of living provided only by the white man, the collective impulse of Negroes everywhere seems to be, where possible, to seek the very white society, not brown, yellow, or red, that they profess to hate. It is upon this weakness that the Black Muslims and all other Negro movements founder, become doubly ludicrous, and lose the respect of those who observe them.²⁹

In South Africa’s final days this difference was witnessed in the advocacy by the formally pro-apartheid Conservative Party of nothing more than white secession from the unitary majority rule state. On the other hand the HNP (*Herstigte Nasionale Party*), under the late Jaap Marais, insisted to the end and beyond that all proposals and referendums to end white minority rule were inherently “illegal,” as were all future multiracial elections.

Many European nationalist groups have chosen the universalist model of white nationalism in recent decades. The French New Right of Alain de Benoist is certainly a primary and most articulate incarnation of this view.³⁰ Some in this school have even dropped their opposition to non-European immigration, claiming that separate racial and ethnic communities could function, side by side, in the “New France.”³¹

Perhaps it is this fundamental disagreement that may explain the ideological basis of the dispute between the rival British National Party visions of John Tyndall and Nick Griffin in Great Britain at present, as well as many of the earlier ruptures in British nationalism. Griffin had already embraced the notion that “every people should have self-determination in their own lands” during his days in the “official” or “radical” National Front of the late eighties.³² Tyndall, on the other hand, has advocated recolonization of Africa and other parts of the world in his writings.³³

Let us listen to Tyndall for a moment as he states explicitly the tribalist, racial morality view:

It is the natural function of every healthy living organism on this planet to grow, spread, colonise and increase its power. When all the pretty rhetoric of ideology is swept away and we get down to first basics, history can be seen as a chronicle of the rise and fall of states proceeding in accord with nature's rule of survival of the fittest. To acknowledge this is not to say that it should be the only ethical consideration governing our affairs; that would be to reduce man to the level of the animal world. We should, however, take care that our formulation of the complex ethical systems necessary to civilized society should proceed *within*, and not against, that fundamental *truth*.

Again a few pages later the same theme appears: "*power* precedes and establishes every condition for the achievements of the refinements of civilization, culture, decency, humanity and order. These latter things, desirable as they are, must always be regarded as predicates of the first, never substitutes for it."³⁴

It is illustrative to contrast this older perspective with the following excerpt from a *National Front News* cover story of the post-1986 period.

The National Front is not based upon hatred of any sort. Our movement is based upon Love. Love for our own people's cultures, races, traditions, and nations and respect for all others.

The article was titled "Stop the Race War!" and featured a picture of black youths who were described as "victims of multiracialism."³⁵ One cannot imagine racialists of the nineteenth century writing in this fashion. Indeed, this faction of the NF directed its fire against publications of the NF itself of just a few years earlier, for preaching "race hate."³⁶

IS UNIVERSALIST RACIALISM RECIPROCATED?

Whites who advocate the more liberal stance of universalist racialism have to deal with the reality that other tribes of men seem not to reciprocate their sense of fairness and equality.

Neither Robert Mugabe nor Thabo Mbeki is much interested in the rights of whites in their lands, either as individuals or as groups. Blacks in America have long since come to oppose a level playing field with whites. They demand and receive from whites a privileged and dominant position in society.

The ANC refused and continues to refuse all pleas by the Afrikaners for self-determination. To them, whites are needed to provide tax dollars. The ANC is not interested in self-determination for all.

Black juries routinely find blacks innocent of crimes against whites, much as a deep South jury in decades past would have found whites innocent, even if clearly guilty, of crimes against blacks.³⁷ Blacks have long since learned how to manipulate the white man by utilizing white compassion, fair play, and the like while having no intention of practicing the same virtues in return.³⁸

The Jews have demanded and received their own state based upon religious/tribal identity. Yet when they live amongst non-Jews they always advocate pluralism and universalist states. Thus, they too have mastered the skill of using the rhetoric of universal morality only when and if it advances their own tribal agenda.³⁹

This then is one of the powerful arguments against the universalist racialists. Their policies are counterproductive. No other groups behave the same way. Others will invariably take advantage of their fair play and compassion.

This is not limited to matters of race. The Stormont, the majority-rule government of Northern Ireland (1920–1972), was accused by Catholics of allowing institutionalized discrimination against them. The argument was that some form of legal power sharing would guarantee Catholic equality. No sooner was this implemented, though, than the cat was allowed out of the bag. The real goal of almost all Catholic political activism in Northern Ireland was no longer the protection of rights but the eventual absorption of the state into the Republic of Ireland, where Catholics would then be members of the dominant majority.

Did the Protestant majority mistreat the Catholic minority in the days of the “Protestant ascendancy”? Once again it depends on whether one accepts the notion that an in-group must grant an out-group equality. It is true that Protestants of wealth and power generally sought to keep social dominance (and well-paying jobs) in the hands of their co-religionists via economic and political double standards. The approach is largely similar to that in Israel today, where a combination of law, custom, and tribal loyalty ensures that Jews control the culture and economic/political power of the state. This is the old approach of tribal morality, understood by some but condemned, today, by most.

HISTORICAL GUILT COMPLEXES

The lack of a contemporary articulation of the old model of racialism is what makes it difficult, if not impossible, for most whites, including many “movement” people, to explain the racial approach of pre- and early twentieth century America, with its guilt-free, relaxed, and widely accepted exclusion of blacks, Indians, and Jews from political, economic, and even athletic and entertainment realms.

Thus, for example, whites, even racialists, sometimes find it hard to defend racial separation in sports. Why shouldn’t blacks have been allowed to play major league baseball, for example?

The old model was not afraid to say, in effect:

This is our society. We really don’t want you here altogether. If you must be here, you will have to accept some degree of exclusion and secondary status. We intend to live among our own. We do not want our people socializing with yours. This country and its institutions exist for the sake of our people, their survival and betterment. If you accept this you will generally be treated well. If you refuse, then watch out!

This stance was backed by both the force of law and the power of the masses. It clearly worked as far as its stated goals went.

“NEO-CON RACIALISM”

Just as Christians in America have been reduced from the status of being the dominant culture as institutionalized in schools, laws, and public places to their current state of humbly begging to be allowed the “right” to pray and practice their religion, so too have racialists abandoned their former world view.

“Please,” neo-con racialism says, “Give us just a little space where we won’t have to live with nonwhites or send our children to school with them. Racial pluralism may rule society; all we want is a tiny corner for ourselves.”

White racialism is obviously a doctrine in a state of much theoretical flux. Some might be tempted to view this flux as one of consistent retreat. Whatever description applies, the new model is very different than the old.

IS THE NEW MODEL MORALLY SUPERIOR?

Having examined the different approaches to racialism from historical, cultural, and pragmatic perspectives, it is worth dwelling for a moment on the underlying philosophical assumptions of these two views. We leave aside, for the moment, libertarian racialism, that is, the advocacy of nothing more than a level playing field among individuals. This creed, rooted as it is in the individual and his freedom as the fundamental “social” value, seems to offer white society no protection from races that are more intelligent, industrious, and disciplined than Europeans. (And given the inabilities of the dark races, it seems sure to feed their resentment as they fail repeatedly to compete and progress.) Asian races and Ashkenazi Jews might well come to dominate European lands given the level playing field approach.

The universalist version of racialism, however, need not yield an individualist vision. It might also legitimately advocate racial separation within nations or strict racial barriers to immigration in order to reserve national racial identity, provided, of course, that there be no accompanying expansionist or colonial efforts or needless cruelty. Given the assumptions of the contemporary white world, this fair play version of racial self-determination for all is very appealing. Racialists in this camp are now able to say to the world, “We are all for equal rights, self determination, cultural integrity, and survival for nonwhites provided that we are separated from them and granted the same.”

This perspective also allows racialists to keep within the confines of the accepted morality of the post-World War II white world. No one likes to feel completely out of step with the accepted moral conscience of humanity, and it is very difficult to do so emotionally. In other words most of us have a hard time relating to the concepts of slavery, conquest, exploitation, and even political supremacy.

The conquest of America is an example of this. Just a century ago the vast majority of white Americans had no problem with the notion that their ancestors came here and took the continent away from the indigenous population simply because it was there for the taking and they were not us and we were not them. It is unthinkable that any white nation or people would behave that way today. And most white nationalists would be heavily influenced by this trend.

But is this latter model definitely morally superior to the previous one?

Surely even modern thinkers (including those that are not racially inclined) would grant that we have greater obligations to family and friends than to strangers. We would not claim that all men have the same rights to our homes, property, protection, and personal aid as do family and friends. Thus it seems not too far-fetched to believe that one's own people (nation, culture, or race) could or should come before others.

Having seen that mainstream morality posits that one may care or do more for one's own we turn to the further question: Would a man, on behalf of his inner circle, be allowed to take from or infringe upon others? To do unto them what he would not do to his own?

Contemporary universalist ideologies in European lands prefer to see people as individuals rather than groups; race is seen as one of many "illegitimate" group categories.⁴⁰ Thus, racialists must emotionally escape a powerful ideological double bind. First, they must break through the public dogma which declares group loyalties to be illusory or, in the case of whites, somehow "evil." Then they are confronted with the now deep-seated notion that groups must treat each other, at the very least, fairly and equally at all times.

Further, what is the appropriate moral response when one's own requires the space or resources of outsiders? What degree of suffering must one's own be subject to before that of others may be taken or exploited?⁴¹ Although the thought may seem harsh to eco-radicals, all men are willing to displace thousands of insects and animals when they decide the time has come to build a house. How is this done morally? Quite simply, all men conclude that their own life and comfort and that of their wives and children are a far greater value to them than that of other mammals, snakes, insects, and the like. We engage in wholesale slaughter because they are not us. Surely, could these creatures of the meadow be consulted about our massive extermination attempt, they would be quite opposed.

To this example the universalist racialist must respond that humans are radically different. All people must always be dealt with exactly as we would treat those closest to us.

Clearly, though, except perhaps for Catholic clergymen taking vows of poverty, no one treats the other, either as an individual, family, group, race, or nation, as his own. We do not abandon our homes as long as any man on the

Earth is homeless. We do not survive on bread and water so long as any man is hungry. We give our children money and opportunity that we withhold from all others who are starving and suffering on the planet. And when our loved ones attend college or work or travel or whatever, they are living the lifestyle they do because hundreds and thousands of those less fortunate work for them in very rough conditions producing their needs. All of us put ourselves and families first.

For the individual to whom his nation, people, or race is very dear, the question is, may or should he regard their needs as of primary and, perhaps, singular importance. Just as he does not subject himself to reciprocal morality as an individual, so too would he exempt his larger group.

Who is to say that race demands this loyalty? Where is the imperative that one be concerned about nation, people, or race? Practically speaking, at least for whites, the loss of racial cohesion has left them defenseless as individuals. The group best protects the individual. Beyond that, though, most men did, some still do experience themselves as group members. This is common outside of Europe today but increasingly rare among whites.

Is it somehow more natural or morally superior to experience oneself as a member of a tribe and to treat fellow tribe members better?

Who is to say what is "natural"? What does seem clear, though, is that in a world of fiercely loyal groups, each battling for its own survival and prosperity, it ill serves the group that feels compelled to behave in accord with the dictates of universal morality and reciprocity.

However, this universalist model, whether motivated by Christianity or simply the "spirit of the age," is merely the current moral consciousness of European society. It was not the consciousness of previous generations. Its claims to universal moral standards are little understood or practiced by the rest of mankind.

If current trends continue then we will not see universal morality until nonwhites take over. Then at that late date whites will have plenty of time and cause to ponder the wisdom of universalist racialism.

Gil Caldwell is the pen name of an academic who fears the results of a racialist movement weakened by absolute universal morality.

ENDNOTES

1. For an overview of all the above in the Colonial era and early days of America, see Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro 1550-1812* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina, 1968).
2. George M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) p. 69.

3. For a thorough overview of the racist morality of pre-World War II America, see the critical but well referenced *Jim Crow's Defense: Anti-Negro Thought in America, 1900-1930*, by I. A. Newby (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1965).
4. Fredrickson, op. cit., p. 81.
5. One finds in the ranks of the neo-Confederates a classic evidence of this surrender. For example, the journal *Southern Partisan* is forever defending the Confederacy while viciously attacking all those guilty of "racism." Why the leaders and citizens of the CSA are somehow exempt from this crime remains a mystery.
6. In Devi's work, *Gold in the Furnace* (Temple Press: 1952), based on her experiences in Germany in 1948, she writes that she was told by many, including a "woman who held an important post in the management in five concentration camps...a women who, knowing full well how little I really care, at heart, to what extent such acts took place and how far they were discouraged, had no reason whatsoever to hide the truth from me" that "there were gas chambers in some of the concentration camps under the Third Reich.... There were five in Auschwitz; there was one in Lublin. However, she continues "the people who met their death in them were all sentenced for some serious offense for which that particular penalty was foreseen; they were not "innocent" people guilty only of being Jews...." This is an early form of revisionism: gas chambers existed, but only for criminals. In a 1978 taped interview with her recorded in New Delhi, sold by Zundel's Samisdat Publishers in 1979, she declared that although "now knowing" that the Nazis had not killed six million Jews in gas chambers, she "didn't care. They were just damn Jews anyway."
7. Rockwell's position is somewhat difficult to pin down. In his famous *Playboy* interview he argued against the six million figure and also "den[ie]d that there is any valid proof that innocent Jews were systematically murdered by the Nazis." However, in the same interview he noted that should Nazism come to power in America, "there are going to be hundreds of thousands of Jewish traitors to execute" and that "mass gassings are going to be the only solution" (<http://www.reb Rebel.com/artists/rockwellplayboyinterview.html>) (p. 9). And in *This Time the World* he wrote, "This time we will not permit traitors to 'escape' so that they can move in and betray them as the German Communist Jews did to America. None shall pass or escape retribution, not one!" (<http://www.churchoftrueisrael.com/rockwell/world/rocttw-18.html>) (Chapter 18, p. 14). Whether the reference is to "Jews" or only "Communist Jews," of which "there are hundreds of thousands," one couldn't imagine many racialsists speaking in this manner today.
8. These quotes appear in the 1999 film *Mr. Death: The Rise and Fall of Fred Leuchter Jr.*
9. *Ernst Zundel His Struggle, His Life*, no date, no author (Samisdat Publishing) p. 65.
10. "Ralph Perrier" in *Religion and Race* (Liberty Bell: 1980), p. 23.
11. It should be noted that apartheid generally attempted to allow for and often assist blacks in their development, in their own areas. For example, Prime Minister J. B. M. Hertzog said in 1936, speaking to a "Native" audience, "We want as few of you as possible in the White man's area. For that reason we are setting aside defined areas for you in which you can carry on your farming operations, in which you can go and live. When you come within the White man's area you should know that really you come, in the first place to serve his interests. If possible in your own areas we would like to see you govern yourselves" (*Debates, Union of South Africa Assembly, 1936*, p 4085).
12. *Verwoerd Speaks: Speeches 1948-1966*, edited by A. N. Pelzer (Johannesburg: APB, 1966), pp. 16, 24.

13. Italics added.

14. Ian Smith, *The Great Betrayal* (London: Blake, 1997), pp. 105, 108.

15. A recent, lucid exception to this may be found in David Lane's *Deceived, Damned & Defiant: The Revolutionary Writings of David Lane*, edited by Katja Lane (14 Word Press: 1999) where we read in the "88 Precepts" that "nature has put a certain antipathy between races and species to preserve the individuality and existence of each" and "inter-species compassion is contrary to the Laws of Nature and, is, therefore, suicidal." (pp. 88, 89)

16. The title of Madison Grant's racial history of America's settlement is instructive in this regard. *The Conquest of a Continent or the Expansion of Races in America* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933) is an event that Grant and his many admirers saw as positive. The "races" referred to in the title are all white sub-races.

17. One hesitates in referencing here that sixties' favorite by Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West* (originally published by Henry Holt and re-issued by Owl Press in 1991). It is, however, despite its dated New Left polemical style, highly instructive on the racialism of nineteenth-century Americans toward the long-standing Indian inhabitants of this continent.

18. Herman E. Talmadge, *You and Segregation* (Birmingham, AL: Vulcan, 1955), p. 49. Interestingly, Talmadge limits his opposition to racial mixing by ruling out "the use of force, or any other unlawful means" (p. 80). Apparently even racial survival was not as vital as peace or law. This was quite a difference from the attitude of Talmadge's ancestors, who sang in *The Bonnie Blue Flag*, "Then here's to our Confederacy, strong we are and brave; Like patriots of old we'll fight our heritage to save; And rather than submit to shame, to die we would prefer, So cheer for the Bonnie Blue Flag that bears a single star."

19. Theodore G. Bilbo, *Take Your Choice, Separation or Mongelization* (reprinted by Historical Review Press, 1980), p. 280.

20. James Burnham, *Suicide of the West* (New York: John Day, 1964), p. 130.

21. William F. Buckley Jr., *Up from Liberalism* (New York: McDowell Obolensky, 1959), pp. 126-131.

22. Historians today are largely agreed that Joshua's wars of extermination and expulsion are mythical. Thus, Bible-believing Jews are the only people who claim, proudly although falsely, to be genocidists. Holocaust revisionists would argue that Germans have been persuaded to make the same claim, albeit with much guilt and self-imposed penance.

23. Thus, for example, Jews do not have to return money that Gentiles mistakenly gave them in a business transaction (*Talmud Bavli, Bava Kama* 113b), they need not return to them their lost objects (*Talmud Bavli, Bava Kama, ibid.*, and *Sanhedrin*, 66b) and one must always give precedence to a Jew in business (buying and selling, hiring and renting) (*Torat Kohanim*, Section 3). On the other hand one may not steal from them because this could cause "hatred." According to the Talmud Yerushalmi (*Bava Kama* 4:4), theft from Gentiles was originally permitted but was later forbidden by rabbinic decree when a Gentile King became aware of the original law. Few Jews today are aware of or would support these standards.

24. It is important to note that various Talmudic authorities, even in the Middle Ages, sought to limit the binding nature of these laws by claiming they were only relevant to "idolaters" who lived in Talmudic times. There is, also, another stream of Talmudic literature citations, less numerous than the first, that seems to embrace universal morality. For a brief overview of the former attempts, see David Novak, *Jewish-Christian Dialogue* (New York: Oxford, 1989), particularly chapter two, "Christianity in Medieval

European Halakhah" (pp. 42-53). For many citations of universalism in Talmudic and later traditional Jewish sources, see Yosef ben Shlomo Hakohen's *The Universal Jew: Letters to My Progressive Father* (New York: Feldheim, 1995).

25. Of course, Talmudic morality has nothing to say about what other peoples do to each other when there is no impact on Jews. That is the whole point about pure in-group morality. The definition of "good" is something good for the tribe. "Bad" is bad for the tribe. Events that don't have any impact on the tribe are simply non-events. Our point is that the logic of in-group morality would allow for these practices.

26. The Marcus Garvey school of black nationalism has long attracted white sympathy. Garvey met with Klan leaders in the 1920s to explore the possibility of a black return to Africa. See, for example, Michael C. Dawson, *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 104.

27. "Garvey's Vision" in *Nationalism Today*, No. 42, pp. 20-22.

28. "Nation of Islam: a Photo Essay" in *Nationalism Today*, No. 39, pp. 16-19.

29. "Mr. Yacub Goes to Patmos" in *Best of Instauration 1977*, pp. 53-54.

30. A presentation of this view in English may be found in the journal *The Scorpion*, edited by Michael Walker. See, in particular, issue number 10 of autumn 1986, titled "Against all Totalitarianisms."

31. *Telos*, a New York-based journal, formally of the left, but having undergone many creative changes over recent years, often features translations of de Benoit's writings.

32. The post-1986 split in the National Front saw a two-year period in which there were two National Fronts. Griffin's faction, the self-styled "radicals," went to great lengths in order to embrace self-determination for all peoples. Among those featured prominently among their mentors and models were Muammar Qadhafi of Libya, American Garveyite Osiris Akebela of the Pan African International Movement, the black Nation of Islam, the American Indian Movement, and many others. See, for example, *National Front News*, issue number 109, p. 1.

33. Tyndall has always advocated the repatriation of nonwhites from Britain. This was to be done even if the non-whites refused. Griffin, for his part, supported compulsory repatriation during his NF days. Indeed, when the "radical" NF split in 1989 into Third Way and Third Position, it was Griffin's Third Position that continued to advocate this view. It is only recently, in the context of Griffin's having assumed control over the British National Party, that he has moved to the voluntary repatriation stance.

34. John Tyndall, *The Eleventh Hour* (Albion: 1998), pp. 395, 397.

35. *National Front News*, issue 71, p. 1. Similar cover stories are found in issues 93 and 109.

36. "The Bulldog Breed" in *Nationalism Today*, No. 41, pp. 25-26.

37. The routine policy of white Southern juries of finding their racial kinsmen innocent of crimes against blacks, even when the evidence was overwhelming, became a national scandal in the Emmet Till murder case in Mississippi in 1955. The acquittal of Roy Bryant and J. W. Milam is a good example of this phenomenon of tribal racialism. Interestingly, though, by that time things had changed in the state to the point where the governor, Hugh White, called for the conviction of the murderers. (The defendants later admitted their crime to a national magazine reporter.) It should be noted in passing that this leniency was not always extended in Mississippi to whites whose crime was the rape of blacks, as in the 1957 Dillon/Duncan case.

38. A recent example of tribal morality from black intellectuals may be found in the summer 2003 *Black Scholar*. There one may read a well-written defense of the person, philosophy, and lyrics of the late black “gangsta rapper” Tupac Shakur. Neither Shakur’s calls for racial murder nor his vicious attitude toward all women are seen as grounds to criticize him (*Black Scholar*, 33, no. 2, pp. 44–50). Can one imagine a mainstream publication, on sale at every scholarly bookstore in America, making the same case for the late Ian Stuart of the white racist band Skrewdriver, whose life and lyrics are positively genteel when compared with Shakur? Indeed, even among racials, Skrewdriver was a subject of controversy. The “radical” National Front embraced, in the late eighties, a rival band called Skullhead and rejected Skrewdriver because the former endorsed self-determination for all in its lyrics.

39. The contradiction between the Jewish identity of Israel and the “pluralism” that is now official state dogma throughout the West is slowly becoming a subject for public discussion. See Tony Judt’s “Israel: The Alternative” in *The New York Review of Books* of October 23, 2003 (pp. 8, 10). Judt applies antitribalist morality to Jews, a once rare but now more common event. “The very idea of a ‘Jewish state’ – a state in which Jews and the Jewish religion have exclusive privileges from which non-Jewish citizens are forever excluded – is rooted in another time and place. Israel is, in short, an anachronism.”

40. We leave aside for the moment the fact that race is seen as an illegitimate form of identity only for whites.

41. The Zionist movement, in most of its streams, has always referred to Jewish persecution in Europe as a warrant to dispossess the Palestinians.

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN “RIGHT”:

A WIDE VARIETY OF FORTUNES FOR A WIDE VARIETY OF PARTIES

DEREK TURNER

The picture presented by parties of the nationalist and populist Right in Europe is one of great complexity and fluidity. Almost every country in Europe has a party that considers itself, or is considered by others, to be rightwing nationalist—although such parties often attract other epithets too! With the disappearance of communism in the East, and the continuing degradation of the quality of life across Europe, has come an unprecedented upsurge in populist, anti-establishment nationalism.

As can only be expected from such a diverse assemblage of countries, they are all very different in their styles and emphases. In the northern and western parts of Europe, such parties are often at least partly free market, tax-cutting, Atlanticist, pro-Israel, and sometimes even libertarian in tendency. In southern Europe they are more usually corporatist or semi-corporatist, often with a strong traditionalist Catholic support base. In the east these parties often include many ex-communists and have a nationalist veneer; they fear their neighbors’ territorial ambitions, and are usually strongly anti-American and anti-Semitic. Often they are centered around individuals rather than particular ideologies, and reflect their leaders’ personal tastes and character traits.

Furthermore, these parties are often extremely volatile. Facing, as they do, unique cultural, ideological, and credibility barriers; unused to success and government; filled with strong personalities and fragile egos; often made up of unlikely coalitions of interest groups, they are especially prone to splits and internecine squabbling. In the east, the situation is especially confusing, with parties springing up and disappearing overnight. In Bulgaria alone, there are over two hundred political parties. Such parties often experience spectacular victories followed by equally spectacular defeats.

In Austria, Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) has been in government, out of government, and back into government within the past two years, as a junior partner in a conservative coalition with Wolfgang Schüssel’s Austrian People’s Party. After Haider stepped down as leader in 2001, to deflect attacks by the European Union at the time of his party’s original election to office, the party had a succession of short-lived caretaker leaders, who between them helped lose the FPÖ half of its support. To be fair to these politicians, much of this

draining away of support was inevitable; parties like the FPÖ often benefit from being anti-establishment. When they enter into coalitions, and inevitable compromises start to be made, some of their impatient or less practical supporters lose their faith. At present, from his power base in the province of Carinthia, and with the assistance of key allies like Matthias Ewald, Haider is angling to regain control of the party, in preparation for the European elections of 2004.

In Belgium, the Vlaams Blok, which is one of the most sensible and successful of the small rightwing parties, had its greatest electoral success ever in May 2003. Campaigning on a resolutely anti-immigration, anti-corruption, and Flemish separatist platform, the Blok is now the fifth-largest party in Belgium, attracting 11.6 percent of the Belgian vote and 17.9 percent of the Flemish vote. It has 18 seats in the federal chamber of representatives and, with 7 seats out of 24, is the largest party on Antwerp's city council. However, this electoral clout does not do it much good directly, because all the other political parties have imposed a *cordon sanitaire* on the party, refusing it all cooperation. The Vlaams Blok has a counterpart in the Francophone part of Belgium, the Front National, with which it has surprisingly cordial relations, bearing in mind that the Flemish party depicts Wallonia as an economic basket case and deplores the Frenchification of the Dutch-speaking parts of Belgium. At present, the Belgian FN has 5.6 percent of the Walloon vote, which equates to one seat in the chamber of representatives and one seat in the senate.

In Croatia, Franjo Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party was in power until 1999, but it fell apart after his death. Today, the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) has five seats in parliament, but it is far removed from the center of power in a country that, like many in Eastern Europe, is so anxious to become part of the European Union that it is desperately trying to live down its "racist," "sexist," and "homophobic" past.

In the Czech Republic, the Republikani Miroslava Sladka party, led by doctor of philosophy Miroslav Sladek, used to get 8 percent of the vote, making it one of the largest parties in the parliament. But the party was routinely excluded by President Vaclav Havel from parliamentary delegations (Havel also excluded communists from these delegations). The "Velvet Revolutionary" further displayed his liberal conscience by using his presidential prerogative to pardon two gypsies who had assaulted and injured Sladek. The RMS subsequently lost all its seats in 1998, went through a split, and failed to make any headway in the most recent election.

In Denmark, the Danish People's Party attracted 12 percent of the vote in the 2001 election. While it was excluded from the conservative coalition government, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen felt constrained to pass restrictive asylum legislation, with the result that asylum applications have halved since his government came to power. As it has been historically careful in its connections, and has always expressed itself in moderate terminology, the

DPP is in the unique position among populist, anti-immigration parties of being regarded by the British Conservative Party as eminently “respectable,” attracting British Conservative members of the European Parliament as speakers at its meetings.

In France, the Front National raised the hackles of the world media in 2002, when, admittedly assisted by a leftwing split, it came in second in the first round of the presidential elections. The FN’s 18 percent showing in the second round, while superficially disappointing, was nonetheless a remarkable achievement, considering that all the parties (with the insignificant exception of Bruno Mégret’s dying Mouvement National Républicain) had endorsed Chirac. Bearing in mind the vitriolic campaigning against Le Pen, which encompassed everything from organized marches of schoolchildren lispng anti-racist slogans, anarchist demonstrations calling for Le Pen’s death, and sermons from the world’s pulpits, to Chirac’s refusal to meet Le Pen in a televised debate (the only time the final two French presidential candidates have not had such a debate), the FN did extremely well to increase its share of the vote. Hearteningly, one of the fastest-growing FN support groups is voters under twenty-five. The FN expects to do well in the 2004 regional elections, especially in Provence and Cote d’Azur.

In Germany, the small rightwing parties are moribund, largely because the Christian Democrats, and more especially their Christian Social Union allies in Bavaria, have in recent years been moving gradually to the right. They opposed the Schröder government’s proposals to liberalize German nationality laws, and were attacked for their “Kinder, nicht Inder” campaign poster in 2001, which called for increasing the German birthrate instead of increasing immigration from the Indian subcontinent. The most respectable of the smaller parties is the Republikaner party, formerly led by Waffen SS sergeant and television talkshow host Franz Schönhuber, but now led by medical doctor Rolf Schlierer. The Republikaner once had several seats in the German parliament, but now has none, and attracts between 1 and 2 percent of the vote in Bavaria, and 3.5 percent in Bremen. Next is the Bürgerinitiative party (or the Partei Rechtsstaatliche Offensive [PRO]) of former judge Roland Schill, who enjoyed brief success with his populist campaigns against immigration and crime, even being elected senator for the Hamburg region – only to be dismissed in August 2003, after a complicated scandal.

Then there is the Deutsche Volksunion, led by millionaire publisher Gerhard Frey – although a question mark has been placed over its long-term future, since the party did not stand in the September 2002 elections. Then, least reputable of all, is the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, strongest in eastern Germany, and unfortunately characterized by a large skinhead element. Last year, in an amusing interlude reminiscent of G. K. Chesterton’s *The Man Who Was Thursday* (in which a police spy infiltrates an anarchist group only to find out that all the other members of the group are also police spies),

the German Constitutional Court, backed by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, tried to ban the NPD as a supposed menace to democracy, only to find that the party was so riddled with police agents that they were all provoking and informing on each other. Despite the political pressure, the case had to be thrown out. News is now coming in of a new, Bavarian-based party, Democracy Direct, which aims to unite disaffected activists from the Christian Social Union (already on the hard Right of mainstream politics) with the nationalist Right.

In Greece, for the first time in decades, a new rightwing party, the Hellenic Front, which is affiliated with the French FN, is starting to register on the political radar, obtaining 1.4 percent of the vote in Athens last year, and 4.5 percent in one other municipality. This has given the Hellenic Front three local councillors.

In Hungary, the Justice and Life Party, led by playwright Istvan Czurka, was briefly respectable after the collapse of the communists, and had 14 seats in parliament and several government portfolios in 2000, as part of a rightwing coalition. But a combination of leftwing disapproval and unwise statements by the party's leaders—its vice president received an eighteen-month suspended sentence in 2003 for saying that Jews should be segregated from other Hungarians—meant that their vote collapsed in 2002, falling to 4.36 percent (parliamentary representation starts at 5 percent). The presence of a splinter group, the Hungarian National Front, did not help matters.

In Ireland, which has only recently developed a race problem—thanks mostly to a law that anyone born in Ireland automatically becomes an Irish citizen (this law has just been attacked by the High Court, but we shall have to see if it makes any material difference)—there is no properly organized anti-immigration party, although there are small social conservative parties. However, at least two new parties are planned in the near future, one of them being organized by a flamboyant anti-abortion and anti-EU campaigner named Justin Barrett, who became briefly notorious last year, when his links with the German NPD and Italy's Forza Nuova were profiled in the media.

In Italy, the populist Right is in government. Both Umberto Bossi's Liga Nord and Gianfranco Fini's Alleanza Nazionale (AN) have been part of the Forza Italia coalition under Silvio Berlusconi since 2001, with three ministries allotted to each party. Even by Italian standards, this is an unstable coalition, attempting to encompass Bossi's ideal of independence for northern Italy and the AN's nostalgic Italian integralism. Bossi is very outspoken, and has caused headaches for Berlusconi by saying, *inter alia*, that Brussels "wants to legalize paedophilia," and that he wanted to "hear the cannon roar" against the boatloads of illegal immigrants who try to cross the Adriatic from Albania every night. "Illegal immigrants," he went on, "need to be hounded out, either nicely or nastily." By contrast, Fini has been trying very hard to be respectable, although his efforts are constantly set back by an increasing flood of Mussolini

nostalgia expressed by senior AN politicians, including one who said that he wished Italy and Germany had won the war. Out beyond the government, there are two other groups, Pino Rauti's Fiamma Tricolore (with whom Forza Italia made an electoral pact in Sicily in 2001) and Roberto Fiore's "third positionist," ultra-Catholic Forza Nuova.

The Netherlands, of course, had a rare burst of interesting politics in 2002, when the flamboyant homosexual libertarian Pim Fortuyn began to make waves by saying that Islam was "backward," that Muslim immigration should be stopped because of Islamic "homophobia," and that the Netherlands was overpopulated and could accept no more immigrants. He was expelled from the neo-conservative Liveable Netherlands party for these remarks, so he formed his own party, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List of Pim Fortuyn). The party was projected to do well in the elections of May 2002, and then Fortuyn was murdered by an animal rights fanatic. In the subsequent elections, his party (still called the Lijst Pim Fortuyn) did extremely well, winning 26 seats in the Dutch parliament and joining the government. But the party was a personality cult rather than a normal political party, and in the absence of that personality, the party—which had briefly united social conservatives with gay rights activists, and immigration restrictionists with assimilated immigrants from the former Dutch colonies—fell apart, precipitating the collapse of the coalition. The new government, which came to power last May, is led by the Christian Democrats, and does not include any LPF members—although individual LPF members supported the government's recent asylum bill, and in local government in Rotterdam, former LPF members, now confusingly calling themselves Liveable Netherlands, work closely with the Christian Democrats on asylum and crime. There are two smaller, more traditionally ultra-right parties—the Center Democrats and the Netherlands Bloc—but with only one local councillor each, they are unimportant.

In Norway, Carl Hagen's Progress Party obtained 14.6 percent of the vote in the December 2001 election, approximating to 26 seats in the 165-seat parliament, and the conservative government has to rely on them. This has ensured that the government has passed restrictive asylum laws, and kept its distance from the EU.

In Poland, the League of Polish Families, an ultra-Catholic group which is strongly Eurosceptic and has expressed strong reservations about immigration, won 8.7 percent in 2001. The Alternative Social Movement, led by Michal Janusewski, which has several MPs, invited Jean-Marie Le Pen to visit Poland's legislature, but the visit was called off after protests from the far Left.

In Portugal, the Popular Party, led by journalist Paulo Portas, has 14 seats in the 230-seat parliament (9 percent of the vote) and is part of the governing coalition, which has just announced immigration restrictions and called for national powers to be repatriated from Brussels.

In Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party is affiliated with the French FN. Zhirinovsky, presently vice-speaker of the national assembly, is both a hindrance and a help to his side. His publicity skills are unquestionable. The problem is that often this publicity is gained through preposterous suggestions, such as using nuclear weapons against hostile neighbors and expanding Russia to the Indian Ocean. He also veers between acute anti-Semitism and acute philo-Semitism – with the emphasis on the latter since he discovered his own Jewish ancestry. There are several other parties – the People's Patriotic Party and the National Power Party, which sounds like an electricity provider! – but none of them has any electoral strength. However, it is worth noting that in national elections held in December 2003, Zhirinovsky's LDP and the Homeland Party-National Patriotic Union won nearly 20 percent of the vote.

The Serbian Radical Party, which has previously been in government, presently has five seats in the national legislature and two members in the federal Chamber of Republics, but understandably enough, politics in Serbia still center on post-Yugoslavia unrest, and they are unlikely to make further headway until the outstanding war issues are resolved.

In Spain, a regionalist party called Platform for Catalonia did unexpectedly well in local elections this year, and now controls five councils in the region. The Independent Liberal Group, led by former Christian Democrat Jesus Gil, which has made noises about immigration, controls Marbella city council, but is held back by its leader's alleged links with organized crime. A Francoist party called Frente Espanol, led by Jesus Lopez and a former Franco minister, has just announced it will contest elections in 2004.

In Sweden, the Swedish Democrats won 1.4 percent of the vote in the 2002 elections and became the biggest extraparliamentary party. In October 2002, they won 41 seats in 19 municipalities, in 14 of which they had not had any elected representatives before.

In October 2003, industrialist Christoph Blocher's Swiss People's Party, campaigning against asylum and the EU, emerged as the largest party in the Swiss lower house, with 26.6 percent of the vote. Blocher, who campaigned for a second seat on the seven member Swiss Bundesrat, or cabinet (traditionally, the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats, and the Christian Democrats have two seats each, with one seat for the next biggest party), was elected to the Swiss national cabinet in December 2003. Other parties expressing anti-immigration sentiments include the Swiss Democrats and the Swiss Party of Liberty.

In the Ukraine, three nationalist parties have just announced that they will unite to fight together in the presidential elections of next year, where they are expected to poll strongly.

Some of the most interesting developments on the European nationalist Right are taking place in the United Kingdom. After the implosion of the National Front in 1979, efforts at immigration control were made only through

a dwindling band of sincere, but relatively powerless, Conservative parliamentarians and the British National Party, founded in 1982 by John Tyndall, a former National Front chairman. The BNP struggled along futilely for years, hampered by a combination of media bias and unwise actions and statements by party officials. In 1993, the BNP got a councillor elected in London's East End, but lost the seat a few months later, after a vitriolic campaign against the party by everyone from the local Church of England bishop—who appeared to be delighted that his diocese had already been almost entirely emptied of English Christians in favour of Asian Muslims—down to crazed and hate-filled far leftists ready to kill to bring about the brotherhood of man. After this brief irruption, silence again until 2001 when, under a new chairman, Nick Griffin, they began to attract serious levels of support in urban areas, especially in northwest England. Then they got three local councillors elected in Burnley and, in May 2003, achieved a total of 17 councillors—down to sixteen when one had to be sacked for drunken violence—and then back up to 17, with a surprise win in Essex. Now, once again, they are down to 16, having just lost one of their seats in Yorkshire.

This incident of public drunkenness demonstrates that the BNP still has “housecleaning” to do. There are people in the party with serious criminal convictions. That these things happened many years ago and that other parties contain comparable people does not matter. In Britain, with its residual non-conformist mentality and endemic hypocrisy, such things are enormously important. A party that needs to begin to be seen as a victim of negative perceptions, and so appeal to the British sense of fair play, cannot afford to feed those perceptions. Because of the negative stereotyping that has taken place over many years, parties of the nationalist Right attract more than their fair share of eccentrics and psychopaths. Unpleasant people can be found in all parties, but when you are starting from a severe moral disadvantage, you should not give hostages to fortune. Whether the BNP has the sagacity to purge one or two people like these, and to screen all future candidates more carefully, remains to be seen. Nor should a practical political party be selling books with names like *World Plot Exposed*.

Internal party relations are also fractious, with whole branches of the party hardly speaking to Griffin or his allies. Many BNP members feel loyalty instead to previous leader John Tyndall, who is presently being expelled from the party he founded. Something else to consider is that the BNP councillors are unused to government, and will need to prove themselves to be efficient and honest if they are to be elected a second time.

But the BNP's recent achievements have galvanized political life and started to lift the BNP out of the political ghetto. There have been immediate benefits for the residents of areas where the BNP has polled well: The national government has avoided sending asylum seekers to areas where the BNP is strong. The government has even begun to make noises about asylum and

seems to be moving away from multiculturalism in favour of assimilation, with David Blunkett calling for English-language tests and Labour MPs decrying arranged marriages. The Eurosceptical United Kingdom Independence Party, which has three MEPs and 30 to 40 local councillors, is very concerned about the possible threat from the BNP, and has accordingly beefed up its immigration policies. The UKIP rejected out of hand a recent BNP suggestion that the parties should form an electoral pact for the European elections.

The Conservative hierarchy is still nervous about raising the immigration issue—and is in any case in a state of flux, having just elected a new leader—but many of its rank and file members and traditional supporters are becoming more and more interested in the BNP. Relations between activists of the two parties in certain areas—notably the northwest, east London, and parts of Essex—are very close, even amounting to *de facto* electoral pacts. In one area of the northwest, BNP and Conservative activists hold joint social meetings, and even help each other out leafleting on alternate nights. There is a good chance that the BNP will pick up one seat in the European Parliament in next year's elections; if so they have pledged to work with the Front National, Vlaams Blok, and anyone else willing to work with them.

Other interesting developments have been taking place in the West Midlands, where a new party, the Freedom Party, stood for the first time in May and won two seats (both won by the same person, Sharron Edwards). The Freedom Party aspires to be the first British populist party on the Right that avoids the mistakes that have bedeviled all similar parties, by offering a genuinely democratic party structure, with transparent accounting, respectable personnel, local roots, and sensible policies expressed in moderate language. Although at present they are the BNP's poor relation, it is not impossible that their modest gains will be longer lasting than those presently being enjoyed by the BNP.

With that quick *tour d'horizon* of the European Right, the next thing to consider is whether these multifarious parties could help each other more. At present, there is hardly any practical cooperation between these various parties. This is hardly surprising, given the very nature of nationalism, and that many European countries have historical grievances and territorial aspirations that are directly at odds with their counterpart parties in adjoining countries. These parties depend for their very existence on their national traditions, their knowledge of their respective peoples, and their particular prejudices. Although all of them share strong reservations about immigration, globalization, and the EU, apart from that they really have very little in common. What makes sense in Spain will not necessarily make sense in Slovakia or Serbia. Styles and terminology that are perfectly mainstream in Bratislava can sound very peculiar in Birmingham. And with the best will in the world, these small parties have limited resources and need to concentrate their efforts on domestic politics.

Some efforts have been made to develop and deepen such alliances – notably the Front National’s Euronat organization, by means of which 30 foreign delegations (including one from Japan) came to the FN’s last major rally in Nice. But the limitations of such aspirations were made abundantly clear to me some years ago, when attending the Front National’s Bleu Blanc Rouge festival in Paris. We were one of the foreign delegations, as were both the Greater Romania Party and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party. Some FN official had decided that the two parties’ respective stands would be situated adjacent to each other. It did not seem to have occurred to the official responsible that ultranationalist groups representing adjoining countries whose relations have been historically poisonous, and who both lay claim to the same territories, might not be especially good neighbors. Some years previously, there had been tension between some British National Party members and a couple of people from Sinn Fein, who had rather surprisingly attended the rally. The previous year, Serbian and Croat nationalists actually came to blows. This time, the Hungarians and Romanians contented themselves with ignoring each other – ensuring that when one group was at their table, the other delegation was not at theirs – interspersed with tense periods of glowering at one another from opposite ends of the marquee, muttering to themselves in Magyar or Romanian. Meanwhile, the Slovak delegation kept well away from both the Hungarians and the Romanians!

Historical grievances aside, there is a tendency for the more successful of these parties to distance themselves from their less successful neighbors who have suddenly become something of an embarrassment. The Front National used to look to the British National Front as an example, but then the tables were turned, and the FN – correctly in my view – hastily dropped the NF while the NF was going through its “political soldier” period of ultra-Catholicism and hero-worship of Libya’s Colonel Gadaffi.

The FN has been examining ways of broadening its international network, especially in the English-speaking world, with enthusiastic support from Jean-Michel Girard, its South African-born, English-speaking head of foreign affairs. There are plans to replace the Euronat organization with a wider organization, with its own website, English-language news service, and regular meetings. Such an initiative would incorporate pressure groups and publications as well as political parties.

Yet what may be more important in the short term than the FN’s well-meaning, if occasionally misplaced, efforts were the talks that took place late last year in Carinthia between Jörg Haider, the Vlaams Blok, and the Liga Nord. These talks were an attempt to broker an electoral pact for the European elections of 2004, in which, for the first time, voters will be able to vote for parties outside their countries on trans-national “lists.” The discussions were cordial, but have not yet produced any concrete results; yet the participants are still hopeful that a deal can be struck. What makes these negotiations so hopeful is

that those who are engaged in them are all politically pragmatic, and accordingly there will be no grandiose statements or schemes, merely quietly competent technical cooperation for a specific objective.

It would seem that the European nationalist Right is going to be around for a long time to come—occasionally feuding, occasionally facing electoral reversals, often failing to capitalize on opportunities through lack of imagination or lack of resources—but nonetheless a force to be reckoned with. For the moment, each of these parties will need to concentrate their efforts internally, trying to work with like-minded people at home while avoiding attacking their counterparts in other countries—acting locally while, hopefully, thinking globally. With participation in real politics and decision-making, and control of budgets, will come greater wisdom, greater credibility, and greater influence. Although change may not be as rapid or as far-reaching as many of us would like, it will come. What little these parties have so far achieved would have been inconceivable ten years ago. Despite their shortcomings, all of these parties, in their dramatically different ways, are helping to slow down what would otherwise have been an inexorable decline into extinction. Much that Europeans have loved will be lost along the way, but in time—and with luck—we will turn the tide.

*Derek Turner is the editor of the British conservative magazine **Right Now!***

THE CASE OF VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: FARMER, SCHOLAR, WARMONGER

F. ROGER DEVLIN

Everyone is a reactionary about subjects he understands.

-Robert Conquest

Victor Davis Hanson's name has become known to millions of people since the attacks of September 11. Beginning the very day of those terrible events, he has poured forth a stream of commentary urging a tough response against...well, against somebody. At first it was bin Laden and al-Qaeda, of course. But as soon as the Bush administration announced that Iraq was a proper target for American retaliation, Hanson got on board. Since then he has briefed powerful men at the Pentagon, taught midshipmen in Annapolis, given lectures and interviews, all while maintaining a steady flow of "tough" journalism for National Review Online.

It is all quite a change for him.

Victor Davis Hanson is a fifth-generation California grape farmer. He has often expressed his admiration for the sort of men among whom he grew up: tough, hardworking smallholders, taciturn men with a sense of loyalty to their land and families. He clearly understands the privilege he enjoyed in being reared among this vanishing American breed.

He attended a nondescript state-supported college close to home and went on to graduate study in classics at Stanford. He developed an interest in ancient warfare, and found that his own farming knowledge could illuminate ambiguous and misinterpreted passages in the ancient historians.

All readers of Thucydides and Xenophon know how frequently they refer to armies "ravaging" enemy territory, "destroying" trees or "devastating" crops. The ancients could take for granted that their readers knew what such expressions signified; many had taken part in or suffered from such ravaging themselves. For today's typical urban or suburban reader, however, vines and fruit trees are nearly as unfamiliar as Pindaric odes or red-figure vases. Some classicists have imagined such ravaging to have produced famine and long-term economic depression, or even to have been the decisive cause of Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War.

Hanson, based on his own farming experience, was skeptical. Vines and olive trees have deep roots, and their permanent destruction was too difficult and time-consuming for a marauding army to attempt. Rather than being intended to starve the enemy into submission (as in modern warfare), crop destruction was a kind of slap in the face, a challenge to the enemy to come out and fight. When Pericles succeeded in convincing the Athenians not to fall into this trap and to rely instead on their naval power, it was a sign that the traditional pattern of hoplite (i.e., heavily armed infantryman's) battle was eroding (Thuc. II, 21-22).

In 1980, Hanson submitted a doctoral thesis on this subject to the classics department at Stanford and quietly went back to farming. Three years later the dissertation was published as a book: *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece* (University of California, 1983). I recall seeing it on the "recent arrivals" table at a college bookstore: the back cover featured a photograph of the author in the unkempt dress of a grape farmer.

1983 saw a catastrophic fall in grape prices, and Hanson found himself, in effect, paying consumers to eat his produce. Things were so bad he found he could earn more teaching Greek. He became classics professor at California State University, Fresno — a position he still holds. His reputation as a classroom teacher is high and has won him awards.

By 1987 he had completed work on a second book, *The Western Way of War* (University of California, 1989). Its title may be misleadingly broad. The work is directly concerned only with infantry battle in classical Greece. The polis, Hanson explains, developed a mode of warfare peculiar to itself and with an influence still perceptible in the military practice of the occident.

Other ancient nations such as the Egyptians and Persians fought to a large extent with bow and arrow or sling, on horseback or from chariots. Attacks were often uncoordinated. Battle could be prolonged for days into a series of indecisive skirmishes. Troops were lightly armed, dressed with a view to looking fearsome and masculine, rather than heavily armored to protect themselves from blows. Warriors were as intent upon avoiding the stroke of death as they were on dealing it out to their enemies.

Greeks of the classical period had a strong preference for pitched battle between heavily armed infantry. The favored weapons were sword and hand-held spear, no arrow or throwing-spear. Ambushes and irregular skirmishing — indeed, almost all that we think of as strategy and tactics — were avoided in favor of brief, simple face-offs between identically equipped massed formations. Battle, that is, was a kind of ritualized collective dueling. Armor was designed with single-minded attention to preserving the life of its wearer. On the other hand, once battle commenced, the individual hoplite's supreme duty was to forget about his own preservation, stand his ground and take his chances. "Few types of fighting," writes Hanson, "have required quite the same degree of courage, of nerve in the face of mental and physical anguish, as this...in which armed and armored hoplites advanced in massed formation with no chance of escape" (p. 25).

The terrible ordeal of hoplite battle had, however, two advantages. First, it was economical. Deaths on the winning side averaged about five percent, on the losing side fourteen percent. Armor was affordable for the ordinary farmer. There were no long or distant campaigns; service lasted a few days, with the actual fighting occupying perhaps not more than an hour. Second, no non-Western army could stand up to it. This is what saved Greece during the Persian invasions of 490 and 480 B.C. Reluctant Persian draftees were simply not prepared to face heavily armed men who fought in formation and did not shrink from death. Herodotus relates that the Persians at Marathon believed the Athenians “possessed by some very desperate madness.” The death toll he reports for the battle—6,400 Persians versus 192 Greeks—gives some idea of the superiority of the “western way of war.”

Earlier military historians have tended to concentrate on questions of strategy, tactic, terrain, and logistics. But for these very reasons they also tended to slight hoplite battle of the classical period in favor of later Macedonian and Roman practice—which, incidentally, involved immeasurably greater loss of life.

Hanson also distinguishes himself from most of his predecessors by his attention to the harrowing experience of the individual Greek fighter. His inspiration here appears to have been John Keegan’s study *The Face of Battle* (Dorset Press, 1986); and Keegan returned the favor by writing an admiring preface for *The Western Way of War*. Hanson, indeed, several times cautions readers that the necessarily gruesome descriptions of hoplite battle are not intended as pacifist propaganda—a claim readers of his post-9/11 journalism will have no difficulty believing. Any student of Herodotus will come away from the *Western Way of War* with a greatly increased admiration for the courage and fortitude of the ordinary, unlettered farmers whose sacrifices made the cultural efflorescence of fifth century Greece possible.

Between 1988 and 1993 Hanson wrote what is likely to remain his most important book, *The Other Greeks: the Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization* (Free Press, 1995). It is an extraordinary contribution to our understanding of classical Greece: the achievement of a lifetime, really, though produced by a man still in his thirties. It is the principal grounds for his reputation as a scholar, but has also gained him a large audience for views on other subjects concerning which he is ill informed or mistaken. Before I offer criticism of his writings of the last five years, I want to give readers some understanding of the importance of his scholarly masterpiece.

Human beings have existed for hundreds of thousands of years, and the white race for about the last forty thousand. But what we refer to as Western Civilization cannot plausibly be traced back farther than the first millennium B.C. Furthermore, it was originally the achievement of a single nation, the Greeks, during a relatively brief span of time, the eighth through fourth centuries B.C. Ever since, men have understandably wondered what the

explanation of this could be. What was it about these particular people of this place and time which led them to bring forth self-government under law, free philosophical and scientific investigation, epic and dramatic poetry, and a body of art and architecture which remain the wonder of mankind two and a half millennia later?

It has been called the Greek miracle, but of course there was nothing miraculous about it. Such a grandiose manner of speaking merely reflects—besides admiration for the Greek achievement—our ignorance of its sources. For most of the centuries during which the ideal of classical education remained strong, this ignorance remained total. Consider, for example, the realm of literature. The Western literary tradition begins with a long poem called the *Iliad*, said to have been written by someone named Homer. This Homer is little more than a name to us. We still do not know exactly when or where he lived. But he was obviously a highly accomplished artist. Appearing suddenly as he does in our historical record, he is apt to seem an inexplicable, superhuman genius. And he has often been spoken of as such. But in fact the *Iliad* was the product of a long development. We know, thanks to the work of Milman Parry and other scholars, that Homer was an oral poet, very possibly illiterate, working within a tradition of public recitation for discriminating, aristocratic audiences. He brought that tradition to an unsurpassed level of perfection, so much so that the work of his predecessors ceased to be recited and their very names are now forgotten. Yet their work was by no means insignificant or mere labor lost; it was a necessary precondition for Homer's own achievement. No one—not even a writer of Homer's skill—could have created a work such as the *Iliad* from whole cloth.

Something analogous is true of the Greek polis, an historically unprecedented system of consensual government under law. When it suddenly emerges for us into the light of history in the pages of Herodotus (writing in about the 430s B.C.) we see it already fully formed and defending itself against the encroaching oriental despotism of Persia. Like the *Iliad*, the classical Greek polis is apt to appear to us something marvelous and inexplicable as long as its genesis remains hidden from view. And for most of later history, that genesis was well hidden indeed.

Beginning with the discoveries of Arthur Evans in the nineteenth century and continuing to the present with the recent development of "field survey archeology," this has changed. Enough is now known to allow a plausible reconstruction of the early development of the Greek economy and city-state. Professor Hanson's great contribution is to have synthesized the work of dozens of specialists to provide such a reconstruction; the bibliography of *The Other Greeks* (second edition) is thirty-six pages long. It is impossible to do the work justice in a short space, but perhaps what follows may encourage readers to attempt the five-hundred page original on their own.

In the course of the second millennium B.C. there rose and fell in Greece a notable civilization known as the Mycenaean (after the location of the first impressive archeological finds). Its economic life centered around large palaces, great lords, and a class of bureaucrats or administrators who oversaw agricultural laborers, assigning them their tasks and doling out rations. Most impressive to many are the rich burial finds: jewelry, weapons, pottery, sculpture. And they possessed two seemingly indecipherable scripts, which their discoverer Arthur Evans called simply Linear A and Linear B, both of which looked quite unlike classical Greek.

This Mycenaean palace culture of 1600–1200 B.C. did not, however, mark the dawn of Western civilization. It was a society comparable in achievement perhaps to the early Celtic Hallstatt and La Tène cultures, and considerably less interesting than the already ancient civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia. Like the latter, it was regimented and centralized. Hanson explicitly draws the parallel with Soviet-style collective agriculture.

Toward the end of the second millennium the Mycenaean world collapsed. Most of the palaces were burned. The next four centuries are termed the Greek “Dark Ages.” In fact, they are much less well known to us than Merovingian France or Saxon England. The archeological record is almost a complete blank, and there is no written literature at all. Then, in the eighth century, Homer, the polis, overseas colonization, even the Olympic Games, all appear almost simultaneously. How did it happen?

During the heyday of racial theorizing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there existed a kind of scholarly orthodoxy on this subject. Mycenaean civilization was destroyed by a superior race of invaders from the north: the Dorians. They brought the Greek language and Nordic blood with them, making classical civilization possible.

Even at the time this theory was first put forward there was one fairly obvious problem with it: the Dorians had to come from somewhere. If their superior natural endowments produced a great civilization in Greece, shouldn't it have done so in their earlier homeland to the north? Why is there no record of any such civilization?

The really decisive blow to the theory, however, came with the decipherment of Linear B in 1951, and the revelation that it was an early form of Greek. The Greek speakers, in other words, were already in their present homeland by the middle of the second millennium B.C. The Dorians did not displace the native population or even impose a foreign tongue; they added only a slight variation to the existing genetic pool.

By the late twentieth century, the racial theory of classical civilization lay mostly in ruins for sound reasons unrelated to “antiracist” demagoguery. But there was no replacement for it. We still had no plausible explanation for the Greek miracle. Thanks in some significant measure to Victor Davis Hanson, we now do. The explanation, in a word, is *agrarianism*.

All preindustrial societies are agricultural, but only a few have been agrarian; of these latter, classical Greece was the first and most important. Agrarian societies are informed by a certain ideal, according to which landed estates should be generally small and inalienable. A plot of land should be large enough to provide a family with a decent sufficiency, but not luxury. It should belong to a family rather than any individual; the head of the family holds it in trust for the benefit of his children and his children's children. It is *his*, in other words, but not his alone. He has no moral right to do with it simply as he pleases.

Agrarianism is an egalitarian ideal, in a sense. A common Greek proverb was *ouk agathoi hoi plousiotatoi*: "the very rich are not good." And, as Hanson easily demonstrates, there was an anti-aristocratic tendency to much Greek literature: especially apparent in Hesiod, Euripides and Aristophanes. But this must not be confused with the envy-driven modern ideology of socialism. In the agrarian polis there was no objection to the accumulation of wealth as such; only to wealth being used to buy out family farms and consolidate large estates. Such *latifundia*, as the Romans called them, inevitably come to be controlled by absentee landlords in their own interests, leading to dependency for those who actually worked the land: free citizen-farmers are replaced by a peasantry. This is inimical not only to efficient land use but to political freedom. The elder Pliny echoed this old agrarian sentiment when he wrote, in an age of Trimalchios and *vomitoria*, "anyone for whom seven acres are not enough is a dangerous citizen."

Solon boasted that the legitimate interests of the wealthy aristocrats were respected in his legal code: a concord of the orders, not class struggle, was the classical ideal. Wealthy men were encouraged to use their wealth for the public benefit, for example, by sponsoring religious festivals and dramatic performances. Aristotle believed a polis had the duty to "teach those that are the respectable by nature that they are not to desire excessive riches," not because he resented aristocrats having more wealth than he did, but from a belief in *noblesse oblige* and a realization that the piling up of riches is not the proper end of human existence. And many aristocrats sincerely accepted the agrarian ideal. Plato—no democrat—suggested in his *Laws* that no farm should be more than five times as large as the smallest holdings.

Hanson sketches for us an account of the rise of Greek agrarianism for which the evidence must necessarily remain meager but which, as far as it goes, is utterly convincing. From comparative studies (for example, of the Western European Dark Ages) certain things can be known about the consequences of the collapse of a complex society. We may infer, for example, that there was a drastic decline in the population, a partial or complete reversion from cultivation of the soil to pastoralism, and an organization of society on the basis of kinship and personal service—feudalism, in a generic sense. Any agriculture that remained would have been extensive rather than intensive; in other words,

land use was extremely inefficient. Probably it consisted of cereal cultivation in the rich but (in Greece) scarce bottomland of river valleys. Gradually, as conditions became more settled, population began to increase and this type of land ran out. Men then began to stake out individual plots of slightly less desirable land on the lower slopes of the surrounding hills. As this too was engrossed, other enterprising farmers worked their way onto rockier ground, ever less suited to cereal cultivation. To compensate for the inferiority of the soil, they began to experiment with other crops, notably olives, figs, and vines – inventing the practice of grafting in the process. These new crops had a longer life-cycle than cereals, and the men who raised them had, correspondingly, a greater tendency to take long views. The new diversified agriculture was labor-intensive, producing not merely more or better food but a new type of person: the family farmer, a hard-working, practical man with a stubborn, individualistic streak, a strong sense of property rights backed by the courage and ability to defend property tenaciously. These agrarians may have been the first considerable body of men in history to develop a “work ethic,” a view of labor as intrinsically important and ennobling rather than mere pain to be endured for the sake of the wealth it produced. Hence arose the idea – so common among ancient moralists, so rarely recalled today – that luxury could be a snare, that the best situation in life was a mean between destitution and riches rather than the maximization of riches.

Besides respect for property, agrarianism favored the rule of law. Aristotle saw this: “when the farmer class and the class having moderate means are in control of the government, they govern according to laws; the reason is because they have a livelihood, and they are not able to be at leisure, so that they put laws in control of the state and hold only the minimum number of assemblies necessary” (*Other Greeks*, p. 114). Aristotle defined a free polis as one in which men rule and are ruled in turn according to generally accepted procedures. Greek civilization thus came to place great emphasis on law-abidingness. Furthermore, educated Greeks were aware that this distinguished them from other nations. Herodotus depicts an envoy warning the king of Persia that Greeks “have law for a master, whom they fear more than your men fear you.”

Eventually the sheer numbers of new agrarians shook the old Dark Age, clan-based structures of authority. The small farmers began to make their influence felt politically. This, in Hanson’s view, was the true significance of Solon’s legislation in sixth-century Athens. He and the other “lawgivers” – shadowy figures such as Philolaus of Corinth and Phaleas the Chalcedonian – were actually agrarian reformers, men who brought law and politics into line with already established agrarian economic and social realities. Failure to understand this has often resulted in these ancient lawgivers being misunderstood as a sort of philosopher-kings, founding states *ex nihilo* on the basis of their own abstract ideals of justice: consult Rousseau’s *Social Contract*, Book II, chapter 7, for an especially extravagant example of this tendency.

The agrarian character of the ancient city-state is concealed to a great extent by the nomenclature of ancient political thought, which centered on moral virtues and the number of enfranchised citizens rather than on economic arrangements. Consider, for example, Aristotle's well-known sixfold classification scheme for regimes. A city may be ruled by one man, a few men, or the mass of the population. And the rulers may govern in their own interests or that of the city as a whole. Hence there are three good regimes: kingship, aristocracy, and polity, or "good" democracy (*politeia*). And, correspondingly, there are three defective regimes: tyranny, oligarchy, and 'bad' democracy (*demokrateia*). Hanson ably demonstrates that this scheme is a Procrustean bed when applied to the economic evolution of the classical city-state. The early agrarian polis might be described as a broad oligarchy, since the landless poor were excluded from government. But in those times there simply was no large urban class of artisans and tradesmen, so the regime might with almost equal propriety be named a democracy. Because, however, agrarianism led to efficient land use and an ever-increasing surplus, such a landless, urban, but not necessarily poor or uneducated class did arise and seek participation in government. In Athens, it won that participation in the fifth century and a new, radical type of democracy came into being, lasting down to Aristotle's own time. Under the new conditions, oligarchy came to be conceived in a new way. For example, occasionally power was seized by an aristocratic cabal, as in the famous episode of the "four hundred" in Athens in 411 B.C.; or a narrow collaborationist government might be installed in formerly democratic cities by Sparta in its own interests. By Aristotle's day it was these despotic regimes which were known as "oligarchies." It would be perverse, however, to class them with the broad agrarian oligarchies of earlier times. But Aristotle's terminology blurs this essential distinction. It can be sharpened using modern economic and sociological concepts, but these disciplines were simply not part of the Greek achievement.

Among the high points of *The Other Greeks* we may mention chapter 9, "The Erosion of the Agrarian Polis." It concerns itself with Athens from the Peloponnesian War until the Battle of Chaeronea (431-338 B.C.), a period for which the historical record is far richer than for agrarianism's rise. Hanson shows that the Athenian farmers benefited economically from radical democratic imperialism even as they lost their political preponderance. Furthermore, they continued to enjoy a high level of social prestige: the urban population emulated rather than resented them. The phenomenon might be compared to that of the British gentleman, an originally sociopolitical category which gradually evolved into a moral ideal, and "set the tone" for the lower orders of society in an increasingly democratic age. It was not any agrarian "reaction" which destroyed Athenian democracy, but the rise of the nonagrarian monarchy of Macedon.

The Other Greeks contains three chapters devoted to military matters, but limited largely to their economic and cultural aspects. In view of Hanson's recent advocacy of widespread American military intervention, his criticisms of ancient militarism are especially noteworthy. By militarism, I mean lack of civilian oversight, state pay for soldiers and armaments, conscription, extended foreign campaigning, and exemption of generals and decision-makers from actual battle service. All had been characteristic of the ancient Near East, and reappeared in the Hellenistic world which arose out of the Macedonian conquests. Within the Western Tradition, they are a sure touchstone of cultural decadence. During the classical period, and especially until the Persian invasions, Greek "armies" were more properly agrarian militias: amateur, private, and formed by farmers themselves in their own interests. Hanson doubts major wars (as opposed to individual battles) were even common before the fifth century.

The Other Greeks first reveals an interest in American agrarianism, an interest more fully developed in *Fields without Dreams*, (Free Press, 1996). That work is based on the author's own experiences as a grape farmer during the agricultural depression of the 1980s. Hanson reminds his fellow countrymen that characteristically agrarian virtues underscored the democratic practices of earlier America as well as of the classical city-state and identifies government subsidies as responsible for the consolidation of family farms into agribusiness monstrosities. Much of the narrative has the ring of black comedy, though for the small farmers involved—Hanson's family and their neighbors—it was closer to tragedy. Independent farmers are taken advantage of by government and government-favored agribusiness concerns, simply because they *are* hardworking, uncomplaining, and have a sense of responsibility. They have gradually been reduced to a kind of helotry or driven out of business by managers and bureaucrats who are often their moral inferiors. Although I have no personal experience with agriculture, Hanson's narrative has for me a compelling quality. He concludes the book by calling for abolition of the Department of Agriculture. He does not seem to be aware, however, of the broader connection between governmental monetary policies and economic downturns such as the one he experienced. Perhaps a classicist-farmer should not be expected to have mastered the theories of Mises and Hayek.

In *Fields without Dreams*, war disappears from view.

At this point in his career Hanson was only forty-two years old and little known outside specialist circles. He had already achieved more than most scholars do in a lifetime. He could have rested on his laurels; perhaps he should have.

In 1999, however, three years after *Fields without Dreams* and two years before the World Trade Center attacks, Professor Hanson published *The Soul of Battle* (Free Press, 1999). It marks a turning point in his career, and deserves our close attention. The cover touts the work as a story of "how three great liberators vanquished tyranny." Only one of the men in question comes from

Prof. Hanson's special field of study: Epaminondas of Thebes. Greatly admired in antiquity, he is nearly forgotten today; I shall, therefore, summarize his career as briefly as possible.

The Peloponnesian War was waged by a Spartan-led coalition supposedly to free Greece from the domination of Athens. What actually happened was that, after destroying the Athenian Empire, Sparta created an even more despotic empire of her own, demanding tribute and obedience wherever her power extended. In 382 B.C. she occupied her former ally Thebes, installing a garrison and a collaborationist oligarchy. Three years later, a democratic cabal successfully conspired to overthrow the oligarchy and expel the Spartan garrison. They also established a new regional federation of democratic townships, led but not dominated by Thebes. In July of 371 a large Spartan-led force was met and defeated near the village of Leuctra by a smaller Theban-led force under the command of Epaminondas. It was considered a shocking upset. Epaminondas wished to follow up his victory with an immediate descent upon Sparta, but it took over a year to obtain the necessary authority and collect an army. What an army, though! Sparta had many enemies, and in December 370 some seventy thousand of them prepared to march south into the Peloponnesus. Their stated purpose was to aid the Arcadians, who had seen in Leuctra a chance to revolt from Spartan overlordship. Upon arriving, they learned that the Spartans had withdrawn to avoid facing them. The Arcadians, however, convinced Epaminondas it would be wrong to waste the opportunity presented by having such a splendid force assembled so close to Sparta. Overstepping his legal authority, Epaminondas led his men into the Eurotas valley, ravaging the land as far as the suburbs of Sparta itself; no army emerged to meet him. Returning to Arcadia in midwinter, he decided quickly on another, greater, and equally unplanned exploit: the liberation of Messenia. This territory, to the west of Sparta, had been reduced to serfdom three centuries previously. It had provided most of the agricultural surplus necessary to free Spartan citizens from labor, allowing them to devote themselves full-time to politics and military training. Within a few weeks, Epaminondas's men freed it and fortified the capital. Sparta had gone from ruler of Greece to minor regional power in less than two years, and it was largely due to the leadership of one man.

When Epaminondas returned to Thebes in the summer of 369 he received the common democratic reward of Greek generals: he was put on trial for treason by envious fellow-citizens. He was too proud even to mount a defense. The assembly, fortunately, had enough sense to drop the matter. For the next seven years, Thebes was the leading power in Greece. Epaminondas mounted three further invasions of the Peloponnesus, though without a force as great or results as spectacular as the first time. In 362 he was killed fighting another victorious battle against the Spartans in Arcadia. Theban hegemony vanished the instant he died and was never recovered. But neither did Sparta recover; Epaminondas's blow against her was essentially fatal.

There are certain figures from antiquity – Alexander the Great is the most notorious example—who are intriguing precisely because only enough evidence concerning them survives to whet our curiosity, but not enough to satisfy it. There is always a danger in modern attempts to reconstruct the thoughts and actions of such men; we are apt to project modern concerns upon them. This has happened, I believe, in Hanson's mostly competent and valuable summary of Epaminondas's career. A cover blurb for *The Soul of Battle* describes the work as "suffused by the author's deep faith in democracy." That, indeed, is just the problem. We find him speaking, for example, of a "naïve idealism" (p. 45) for democracy in Thebes, which is nothing more than his own modern ideological and messianic "faith in democracy." Few ancients actually had much good to say about radical democracy; those who did—such as Pericles and Demosthenes—did so because they were democratic political leaders themselves. They were, in other words, flattering the sovereign demos. Plato had their number; in his *Menexenus* he has Socrates point out that "it is an easy matter to praise Athens to the Athenians." The soberest ancients (such as Aristotle) propounded instead the idea of a constitution "mixed" of democratic and aristocratic elements.

Worse still, in speaking of the bizarre Spartan constitution so admired by Xenophon, Plutarch and—it is said—Socrates, we find Hanson slipping into Marxese. Sparta's "substructure" (as opposed, presumably, to its "superstructure") was "a maze of cultural, political, and economic contradictions" (p. 67; cf. also p. 178). This may reflect the influence of G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, a Marxist classicist elsewhere praised by Hanson.

Or again, consider Epaminondas's study of Pythagorean doctrine, which, as Hanson describes it, would seem to have made him into a regular Jacobin *avant la lettre*: Pythagoras's followers wished to

Overturn conventional prejudice... censor the luxury and decadence of the more wealthy and powerful, and apply a radical equality to fellows both male and female.... The enemies of all Pythagoreans were superstition, blinkered tradition, conventional religion and custom—anything handed down through ignorance that might impede unfettered examination.... Their utopia... was... a commune of the ascetic and educated, a sect of natural and trained elites, whose own exemplary behavior would allow them to bring justice and enlightenment to the ignorant other. (p. 58)

There does exist a kind of leftist *philosophia perennis*, and a number of cancerous modern ideas were well anticipated in antiquity. Some no doubt were to be found among the Pythagoreans. But there is no call for interpreting Epaminondas's struggle against Sparta as the fulfillment of an ideological program, Pythagorean or otherwise. Sparta was hated because she had oppressed and waged war against Thebes—and many other Greek states. Epaminondas did pride himself on liberating the Messenians, and not merely because this was an economic blow to Sparta. But, as with all ancient leaders (even Spartacus) there is no evidence he objected to slavery in principle.

Messenian helotry, “an altogether cruel and bitter condition,” as one ancient called it, is competently described by Hanson, but oddly termed “apartheid.” This anachronistic expression is first encountered well buried in an endnote to *The Other Greeks* (p. 478, note 4)—a cloud no bigger than a man’s hand. The special character of helotry was that its victims were enslaved by the Spartan state: they were not personal chattels, as were the slaves in most Greek city-states or the American South. In this respect there is a certain analogy with the position of blacks under the old South African race laws. Both were political rather than merely natural or economic statuses; both amounted to a kind of socialism. The essential difference, of course, is that the racial divide between Spartan citizens and Messenians was slight. More generally, all racial differences within the ancient Greek world were slight in comparison with those that afflict the modern era.

As explained above, the old racial theory of the rise of classical Greek civilization was indeed mistaken. It would be improper, however, to generalize from this particular case. If the valleys of Dark Age Greece had been inhabited by the present citizens of Equatorial Guinea, whose average IQ is said to be 59, the result would not have been the classical city-state, self-rule under law, tragedy, philosophy, and the Parthenon. Hanson, unfortunately, has milked the “antiracial” aspect of his own thesis for a great deal more than it is worth. He never misses an opportunity to reiterate that Western Civilization is a matter of “culture, not race”—as if informed racialists were unaware of anything besides biology. The truth, of course, is that writers for publications such as this one are interested in race because of their concern for Western culture. And whatever Hanson may think, race is no exception to the rule that one ought to know something about a subject before endeavoring to instruct others. Sadly, Hanson knows less about racial differences than I do about raisin production.

Which brings us to the subject matter of the rest of *The Soul of Battle*. As mentioned above, the work is billed as a story of “how three great liberators vanquished tyranny.” One of the other liberators in question is Patton. The Nazis, of course, give Hanson ample opportunity for pontificating about “racism.” Still, it is surely fair enough to describe Patton as a “liberator from tyranny.” It is the third liberator I wish to focus on here: William Tecumseh Sherman.

I was shocked to see, at the time *The Soul of Battle* was published, that Prof. Hanson had chosen Sherman as one of his military heroes. He had, after all, been at pains in his very first book to distinguish the ancient practice of crop-destruction from the modern version, in which the intent is precisely to wage war on the civilian population, and even reduce it to starvation. Could he really be unaware what historical figure this modern practice is most closely associated with?

Or what of the “western way of war” consisting of short, decisive infantry engagements? Would Gen. Sherman’s March to the Sea represent this tradition?

Or what of Hanson's agrarian concerns? Would he expect Sherman to share his tender concern for the preservation of family farms?

What we find in the Sherman chapters of *The Soul of Battle* is, in fact, a remarkable testament to the ability of even a highly intelligent man to compartmentalize his thoughts. Much of Hanson's treatment of Sherman can be rebutted from the author's own earlier work. The most striking instance regards the relation between property rights and political power. "You must first make a government before you can have property," he quotes Sherman as saying (p. 149); "there is no such thing as property without a government." The disproof is in the pages of *The Other Greeks*. Property rights and their concomitant—freedom under law—evolved from the special, highly unusual circumstances of Dark Age Greece, where government was nearly absent. The polis, as Hanson demonstrated, arose out of this preexisting economic and social arrangement. Sherman's statist view of property, so common in our day, represents a reversion to the non-Western mentality of Persian autocracy in which subjects only have as many rights as the king chooses to allow them.

Agrarianism is another subject on which our author switches sides when moving from classical Greece to America. The South was quite obviously the agrarian section in antebellum America. Hanson, however, chooses to label it "pseudo-agrarian" merely because some larger plantations existed. Like many Americans, he seems to have an exaggerated idea of the number of such Southern *latifundia*. This received notion—which is not new—feeds naturally into a Marxist-style exploitation theory of the Southern economy. Hanson approvingly quotes an Ohio officer who served under Sherman: "a civilization in which a score of lives are impoverished and embittered, are blasted and debased and damned, in order that one life may be made sweeter, is a system of wrong that no language can properly condemn" (p. 149). The sentiment is difficult to dispute, but it does not correctly describe Southern society—nor any other. Wealth is not extracted from unfree men by the free; it is produced by the labor of all men. If the exploitation theory were correct, the slaveholding South ought to have been wealthier than the industrial North; of course, this was not the case.

Hanson's ignorance of the realities of Southern agrarianism is matched by his ignorance of the rich body of thought it has occasioned. John Taylor, John Randolph, the Vanderbilt "Twelve," Richard Weaver, M. E. Bradford—none seem to have come to his attention. Weaver, in particular, might have taught him a lot. Consider only his great essay "Southern Chivalry and Total War":

The majority of the Southern people looked upon [the war] as an elaborate ceremonial, to be conducted strictly according to rules, and with maximum display of color and individual daring—in short, as a gigantic tournament, with the Lord of Hosts as umpire and judge. After First Manassas some Southerners were actually heard to express the opinion that the war must promptly cease because the question of manhood between the two sections had been decided and

there was nothing else at issue. The South went into the first modern war thinking it was a duel, and “affair of honor.” (*The Southern Essays of Richard M. Weaver*, pp. 164-165)

This Southern view, indeed, bears some resemblance to Hanson’s own description of classical agrarian hoplite battle in *The Western Way of War*. In that book, as above related, Hanson had been at pains to distinguish the limited hoplite duel from the lengthy and distant campaigns of “Hellenistic thugs” and Roman legionaries, financed through plunder and pillage. Is the analogy between this latter kind of warfare and Sherman’s brand of “total war” so difficult to see? How did it go from being despicable in antiquity to being admirable in the nineteenth century?

Hanson’s answer, I think, is easy enough to infer. Reducing a civilian population to starvation is admirable when it is necessary to end what he variously terms the “odious” or “abhorrent” practice of slavery (adjectives he never applies to the slavery of any other place or time). But slavery was in fact abolished in numerous countries during the nineteenth century without any March to the Sea.

The shortcomings of Hanson’s Sherman chapters are indeed so numerous that it is impossible to treat them adequately here. I shall merely list a few more:

He believes the plantation class’s worth was “self-assessed in material rather than human terms” (p. 157). Weaver, again, was on the mark in calling the South “the last non-materialist civilization in the Western World.” There exist innumerable testimonies to how little status value was conferred by wealth in the antebellum South.

He believes Northern prosperity was due in part to taxation—which of course merely reallocates wealth while eroding it (p.199). His knowledge of economics, in other words, has not improved.

He draws inferences from might to right, believing the South’s defeat amounts to a proof of its moral culpability. He explicitly equates the constitutional issue of states’ rights with that of slavery (both these confusions on p. 187).

Secessionists were “revolutionaries” who “hated” the union (p. 155) and “forced” it into the war (p. 185, quoting Sherman’s own words).

Furthermore, the language of these chapters possesses an extravagance unprecedented in Hanson’s writings up to this time (though not unmatched by his political diatribes since September 11). My favorite sentence: “To Sherman, the self-avowed agent of the apocalypse, warfare of the new modern age had only one redeeming feature: the bringing of a brutal, immutable truth to the world of hypocrisy and darkness” (p. 203).

Hanson’s knowledge of Sherman’s March *is* extensive (the bibliography for these chapters alone includes sixty-eight items). But it is strictly limited to the military aspect of the March; where consideration of the larger socioeconomic and moral aspect of events should come, we find only vehement rehashing of Yankee propaganda.

Victor Davis Hanson is a fine military historian of *classical Greece*. He knows so little of political theory that he cannot distinguish imperial aggression from its opposite. Sherman marched for the imperial aggrandizement of the Union; Epaminondas marched to destroy the Spartan empire. In that regard, these two figures were polar opposites. Sherman's historical predecessors were rather the Persian commanders who attempted to crush agrarian, democratic, "Western" Athens and incorporate it into their empire.

How did Prof. Hanson come to associate two such figures in his own mind and in his writings? As best as I can reconstruct it, his train of thought went something like this: "The Greeks were agrarians who figured out democracy and Western Civilization. We Americans are the heirs of that civilization; lots of us used to be farmers and a few still are; we call our own form of government democracy. So we are the Greeks of today. The Confederates, however, owned slaves—which we know is wrong, though the Greeks for some reason didn't. The Confederates, then, were the Persian tyrants of the nineteenth century. Since Sherman fought them, he was the heir of the Athenians facing down Persian might at Marathon. Or perhaps of Epaminondas freeing Messenia from Spartan rule: it doesn't so much matter. In any case, since we are Americans and heirs of the Greeks, we are also Unionists, Western, enemies of tyranny, and various good things. When we fight, the other guys are Persians, Spartans, rebels, Asiatics, tyrants, and various bad things."

This "Hanson doctrine," as it might be called, is not only supremely confused—it possesses a self-righteous Manichean quality worthy of Robespierre.

Now, I must remind my readers that *The Soul of Battle* was published in 1999, two years before the events of September 11. A person reading the book upon publication might have come to the same conclusions I have just sketched. But he could never have foreseen that Prof. Hanson's shortcomings would have an effect outside the domain of military history.

Victor Davis Hanson began on the very day of the World Trade Center attacks to publish articles advocating an American war in the Middle East. The earliest have been gathered in a book—*An Autumn of War*—which has sold briskly and been touted by Rush Limbaugh, William Kristol, and other influential figures. Significantly, the longest piece in that collection concerns Sherman, whom the author puts forward as a model to be followed for America's war in Afghanistan.

Indeed, Hanson's cardinal mistake has been to interpret the events of September 11 as a conventional military attack. They were not. War is older than civilization itself, but the first terrorist organization in the modern sense was only formed in the 1870s, in Imperial Russia. It is the direct or indirect inspiration of all such organizations down to the present day. It styled itself "The People's Will," and its executive committee had only about thirty members. These men resorted to planting bombs precisely *because* they knew they were too weak to confront the Imperial Government directly. Their aim

instead was to provoke the authorities into taking harsh countermeasures, and thus (it was hoped) generate public support for the revolutionary cause. For three years they carried out a dramatic campaign of murder against high government officials, culminating in the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. This succeeded splendidly in provoking the desired countermeasures; within a few years Russia had a secret police that foreshadowed Lenin's Cheka. But it gained no public support; ordinary Russians were horrified by the assassinations and the revolutionaries' cause suffered. Rather than reconsider their aims and methods, however, later Russian terrorists developed a cult of martyrdom, of self-sacrificial violence as an end in itself. Terror was hallowed by its association with revolutionary aims even in the absence of any political gains.

Contemporary Islamic terrorism still bears a strong family resemblance to its Russian predecessor. The traditional Muslim idea of holy war and religious martyrdom fuses easily with Western political fanaticism. The al-Qaedaists find their inspiration in the writings of Sayyed al-Qutb,

a self-conscious intellectual in the Western sense, who attempted to give Islam a decidedly modernist, even "existentialist" character. The faith of the true Muslim was, for Qutb, an expression of his innermost being against the inauthentic otherness of the surrounding world. Islam was therefore the answer to the rootlessness and comfortlessness of modernity, and Qutb did not stop short of endorsing both suicide and terrorism as instruments in the self-affirmation of the believer. (Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest*, pp. 115-116.)

This mentality is difficult for normal people to comprehend, but we must make the effort if we are to understand what our civilization is now up against.

Hanson, in contrast, conceives the September 11 attacks as a tactical blunder in a conventional war. Bin Laden, he assures us, "thought it more likely that he could gain fame and power than court death and destruction" (*An Autumn of War*, p. xvi). He writes as if al-Qaeda had not intended to provoke a military response from the U.S., and must now be shaking in their boots from bewilderment and surprise.

This very lack of imagination makes Hanson useful to vested interests. The American military, while powerful, is a force designed for conventional fighting. Hanson's misleading historical analogies between Sherman and the Afghan war, therefore, come opportunely to its leaders. He has ignorant bureaucrats at the Pentagon imagining they enjoy the authority of history for picturing themselves as "vanquishers of tyranny." Our country may be no safer, but Hanson's own reputation has soared among men unable to appreciate his standing as a scholar. Should his own understanding of terrorism improve, his usefulness to his new friends will vanish precipitously.

An Autumn of War continues and extends other unfortunate tendencies we saw in *The Soul of Battle*, notably the unconditional praise of modernism. "Medieval" is his great term of condemnation, as when he describes

Islamicists as “wedded to a medieval world of perpetual stasis” (p. 15). We, on the other hand, “inherited our democratic ideals from the European enlightenment” (p. 208). So much for Greek agrarianism. He speaks of America being “created as [an] antithesis” to the Old World (p. 211). And in just the last twenty years we have “evolved beyond the traditional Western paradigm in reaching the theoretical limits of freedom and unbridled capitalism” (p. 204). So much for the destruction of free farming by the Department of Agriculture.

Hanson’s “deep faith in democracy” seems to grow ever deeper. “It is the duty of Americans,” he writes, “to support popular governments and democratic revolutionaries wherever possible” (p. xix), and more specifically to support “the right of all Islamic peoples to self-determination through consensual government” (p. 72). Never mind that divine sanction is the only legitimizing principle familiar to ordinary Muslims. He expects that “what once happened among the enslaved peoples of the Warsaw Pact could occur again in the Middle East—and in a decade or less rather than fifty years” (p. 203). What if Muslims turn out not to care for “freedom and democracy?” No cause for second thoughts: “[i]f they wish...to elect themselves into the slavery of Islamic republics, so be it—but at least we can say that we fought for legitimacy—and they, not us, ruined their countries” (p. 143). He speaks casually of outlawing polygamy, “liberating” women, secularizing education, and putting an end to “tribalism.”

Among the more intriguing pieces in *An Autumn of War* is Hanson’s “interview” with Thucydides. Passages from *The Peloponnesian War* are turned into answers to Hanson’s queries about the War on Terror. He asks about the need for tough measures, even against those not directly connected to the September 11 attacks. “General Thucydides’s” answer advocates punishment of the innocent along with the guilty. The passage, it turns out, is taken from a speech by the demagogue Cleon, whom the real Thucydides called “the most violent man at Athens.” In the speech quoted, Cleon was defending a motion to put the entire adult male population of Mytilene to death and enslave the women and children, because *some* of the citizens had plotted a revolt against Athens.

Hanson further sees fit to apply to Donald Rumsfeld a panegyric Thucydides made upon Pericles the Great. More recently, he has compared George Bush to Demosthenes (though not, fortunately, with any special regard for the president’s speaking ability). Thucydides’ magnificent remarks on the perversion of language brought on by war fever are turned upside down into a defense of Hanson’s own wild rhetoric about “Islamofascism” (pp. 75–78). Such is the “classical wisdom” he offers our age.

In the two years since writing the pieces collected as *An Autumn of War* Prof. Hanson has remained busy producing at least one article per week for National Review Online. He seems oddly out of place among the professional libelers

and callow minds now posing as heirs to that once respectable journal, but it is only knowledge of his past achievements which allows one to say this; the actual material he now grinds out is indistinguishable from theirs. We may skip discussing it; besides being numbingly repetitious, it contains little argument or analysis of any sort. Indeed, most of it is mere cheerleading—intended to stir the reader’s enthusiasm for whatever line the Bush administration is pushing at the moment.

Victor Davis Hanson is among the most talented writers in America today. How sad, then, that precisely his *worst* qualities are now exerting the greatest influence. *The Other Greeks* will never reach the vast audience that has devoured *An Autumn of War*. No revival of free agriculture or classical education is likely to be sparked by his earlier work. Instead, he is now a leading proponent of policies which, it is to be feared, threaten us, our country, and our civilization with catastrophe.

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WHAT IS BEST WILL RULE

ANTHONY LUDOVICI ON ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY

JOHN V. DAY

To a casual observer, the British writer and thinker Anthony Ludovici, one of the most politically incorrect Europeans of the twentieth century, was a paradox. After all, he had in the Jewish Nietzschean Dr. Oscar Levy a close friend, mentor, and patron—and yet Ludovici had toured Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s and found much to admire there. Ludovici’s most loyal friends, he recognized, were all women—and yet, as an extreme antifeminist who wanted women to remain in the home, he could describe academic knowledge gained by women as “so much trash.” His grandparents were natives of France, Germany, and the Basque country—and yet he repeatedly attacked human outbreeding, even between Europeans from different countries.¹

But Ludovici was not a paradox. The man’s detailed arguments about race, eugenics, feminism, and many other subjects always ran along strictly logical lines, just as a train holds to its rails. Ludovici had the kind of objectivity and intellectual honesty that puzzles egotists, and he didn’t care if his conclusions wounded his own or anyone else’s self-esteem. For example, when he lectured he had to explain patiently to audiences that, yes, he did find modern people on the whole to be physically botched—but that he included himself in this stricture.

Today, however, more than three decades after his death in 1971, Anthony Ludovici—the author of more than thirty books on subjects as varied as aristocracy, Nietzsche, eugenics, women, religion, and art—has been all but forgotten by the English-speaking world. Thankfully, there are signs on the horizon that after his period of oblivion Ludovici is beginning to make a small comeback, and a few friends and enemies have in recent years rediscovered his work.

Despite being one of the best propagandists of old-style conservatism, Anthony Ludovici currently receives most of his attention from historians of “fascism” and “racism.” The leftist historian Richard Griffiths has documented the role of Ludovici (and many other patriotic Englishmen) in the struggle to prevent Britain from going to war with Germany in the 1930s.² Another hostile critic, Dan Stone, whose interests are the predictable trio of eugenics, fascism, and the Holocaust, has taken a more general look at the man’s life and ideas,

noting that Ludovici's "career trajectory" plummeted from his heyday in the 1920s and 1930s to a low point in the egalitarian 1960s, downgrading him "from a radical, provocative but mainstream thinker to an intellectual outcast."³ Despite Dan Stone's constant sneering, he recognizes that, if Ludovici had been prepared to compromise his frank opinions on race and politics, he might have become one of the leading writers of his time.⁴ More positively, a friend of the conservative English journalist Auberon Waugh, a latter-day Mencken who died in 2001, told me that Waugh admired Ludovici's writings.

Ludovici should win more friends from *The Lost Philosopher*, the recently published anthology of his best work (see p. 66), which should be followed this year by his autobiography, a book that, if the terms of his will had been followed, would have been published thirty years ago. A few of Ludovici's hottest works are available on the Internet. A website honoring Ludovici and his work now offers full-text versions of several of his out-of-print books, articles, reviews, and poetry (for more on Ludovici, visit: <http://www.anthonymudovici.com>).

THE ANTI-DEMOCRAT

A longtime Nietzschean, author of three books on Nietzsche, and one of his first translators into English,⁵ Anthony Ludovici tried to further the interests of what he regarded as superior people. He wanted the healthiest, best-looking, and most creative people in England and Europe to outbreed the rest, paving the way for a revitalized Western civilization. And, in place of the democracy that Nietzsche had dismissed as so much nose-counting, Ludovici wanted these superior people to take control of the government and resurrect not just a ruling elite but an hereditary aristocracy. Not without reason, the freethinker J. M. Robertson once described Ludovici as "the professional champion of lost causes."

After all, Ludovici was swimming against the tide of a century of electoral reform in England. Back in 1832, when the British middle class was enfranchised, just one in twenty-four of the population could vote. In 1867 Disraeli turned against his earlier belief in England's old aristocracy, enfranchising artisans, shopkeepers, and small farmers, and soon the cry went up throughout the nation that "we must educate our masters"—the new voters—it being belatedly recognized that having so many ignorant voters might be politically suicidal.⁶ Nevertheless, in 1884 Gladstone went on to enfranchise agricultural workers, and by that time the electorate made up about one-quarter of the population. In 1918, just three years after Ludovici published his *Defence of Aristocracy*, Lloyd George enfranchised all men over twenty-one and, much to Ludovici's disgust, all women over thirty. And in 1928 the voting age for women was lowered to twenty-one.

As long ago as the 1920s, Ludovici wrote that a professional author like himself could criticize democracy only at the risk of his living. Luckily for all admirers of stimulating prose, he did take that risk, repeatedly and at great

length, and going so far as to describe democracy as “a form of mass neurosis.”⁷ But although Ludovici was no democrat, he disliked snobbery and, in the belief that a nation should value its manual workers as much as its intellectuals, he could praise the German national labor service, which united men from different classes in a common task.

Ludovici found many grave flaws in modern democracy. Fundamentally, he argued that the average voter lacks the intelligence and knowledge to handle political issues. Voters, at least in England, have little interest in politics. Most voters are self-centered as well, and seldom consider the future of the nation as a whole—a shortcoming that democracy’s promoters dress up as “enlightened self-interest.”

Although Mediterranean peoples, especially Jews, are shrewd and make good psychologists, the English and other northern European peoples are poor observers of human nature and generally cannot fathom their candidates for political office. In Ludovici’s opinion, asking the average voter to decide about complex political matters that he cannot understand is like asking a tradesman to carry out shoddy workmanship, which insults him:

It is notorious that everywhere on earth the wise, intelligent and discriminating members of the community always constitute the minority. So that majority rule must in any case mean government by the least able and least gifted elements in our population. Can we wonder, then, that wherever today democracy is established things go from bad to worse, and that chaos and anarchy are becoming universal?⁸

The modern fetish for democracy, Ludovici showed, began further back than the French Revolution. It has its origins in such sixteenth-century reformers as Martin Luther and John Calvin. Whereas Roman Catholic priests were expected to interpret the Bible for their parishioners, these founders of Protestantism wanted every adult to read and understand the Bible for himself, which paved the way for the masses to discuss questions other than religious doctrine, such as political beliefs. As things turned out, though, both Luther and Calvin were horrified when the common man started demanding political power.

In democracies, Ludovici argued, breeding and heredity count for nothing. People are judged not by their beauty, health, or talents, but solely by the leveling factor of money, for this way everyone, even the poor, can believe that money, unlike genius or beauty, may well be within their grasp. It is notorious, Ludovici remarked, that most people think it in poor taste to ask *how* someone of great wealth acquired his money; it is enough that he is rich.

Quoting Aristotle’s wisdom from over two thousand years ago, Ludovici predicted that democracy’s leveling tendencies must eventually degrade into socialism and then communism. Notably, democracies suffer from the absence of a guiding elite to set the nation’s tone. Nowadays, the press and television companies, overly powerful and irresponsible though they are, have that role,

if anyone has, but the mass media usually zero in on the nation's lowest common denominator. As William A. Henry notes today, "The dominant mood of contemporary American culture is the self-celebration of the peasantry."⁹ And whereas a true elite can look decades into the future to consider the nation's long-term interests, the press and television companies are rooted in the present, and democratic politicians themselves look no further ahead than the next election.

How, then, could democracy have triumphed throughout the West? In a depressing example of what Alain de Benoist calls "the barbarism of homogeneity," it seems that almost every nation in the world is currently democratic, or claims to be, or at least strives toward this political end. As Ludovici saw things, the modern world esteems democracy primarily because it appeals to the envy of inferior people, assuring them that their precious votes place them on the same level as their superiors. We are all equal in the sight of God, according to Christians, and we are all equal in the eyes of the state, according to democrats.

Something of a Nordophobe, Ludovici regretted that England's great success as a commercial nation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had made it, unjustifiably, the European standard. Other nations wanted to emulate England's economic success, and their thinkers began to praise England's democratic transformation as the key to that success. Such democratic thinkers in England as John Locke and John Stuart Mill soon found their foreign admirers and disciples.

Of course, other scholars have added to Ludovici's critique of democracy.¹⁰ As an example, the libertarian Hans-Hermann Hoppe maintains that democratic rulers thrive when creating problems to solve, and are unconcerned about the quality of electors or even who, and how many, are migrating to become their new electorate.¹¹ One might add that the unprincipled but charming actor-politicians who shine on television—Bill Clinton and Tony Blair come to mind—always prefer a gullible electorate dazzled by Hollywood smiles when they should be remembering voting records.

BREEDING AND CIVILIZATION

In revolt against modern democracy, and always a traditionalist, Ludovici studied the highest civilizations of the past to see how they had emerged and prospered. Never, dare one say, "Eurocentric," he revealed that the great civilizations of Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas always shunned democracy in favor of rule by elites. Moreover, they tended to be isolated from foreigners, usually by the geography of the land. As he observed:

A further interesting fact is that all these [high] cultures arose in naturally or artificially confined areas, where broadmindedness, the universal brotherhood of mankind, internationalism, the love of one's neighbor, and other forms of claptrap were quite unknown.¹²

Specifically, Ludovici pointed out that Britain, Japan, and Crete (the home of the Minoans) are islands. Italy (the home of the Romans and the Renaissance) and Greece are both peninsulas; and, within Italy, Venice is further set apart by being a cluster of islands in a lagoon. Egypt is surrounded by deserts. Mesopotamia, situated in modern Iraq, is flanked by deserts on one side and mountains on the other. Peru (the home of the Incas) is also surrounded by mountains. China fenced itself in with a manmade barrier, the Great Wall, specifically to keep out intruding foreigners. Finally, Jews, although resident throughout much of the world for thousands of years, have, at least until recent times, largely avoided intermarriage with non-Jews owing to a religion insisting on endogamy.¹³

Ludovici found, in addition, that each of these great culture-bearing peoples was founded on xenophobia—or, in modern terms, that they were “racist.” He also discovered that the elites within each people, who made up the creative element, encouraged inbreeding.

To begin with Ludovici’s favorite civilization, ancient Egypt, the Greek historian Herodotus found that Egyptians despised foreigners, shunning customs from Greece and elsewhere and regarding all non-Egyptian-speakers as barbarians. Genesis confirms that Egyptians found it an abomination to eat bread with Hebrews. And in a nice example of role reversal, Egyptians also believed that they were a chosen people; they alone were *romet* or “men.” (Indeed, some historians conclude that Jews borrowed the idea of being God’s chosen people from Egypt.) When Egyptian civilization was at its height, strangers were forbidden to enter Egypt, and, according to Herodotus again, in the seventh century B.C. certain Ionian and Carian mercenaries were the first foreigners allowed to settle there.¹⁴

As is well known, Jews in antiquity also despised aliens and were forbidden by their religion to intermarry. For example, Deuteronomy states that the Lord will deliver their enemies, the Hittites, the Amorites, the Canaanites, and other peoples, “to be utterly destroyed; thou shalt not marry your sons or daughters with them,” because only Jews are a holy people. In a later period, however, the great prophet Ezra bemoaned that the people of Israel hadn’t separated themselves fully from Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Egyptians, and other peoples, but had married their sons and daughters, mingling their own holy seed with them—and that “the princes and rulers have been chief in this trespass.”¹⁵

Educated Greeks in their highest period were, Ludovici demonstrated, hostile both to low-born Greeks and to foreigners. Greeks used the word “barbarian” (probably an onomatopoeic imitation of unintelligible speech) for all non-Greeks, whatever their level of culture. The famed Athenian “democracy,” it turns out, was restricted to well-off men. However, by the sixth century B.C. the poet Theognis of Megara was complaining that Greeks would

marry anyone, no matter how ignoble, for their money, and that whereas farmers find the best mates for goats and horses, the worst humans are mixing with the best, making the breed degenerate.¹⁶

Even among the Romans, whom Ludovici regarded as vulgar and lacking in biological or aesthetic values regarding human breeding, most people tended to be xenophobic. When Mark Antony married the Egyptian queen Cleopatra, he found his renown in Rome ebbing. Similarly, popular opinion in Rome compelled Emperor Titus to give up his Jewish mistress.¹⁷

It is well known that ancient India had religious laws, just as modern India does, prohibiting intermarriage between different castes. For instance, *The Laws of Manu*, composed around two thousand years ago, decrees that if a brahmin—a member of India's highest caste—takes a non-Aryan sudra wife, he will sink into hell after death and forfeit his brahmin rank.¹⁸

The great civilizations also approved of inbreeding among their elites. Ancient Egypt allowed close inbreeding, and in several dynasties the pharaoh even married his sister. The Bible confirms that the ancient Hebrews knew close inbreeding, too, since Abraham married his half-sister, Nahor married his niece, and Lot even mated with his two daughters. Fragments of evidence suggest close inbreeding among such eminent ancient peoples as Greeks, Persians, Phoenicians, Assyrians, and Incas.¹⁹

In the modern world, though, Ludovici found that migrations, racial intermarriage, and a general refusal for like to marry like are combining to create populations who have inherited from their unlike parents disparate physical and mental traits. He used a crude simile to illustrate why our inherited body parts should be as standardized as car parts.²⁰ For example, a man might inherit his physique from a large parent and his internal organs from a small parent, which will lead to poor functioning. Or he might inherit incompatible mental traits. For Ludovici, any great culture-bearing people, past, present, or future, must always have its genius and *joie de vivre* rooted in flourishing health:

Nobody would claim that the incessant crossing between innumerable races that has been going on in the Levant or in South America, ever since the ancient Greeks and the ancient Peruvians ceased to exist, has produced stocks anything like as desirable as these two inbred peoples. Nobody would claim that modern North America, with its hotchpotch of races, is superior to ancient inbred Egypt.²¹

ADVOCATE OF ARISTOCRACY

In several works, Ludovici showed that European upper classes down the centuries have largely themselves to blame for their own decline. Although they mostly lived on the land in agricultural societies, they ignored the farmer's elementary rules of animal breeding and failed to ensure that their own human offspring would be marked by character and intelligence. Indeed, over three hundred years ago William Penn echoed Theognis of Megara when he remarked that men tend to breed dogs and horses with more care than their own children.²²

Scions of the historic European royal families would marry to cement political alliances with foreign countries, never worrying about spouses blemished by ugliness, stupidity, or poor physical and mental health, even to the point of madness.²³ Although Ludovici championed human beauty, he observed that, amongst non-royals in Europe, members of the supposedly noble families have taken as wives many women distinguished merely by pretty faces. He was distressed to calculate that in the two centuries from 1735 to 1945 the nobility in England alone had married no less than forty-two actresses. (This is another example of Ludovici's relentless objectivity, by the way, because even his own mother, whom he adored, had been trained as an actress.)

Furthermore, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many European aristocrats suffering from dwindling resources tried to retain their historic seats by marrying rich heiresses, often from America and occasionally Jewish. In this regard, Ludovici cites Sir Francis Galton, who first pointed out that these women tended to be heiresses because they were only children, owing to their parents' low fertility, and in marrying them the aristocrats might keep their extensive houses and estates, but at the expense of introducing into their lineage an inherited tendency to infertility—a lineage which soon dies out.²⁴

Most aristocracies, too, have fostered the dysgenic practice of primogeniture, handing on the bulk of their wealth to the eldest son, even though he might be the family's worst-endowed prospect. Among commoners, Ludovici showed, such eminent figures as Galton, T. H. Huxley, and Jane Austen appeared only seventh in their families. This implies that large families are needed for the emergence and selection of talented offspring, and so primogeniture must have deprived many aristocratic families of potentially their best bloodlines.²⁵

Aristocrats, moreover, have failed to control their fellow aristocrats. If professional associations of lawyers and physicians can discipline their wayward members, Ludovici reasoned, then aristocrats should have done the same among themselves, following a code of honor that would have cut the ground from beneath Thomas Paine and other democratic opponents of rakish aristocrats. After surveying world history, though, Ludovici discovered only one body of aristocrats that had regulated themselves—Venice's long-lasting Council of Ten, which would even discipline the doge, Venice's supreme ruler.²⁶

Aristocrats in the West have had many rivals eager to share their political power, and among them Ludovici identified the Jews. He anticipated Kevin MacDonald's work on Judaism as an evolutionary strategy by arguing that in modern times Jewish anthropologists and other powerful Jewish influences have militated against Gentiles in the West studying heredity and practicing eugenics. Homogeneous Gentile societies, particularly when based on Christian principles, have usually tried to exclude Jews from positions of power, and in reaction many twentieth-century Jewish anthropologists have tended to minimize genetic and racial factors and to promote environmentalism. Although practicing, or at least being influenced by, a religion that insists on

believers marrying in and shunning non-believers, the Jews in recent decades, in Ludovici's words, "became ardent liberals and everywhere became the fervent advocates of indiscriminate and unlimited outbreeding, although themselves strictly continuing to enjoin endogamy at least on their own males."²⁷

While Jews have consolidated their influence in the Western world during the last hundred years, the power of the traditional nobility has diminished. And it is noteworthy that a recent student of aristocrats compares them with Jews, although to their disadvantage. "Aristocracy," says Robert Lacey, "does not stand up well to misfortune. It is a fair-weather way of life.... In the years since the Second World War one looks in vain amongst dispossessed aristocrats for the spirit displayed in the same period by the dispossessed Jews; there is no Zionism of nobility."²⁸

INBREEDING AND ISOLATION

Ellsworth Huntington and others have agreed with Ludovici that it is often the numerically small and inbred peoples who, at least in modern times, display the most talent. Huntington cites, among others, the Parsees in India, the Copts in Egypt, the Icelanders marooned on their bleak homeland, and, most striking of all, Jewish groups throughout the world. The Jews' tendency to suffer from such hereditary complaints as Tay-Sachs disease is more than compensated for by their high intelligence and its concomitant of great achievements in many walks of life, with the notable exception, perhaps, of invention.

Yet Ludovici recommended inbreeding not only within each ethnic group, but within each family. Acknowledging that close inbreeding would bring deleterious heritable traits to the fore, he believed this was outweighed by an increase in desirable traits. But did he realize the scale of the defects produced? For instance, Edward O. Wilson cites a study of 161 children born to Czech and Slovak women made pregnant by their fathers, brothers, or sons. Within a year, no less than fifteen of these children were dead, while more than 40 percent of the remainder "suffered from various physical and mental defects, including severe mental retardation, dwarfism, heart and brain deformities, deaf-mutism, enlargement of the colon, and urinary-tract abnormalities."²⁹

Incidentally, Ludovici admitted with breathtaking honesty that even before he had begun collating evidence about the effects of inbreeding he had an "emotional bias" toward the closest inbreeding. More specifically, as he acknowledged in print, he didn't simply love his mother; he was *in love* with her.³⁰

As for ancient times, though, the study of inbreeding and its effects can be hard to follow. Ludovici offers some notable clues as to isolation being a factor in producing high culture. But for much of the ancient world we have only just begun to reconstruct racial history, a task that really needs many more archaeological excavations and the retrieval of ancient DNA from skeletal material.

Since Ludovici's day, various social anthropologists have analyzed the intricate family structures of many ancient Indo-European peoples and shown that the nobilities among each—in Greece, Rome, Ireland, India, and Iran—were closely inbred.³¹ And, from the standpoint of biological anthropology, such evidences as biographies of early Roman emperors, portrayals of Homeric and Celtic heroes, ethnographic reports of Iranian tribes, and a description of ancient Indian brahmins all point to the nobilities of these Indo-European peoples having largely kept their original northern European physical type. They had evidently avoided racial aliens and, keeping to themselves, had married in.³²

Ignoring this evidence, intellectuals—throughout America and Europe, at least, if not in East Asia—venerate the current buzzword of “diversity,” especially in the sense of racial diversity. Modern intellectuals praise genetic diversity while damning inbreeding, and, indeed, every population does need to vary genetically if natural selection is to function. But genetic diversity alone means nothing; after all, northern Europe has much less of it than black Africa.

Geographic isolation promotes not only genetic isolation, of course; it also promotes cultural isolation. Although trading routes in the ancient world often ensured that inventions and innovations would be picked up by nearby cultures—for example, the diffusion of “Arabic” numerals, perhaps originally from India, westward via the Arabs to Europe—one wonders to what extent the ascent to high civilization in Egypt, Greece, Rome, or England, say, could be attributed to the factor of cultural isolation and the slow build-up of tradition. As Raymond B. Cattell observes of modern times: “Possibly the musical beat from the jungle, or even the mood of the literature of Dostoyevsky, introduce incompatible elements in, say, Anglo-Saxon culture....”³³

A MODERN ARISTOCRACY

Returning to the problems of the present day, Ludovici had little time for contemporary so-called aristocrats. He remarked that “the Conservative and man of qualitative judgment—I do not mean the aristocratic ruler—is an example of a very definite type of mind and body, which occurs in all classes, and is by no means necessarily more common in the present House of Lords than in a coal-pit.”³⁴ After writing his *Defence of Aristocracy* he found, over eighty years ago, that the aristocrats, at least in England, didn't want to be defended: they already believed that their cause was lost. It might be coincidental, but Lord Lynton (who later became the Earl of Portsmouth), the main upper-class man Ludovici worked with in England, campaigning for a revival of British farming and other causes, was a most untypical lord, born in Chicago, of all places, and who had worked as a rancher in Kansas.

At any rate, in England over the last hundred years perhaps only a few dozen members of the upper class have worked for patriotic groups and movements, most notably in the 1930s, when members of the upper class joined various British groups that aimed at halting the drive to declare war on

Germany. After the Second World War, however, these people retreated to their grand houses and tended to disregard such important matters as immigration control. Judging by their accomplishments, then, the present-day “aristocracies” contain few valuable people, and any attempt at building upon an existing “aristocracy” to recreate past greatness will prove fruitless. In Robert Lacey’s words, the modern so-called aristocrat “is an inheritor, by definition, and though there are aristocrats, like Bertrand Lord Russell, who achieve things in their own right, the world is rather surprised by them—and the aristocracy as a whole is definitely disconcerted.”³⁵

Obvious remedies for the construction or reconstruction of an elite, hereditary or otherwise, are thin on the ground. If magic wands really worked, one might wish for the fairytale solution offered by Hans Christian Andersen’s story, “Everything in the Right Place,” in which one tootle from a magic flute administers a come-uppance to upstart and boorish lords and bankers, who are turfed out of their imposing houses and cast into their rightful place of shepherds’ cottages and henhouses.³⁶

Back in the real world, Ludovici argued over several decades that the West must begin by establishing and inculcating scientifically based values in human mating, only after which can flourishing peoples arise. From these peoples, he believed, nobilities will eventually emerge spontaneously, rather like Jefferson’s natural aristocrats, because ordinary people always recognize and willingly follow superior people. Unfortunately, Ludovici never explained how this line of thought dovetails with his suggestion that widespread envy prevents most people from accepting that others might be their superiors, although Hans F. K. Günther, for one, believed that education on the inheritance of talents could overcome envy incited by liberals and socialists.³⁷ Alas, the political groups that Ludovici associated with in the 1920s and 1930s—the elitist, ruralist, and quasi-masonic English Mystery and its successor, the English Array—were marked only by their obscurity and lack of influence.

Political theorists can dream up any number of parlor games to refine modern democracy. For example, nations might award votes in accordance with intelligence and allot perhaps five votes for anyone whose IQ puts them in the top 10 percent of the population and ten votes for anyone whose IQ is in the top 5 percent. Alternatively, nations might award votes solely to taxpayers, or to taxpayers who have passed tests in history, economics, and political science, say, *and* who have demonstrated their patriotism by serving in the armed forces. In such a country, politicians would have to raise their standards when campaigning for election.

But at present one can forget about political schemes to restrict the franchise. In the Western democracies any elitist party seeking to reduce the electorate will need the support of millions of voters, although it seems self-evident that such a party would attract little support. Although the masses are bored by politics, their vote is too precious to their self-esteem for

them to allow its withdrawal. Concluding, however reluctantly, that modern patriotic parties must favor democracy, Nick Griffin, the chairman of the British National Party, offers the clinching argument that turkeys will never vote for Christmas.³⁸ In England, such "far right" parties as the British National Party and the National Front have fallen over themselves in emphasizing that, at least internally, they are far more democratic than mainstream parties.

That perceptive writer, A. T. Culwick, once predicted that the most intelligent and most creative middle-class people – who are usually also the most overtaxed – might one day revolt en masse at their economic burdens and withhold their valuable services until the state grants them full political control.³⁹ It makes for a pleasant fantasy. But Culwick was writing in South Africa during the 1960s, a society where whites in general were politically aware and, faced by a large black majority, comparatively united. One cannot imagine his scheme working in atomized Western Europe or America nowadays, where the middle classes might grumble about crime, taxes, and government control, but, while their incomes remain high, rarely join forces effectively.

George Bernard Shaw proposed toward the end of his life that we replace modern democracy – or "this haphazard mobocracy," as he termed it – with "democratic aristocracy: that is, by the dictatorship, not of the whole proletariat, but of that five per cent of it capable of conceiving the job and pioneering in the drive towards its divine goal."⁴⁰ But exactly how, in practical terms, democratic aristocracy might supplant mobocracy, and exactly how one can identify these democratic aristocrats, Shaw never explained.

THE FUTURE

Always looking to the past, Ludovici reminded us that for the ancient Hindus the creation of a new hereditary elite required no less than seven generations. But can we in the West's crumbling civilization wait for seven generations, or about two hundred years, to experience this elite?

At least in this respect, Ludovici's views now seem antiquated. His approval of eugenics based on numerous offspring from appropriate marriages would have seemed familiar to Plato. But recent advances in genetic engineering have thrown up radically different prospects for man's biological future. At the current rate of discoveries in genetics, we shan't have to wait two hundred years for signs of evolutionary progress.

Nevertheless, Ludovici was right to stress that human groups should keep apart. For mankind to evolve into different species and maximize our descendants' chances of surviving in a pitiless universe, modern nations must splinter into a host of micronations – "ethnostates," as Wilmot Robertson calls them. Regrettably, for the past century or two our roads, railways, and now airways have all colluded to mix people together.

But we might soon find that artificial intelligence will match and even surpass mankind's accomplishments. Who knows, before the century is out intelligent machines may be so concerned by the stupidity and poor memories of even the brightest members of *Homo sapiens* that they will discuss denying us the vote—in our own best interests, of course.

For the time being, though, Ludovici's typically candid analysis has detected a flaw in the psychology of northern Europeans which means that the end of Western democracy is not yet in sight:

The Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon races have little of the seer in their constitution. They are better at meeting and enduring disaster than at foreseeing and forestalling it.... They are completely wedded to the doctrine of experience.... It is so with democracy and it will be so with ochlocracy. These things have been tried before. They are known and have proved fatal to the civilization that tried them. But what is that to the Teuton and Anglo-Saxon? He has no personal experience of their evils and is therefore determined to stake the fate of his civilization on trying them.⁴¹

Such candor makes Ludovici an ever-stimulating writer and, for those who hold with Spengler that "optimism is cowardice," a great prophet.

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ENDNOTES

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3. Dan Stone, *Breeding Superman: Nietzsche, Race and Eugenics in Edwardian and Interwar Britain* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002), p. 59.
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6. The poet Coventry Patmore described 1867 as "The year of the great crime / When the false English nobles and their Jew, / By God demented, slew / The trust they stood twice pledged to keep from wrong."

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16. *A Defence of Aristocracy*, pp. 302–6; *The Quest of Human Quality*, pp. 164–5.
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21. *The Choice of a Mate*, p. 118.
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23. Compare, perhaps, the late Princess of Wales's own observation that her brain was "the size of a pea," and the observation of many others that her mind, whatever its size, was not attuned to reality.
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IMMIGRATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION MEANS DISPOSSESSION

America Extinguished: Mass Immigration and the Disintegration of American Culture

Samuel T. Francis

Monterey, VA: Americans for Immigration Control, Inc., 2002

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215 pp., paperback

Reviewed by John Attarian

Over a million immigrants, virtually all non-white, enter America every year, and well over thirty million have arrived since 1970. Americans are taking this unprecedented flood calmly. Apparently they believe that these newcomers will assimilate—conform to American culture, folkways, and mores—just as their own immigrant ancestors did in the 1840s, 1890s, and 1910s, and that America will digest them without ill effects.

Not so, retorts paleoconservative columnist Samuel Francis, a penetrating observer of politics and culture. In this collection of columns written in 1998–2001, Dr. Francis argues persuasively that assimilation is not happening and that as a result, immigration is starting to radically transform America, with whites being dispossessed of economic, social, and political power, and of their culture too.

Studies, including a Center for Immigration Research and Education study in 1982 and a Census Bureau report in 1992, have pointed out that if current trends in non-white immigration and fertility continued, American whites would be a minority by about 2050. They have elicited little notice, much less alarm. Most Americans believe that race does not matter and that cultural differences will vanish as the newcomers become like us.

Mainstream conservatives and libertarians have a deep faith that insists that immigrants will assimilate. These people—Linda Chavez, Jack Kemp, Bill Bennett, Ben Wattenberg, and so on—typically argue that American identity is not

grounded in race, ethnicity, national origin, culture, or religion, but rather in a set of “propositions,” such as equality, entrepreneurship, “family values,” and so on. This reductive approach, Francis rightly observes, does not try to prove that “real assimilation, as understood by sociologists and anthropologists, was taking place,” but seeks to water down “the meaning of the concept of assimilation itself—and of America as a distinct, historically articulated culture as well.”

But if the “right” dilutes assimilation, liberals simply disdain it. They laud immigration as providing “diversity,” the real purpose of which, Francis bravely and rightly observes, is “to destroy whiteness.” Liberals forsake the image of the melting pot for the “salad bowl,” in which different groups will preserve their unique identities and perspectives. But salads are not famous for cohesion.

Dr. Francis excels at spelling out what assimilation is and why it matters. Many immigrants, he acknowledges, do assimilate and many others do so partially. But he makes the crucial point that assimilation itself admits of degrees. Minimal assimilation entails merely things like wearing blue jeans and eating fast food. Deeper assimilation involves adopting not only conventional American dress, speech, and the like, but also “cultural attitudes toward a multiplicity of kinds of behavior and the cultural norms that govern them.”

Bad as the new “American” practices of genital mutilation and witchcraft are, Dr. Francis rightly deems them less important than “the more fundamental and less tangible form of non-assimilation” regarding beliefs about the appropriate use of violence, the individual’s relationship to the group, and so on. These beliefs are part of every person’s basic outlook. Francis keenly observes that “precisely because most human beings simply don’t know what their attitudes on such matters are and have never consciously thought them out, they are not easily discarded at the borders of whatever country a person leaves and enters.” Therefore, they clash with the views of the host population. This explains why almost all multicultural or multiracial societies have had either authoritarian rule or instability. Achieving a consensus outlook in such societies is difficult. If neither authoritarian rule nor consensus exists, Balkanization follows: “physical fragmentation of a common political unit into its component ethnic, racial, and regional parts.”

Dr. Francis seconds George W. Bush, an immigration enthusiast, in seeing America as a melting pot, not a salad bowl, but points out that “the melting pot has been possible at all only because what was melted in it was never very different in the first place.” The overwhelming majority of immigrants until recently had a macro-level resemblance to the people already here: white, mostly Christian, with European folkways, institutions, and morals. “Since they were largely homogeneous to begin with, it’s not all that surprising they formed one nation that has retained that homogeneity until recently.” Unfortunately, the homogeneity no longer exists. Most of our recent immigrants are radically different from America’s host population, so assimilation is far more difficult.

Ominously, in many cases assimilation is not happening. "Nothing is more basic to the assimilation of immigrants in a foreign culture than learning its language," Dr. Francis rightly observes. But many Hispanics and other immigrants are not learning English—a strong sign that "they haven't assimilated and don't intend to." Indeed, special foreign-language schools for immigrant children are proliferating. Another sign of non-assimilation is the collapse in the naturalization rate. In 1970, about 90 percent of foreigners who had lived in America for over two decades were naturalized citizens; as of 1999, only 30 percent. Moreover, many Hispanics have a militant race consciousness and identify with Mexico, not America.

Why is assimilation not happening? Dr. Francis argues that mass immigration is the problem. When too many immigrants arrive at once, their language and folkways reinforced by large numbers of similar people, "they don't need to assimilate. Instead, they form their own communities and enclaves, and the surrounding society has to assimilate to them."

Yes and no. America experienced mass immigration before, with immigrants clustered in ethnic communities—Hamtramck in Detroit, for example—yet assimilation took place. My grandparents fled Armenia before World War I and came to Detroit, where an Armenian immigrant community resided. Grandma enrolled my father, born here in 1913, in an Armenian school, which impeded his learning English; he would address classmates at his public school in Armenian. One of his public school teachers told Grandma what was happening and insisted she pull him out of the Armenian school, because he would have to become fluent in English if he was going to get anywhere in America. She did, and he did. Assimilation happened in Grandma's day because America demanded it, and enforced it in institutions such as public schools, where most teachers were patriotic WASPs. Today's politically correct teachers, marinated in multiculturalism, would laud Grandma for retaining her Armenian identity, and place little Eddie Attarian in bilingual education.

But if Francis misses this point, he cites the Christians' apologizing for the Crusades and Pope John Paul II's apology for past Catholic sins, to nail why America no longer demands assimilation: "Western man no longer believes in himself or the civilization his ancestors created, crusaded for and died for." Myopic self-interest is also a factor. Both major political parties treat our exploding, ill-assimilated Hispanic immigrant population not as a national problem but as a voting bloc to be pandered to. California Republicans even deny funds to white candidates in favor of Hispanics. Both Al Gore and Bush have addressed Hispanic audiences in Spanish, presupposing that they had not assimilated.

Thanks to mass immigration, America's invertebrate failure either to stop it or enforce assimilation, and the cancer of political correctness, American whites are beginning to suffer dispossession. Immigration is literally running whites out of

California. Since apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives is based on states' total populations, including non-citizens, states with high immigration are gaining seats at the expense of states with low immigration; citizens' representation suffers accordingly. The push for a California state holiday honoring Cesar Chavez, opposition to Columbus Day parades in Denver, and the de-Christianization of Christmas by nonwhite immigrants witness for "the displacement of European-American civilization and its heroes, holidays and symbols by another civilization." The seizure of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe, Francis warns, is a grim portent of what might await American whites if immigration and immigrant fertility reduce them to a minority.

Even though polls reveal solid majorities of Americans opposed to immigration, it continues, Francis rightly maintains, because it enhances the wealth and power of the elites who dominate America. Business wants cheap immigrant labor, and hang the consequences for the larger community. For example, immigrants, with the carpet industry's blessing, poured into the Georgia towns of Dalton and Gainesville, causing whites to flee the schools. Churches and unions want immigrant members. Multiculturalists and welfare bureaucrats want to import a clientele.

The elites' self-serving conduct makes it brutally clear, Dr. Francis argues, that the American people cannot look to the elites to save America from being ruinously transformed by immigration. We must do it ourselves. The electoral victory of California's Proposition 187 shows that grassroots efforts can succeed. There is still some time left, he believes, but not much. "The day is soon coming—Mexican revanchists remind us of it all the time—when the immigrants will simply be too many for any sitting politician to call for immigration controls without inviting political suicide."

Sam Francis has an enviable knack for "reading" current events to divine what they reveal about both the present and the future; the penetration to see what he looks at; and the guts to report what he sees. The result is deep insight conveyed in vigorous, readable prose. Francis puts me in mind of the journalist Jules Machefer in Jean Raspail's *The Camp of the Saints*.

America Extinguished is one of the best warnings about the immigration menace I have read, a powerful work of prophecy. Fortunately it's priced to reach a mass audience. Buy it, read it, buy more copies, and pass them on.

Time is short.

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SETTING THE ISOLATIONIST RECORD STRAIGHT

A Story of America First:

The Men and Women Who Opposed U.S. Intervention in World War II

Ruth Sarles

Edited with an Introduction by Bill Kauffman

Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003

\$65.00

lvi + 238 pp.

Reviewed by Stephen J. Sniegowski

The America First Committee was the major anti-war group during the Roosevelt administration's preparations for American entrance into World War II. There was nothing novel about its stance. The idea of putting American interests paramount and of staying aloof from overseas conflicts had been the traditional foreign policy of the United States from the time of the Founding Fathers, and was most memorably articulated in George Washington's "Farewell Address." Yet the America First Committee was smeared by the Roosevelt administration and the interventionist media as a subversive "Nazi-transmission belt."

That negative image persists today among the liberal and neoconservative punditry. However, this has not been the case in the scholarly literature, especially in the works of the pre-eminent historian of the American "isolationists,"¹ Wayne S. Cole, who evaluates America First as patriotic and principled:

The committee's leaders rejected rioting and violence. They barred Nazis, Fascists, and anti-Semites from membership, and tried to enforce those bans. The committee used orderly democratic methods in desperate efforts to keep the United States out of the wars raging abroad. The committee's positions on foreign affairs were consistent with traditions extending back to the beginnings of

America's independent history and before. When war burst on America with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the committee ceased its noninterventionist activities, pledged support to the war effort, and dismantled its organization. Most of its members loyally supported the war against the Axis, and many, including some of its prominent leaders, served in America's armed forces. The America First Committee was a patriotic and honorable exercise of democracy in action at a critical time in American history.²

The manuscript that provides the basis for the book under review was written during the early years of World War II by Ruth Sarles, who had been a staff member of the America First Committee. The book was commissioned by William H. Regnery, a major financial backer of America First. Sarles finished the manuscript in October 1942; its publication comes over sixty years later. Historian Bill Kauffman, a libertarian sympathetic to non-interventionism, was selected to edit the work. Kauffman significantly shortened the massive 759-page manuscript but retained what he describes as "the pith of the manuscript: Sarles's knowledgeable accounts of the America First Committee's founding, its work with congressional allies, its popularity as measured in public opinion polls, the difficulties of being a loyal opposition as the war clouds descend, and the central role played by Charles A. Lindbergh."³ Kauffman does not present the book as the definitive account of the America First Committee, but rather as a supplement to other works on the subject such as those by Cole and Justus D. Doenecke, with Cole's *America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940-1941* remaining the "standard history."⁴

Despite her close connection to America First, Sarles wrote in an objective manner; her interpretation does not significantly differ from Cole's. Kauffman comments that such "Olympian detachment," which was recommended to her by Charles Lindbergh, "may suit a hero, but it does not always behoove an author. Sarles's book is a valuable compilation of facts and speeches – this is what America First sounded like – but it might have benefited from a dash of partisanship."⁵

The America First Committee originated as a student organization at Yale University Law School in early 1940 under the leadership of Robert Douglas Stuart, Jr., a law student there. The initial intention was to establish a national organization of college students opposed to American intervention in the ongoing European war, which had broken out in September 1939, but this effort soon expanded beyond the college ranks to become a general national anti-war organization headquartered in Chicago. Stuart served as its director, while its permanent "acting" national chairman was General Robert E. Wood, head of Sears and Roebuck. In 1941, it attained a membership of around 850,000. Prominent figures in America First included aviation hero Charles Lindbergh; liberal journalist John T. Flynn; the former head of the New Deal's National Recovery Administration, General Hugh Johnson; and Theodore Roosevelt's feisty daughter, Alice Roosevelt Longworth. Although its political

and financial support came disproportionately from conservative Midwesterners, Sarles depicts the extensive diversity in the organization. There were numerous liberals, and America First had significant regional support in every region of the country except the South.

America First was devoted to two fundamental principles: keeping the United States out of war and maintaining an "impregnable defense." Ironically, America First's positions here were superficially the same as the official policy of the Roosevelt administration. Given the overwhelming popular opposition to entering the war, it would have been politically suicidal for President Franklin D. Roosevelt to advocate anything else. Consequently, the Roosevelt administration resorted to public claims that aid to Britain was vital for America's defense and that such aid would actually serve to keep the United States out of war. Thus a major effort of America First was to show how such Roosevelt policies as lend-lease and the convoying of British ships would ineluctably embroil the United States in a shooting war. It would seem undeniable that America First was absolutely correct in its assessment of the effect of Roosevelt's policies, which by the fall of 1941 had drawn the United States into an undeclared naval war with Germany in the Atlantic and would ultimately induce Hitler's declaration of war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Roosevelt's more astute interventionist supporters have recognized that his public claims of "aid short of war" were nothing but political cover for his real aim of bringing the country into the war. As Establishment pro-war historian Thomas Bailey would acknowledge after the end of World War II:

Franklin Roosevelt repeatedly deceived the American people during the period before Pearl Harbor . . . He was like the physician who must tell the patient lies for the patient's own good. . . . A president who cannot entrust the people with the truth betrays a certain lack of faith in the basic tenets of democracy. But because the masses are notoriously shortsighted and generally cannot see danger until it is at their throats, our statesmen are forced to deceive them into an awareness of their own long-run interests. This is clearly what Roosevelt had to do, and who shall say that posterity will not thank him for it.⁶

It might be added that members of America First generally supported an Allied victory and were not averse to providing aid to Britain. Sarles notes that America First "favored aid to Britain within the limits of the neutrality law, but it opposed giving or selling or lending materials needed for our defense."⁷

Why did America First want to stay out of war? Obviously, since most sane individuals prefer peace to war, the proper question is why the Roosevelt administration was pushing (surreptitiously) for war. The Roosevelt administration claimed that America itself would ultimately be vanquished if Germany defeated Britain. Moreover, it portrayed the war as a crusade for freedom and democracy—the Four Freedoms, the noble principles of the Atlantic Charter—against Nazi totalitarianism, despotism, and military subjugation.

Members of America First did not see European war as a Manichaeic conflict of good versus evil, but as more a traditional European power struggle. Some feared that war would so enervate Europe as to pave the way for a Communist takeover—a belief also held by Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, incidentally—so that the best alternative would be a negotiated peace. Moreover, adherents of America First believed that if the United States entered the war it would become a fascist military state itself, with the termination of traditional American civil and economic liberties.

While America Firsters were not proved right in all their predictions, on balance they were more correct than their interventionist adversaries. Obviously, the war did not bring about a reign of peace, as the interventionists had claimed.⁸ The war led to the killing of millions of civilians, but victory did not actually improve American security. The Soviet Union, strengthened by its war conquests, quickly became America's implacable foe and developed the offensive capability to destroy the American homeland. And the United States became a permanently militarized state—though perhaps not as dictatorial as America Firsters envisioned.

Of course it is now widely believed that somehow Nazi persecution of the Jews provided the imperative for the United States to join the war. That reason, however, was never expressed in the debate that preceded American entrance into the war, and even as a very belated *ex post facto* justification, it is obvious that American intervention did not prevent it.

Since Establishment opinion has always been, and continues to be, absolutely supportive of the "Good War," it is rather ironic that America First was founded at Yale by scions of the American elite who, as Kauffman points out, "went on to spectacular careers as pillars of the postwar American Establishment."⁹ These included Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, Yale president Kingman Brewster, President Gerald R. Ford, and Peace Corps organizer and vice-presidential candidate R. Sargent Shriver, Jr. R. Douglas Stuart served as ambassador to Norway from 1984 to 1989 and as chairman of the Council of American Ambassadors. In contrast to the anti-American ethos of later antiwar movements, most of the founders of America First, including Stuart, were reserve army officers.

America First lost every major political battle—lend-lease, convoys, entering combat zones—but it was successful in delaying America's entrance into the war. Sarles sees this as a positive achievement, maintaining that the United States would not have been ready for war at an earlier date.¹⁰ Of course, if America First had been successful, the United States would have stayed out of the war altogether.

Although its enemies constantly smeared it as being pro-Nazi, America First explicitly banned Nazis and tried to keep out other disreputable folks, including "anti-Semites." Of course, a question (seldom asked) is what actually constitutes "anti-Semitism." Apparently, to the America First leadership, anti-Semitism included the view that Jews had a hand in pushing the United States

toward war. Sarles writes that the America First Committee "was constantly weeding from active positions in local chapters individuals who spread anti-Semitism by publicly blaming the Jews for the trend toward war."¹¹

Referring to anything that might imply Jewish power and influence is one of the great taboos of modern American life.¹² It is, in fact, so great a taboo that it is taboo to refer to it as a taboo. Charles Lindbergh, of course, violated that taboo in his much noted (or, in the current Establishment's view, notorious) Des Moines speech of September 11, 1941, in which he claimed that "The three most important groups who have been pressing this country toward war are the British, the Jewish, and the Roosevelt administration" (see p. 7 of this issue). This was Lindbergh's only public reference to Jewish war influence, but interventionists and Jewish groups became apoplectic over this alleged evidence of "anti-Semitism." As Wayne Cole writes, "neither Lindbergh nor America First ever recovered from the staggering blows that statement brought upon them. One might have thought that Lindbergh had personally ordered the Holocaust."¹³ Although some leading figures of America First were concerned about the impact of Lindbergh's speech on public relations, many subscribed to the now quaint notion that "No group in a democracy is entitled to immunity from criticism. It was hard to believe that any group in America could be regarded as occupying a position where its attitude on any public question should be unmentionable and that anyone who did mention them should be accused of trying to incite prejudice."¹⁴ If such limits on freedom were "hard to believe" in 1941, it certainly demonstrates the diminution of freedom since that time, to the point where today all public speech must fit the Procrustean bed of political correctness, where not only "hate speech" but "insensitivity" can bring upon the offender serious sanctions. It should be added that left out in the brouhaha over Lindbergh's speech was the issue of its veracity. "Greatly confusing the matter," Kauffman notes, "was the minor detail that Lindbergh was *right*: Jewish groups *were* solidly behind the push for war."¹⁵

It might be added that since World War II is universally portrayed in today's media as the "Good War," American Jews can now acknowledge the Jewish role in intervention, as political scientist Benjamin Ginsberg, director of the Center for Governmental Studies at Johns Hopkins University, does in his revealing *The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State*. Among the efforts to mould public opinion for war, Ginsberg points out that Jewish Hollywood filmmakers concentrated on the production of anti-Nazi propaganda films. In short, although it is regarded as "anti-Semitic" to "blame" Jewish groups for pushing the United States into World War II, it is permissible to praise them for doing the very same thing. Ginsberg even points out that the Anti-Defamation League "employed investigative agents who secretly penetrated isolationist and anti-Semitic organizations and collected potentially damaging or incriminating information," which it turned over to the FBI and other federal agencies.¹⁶

The Anti-Defamation League was not alone in using underhanded tactics to try to destroy the America First Committee. The Roosevelt administration and British intelligence also engaged in such tactics. Significantly, for all the talk by America Firsters of Roosevelt's quest for dictatorship, the organization's leadership seemed to possess an illusory faith in the fundamental fairness of the American government. Sarles portrays America First as such an upstanding organization that it went so far as to voluntarily give its membership lists over to the federal government for investigation.¹⁷ Obviously, such efforts made America First vulnerable to its enemies, but could never really persuade them of its innocence, since those enemies interpreted "truth" to be what advanced their own war agenda, and certainly smearing the opponents of war intervention as pro-Nazi advanced that agenda.

America First essentially suffered the same fate as all popular anti-Establishment groups in America deemed to be too far right of center. The Establishment constantly portrayed it as malicious, and nothing it could do could remove that stigma. The Roosevelt administration's heaping of lavish praise on "Uncle Joe" Stalin and the Soviet Union, support for the incarceration of Japanese Americans, enactment of the genocidal Morgenthau Plan, terror-bombing of civilians, and repatriating prisoners to Stalin's lethal work camps never seemed to tarnish its beneficent image. And the fact of the matter is that both Truman and Roosevelt held negative views of Jews. Truman even went so far as to claim (in his diary) that Jews selfishly put their interest above that of other peoples.¹⁸ All of these negatives were rendered insignificant by support of the "Good War." Most have long ago disappeared down the Orwellian memory hole to all but scholars of a revisionist bent.

Does the history of the America First Committee have relevance today? The very idea of putting America first puts one on the fringes of the political right, in the realm of bone-headed chauvinism, if not malevolent racism. Today America follows a policy of global imperialism through its "war on terrorism," and the stated American goal is to make other societies, especially in the Middle East, "democratic." Like President Roosevelt, the Bush administration lied the country into war—in fact, in one sense, it was evidently a greater lie since the "weapons of mass destruction" invoked as the *casus belli* were non-existent, whereas Pearl Harbor really was attacked. Once again it is "anti-Semitic" to mention that any Jews, in this case the neo-conservatives, have played a role in bringing the country into war. It should be pointed out that the "anti-Semitic" standard has broadened beyond the prohibition of referring to Jews as a collectivity to actually silencing any reference to a particular small group of Jews.

The ongoing global war/imperialist policy is being promoted by self-styled conservatives and a purportedly conservative administration. The major opposition to the war has come from the radical left, which is characterized by support for revolutionary socialism, anti-Americanism, and general hostility to traditional Western culture. While there has been opposition to the war from

right-wing intellectuals – paleoconservatives and paleolibertarians – what has been lacking has been the grass-roots and financial support to develop a patriotic anti-war organization. That nothing like America First could emerge in 2002–2003 shows how far the mainstream American populace has strayed from the republican principles that once served as the nation’s foundation, and which were still largely extant in pre-World War II America.

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ENDNOTES

1. The opponents of a war of American military intervention did not like the term “isolationist,” but it has become part of common parlance, demonstrating the power of the interventionist/internationalists to shape the language.
2. Wayne S. Cole, *Determinism and American Foreign Relations during the Franklin D. Roosevelt Era* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America), 1995, p. 40.
3. Sarles, *A Story of America First*, p. xlvii.
4. *Ibid.*, p. xlvii.
5. *Ibid.*, p. xlv.
6. Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 13.
7. Sarles, p. 8.
8. I wrote about interventionist beliefs in my Ph.D. dissertation, “The Intellectual Wellsprings of American World War II Interventionism,” University of Maryland, 1977. A brief summary of some of this information can be found on the Internet. See Stephen J. Sniegoski, “Decline and Renewal: American World War II Interventionists,” *World & I*, February 1987 (<http://www.worldandi.com/public/1987/february/mt6.cfm>).
9. Sarles, p. xxi.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
12. It is, of course, one of those taboos that *The Occidental Quarterly* deals with. For example, see TOQ Editors, “The Question of Jewish Influence,” *The Occidental Quarterly* 3:2 (Summer 2003) (<http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol3no2/toq-editnote3-2.html>), and Kevin MacDonald, “Understanding Jewish Influence I: Background Traits for Jewish Activism,” 3:2 (Summer 2003) (<http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol3no2/toq-editnote3-2.html>).
13. Cole, *Determinism*, p. 41.
14. Sarles, p. 57.
15. *Ibid.*, p. xxxiii.
16. Benjamin Ginsberg, *The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 110.
17. Sarles, pp. 33–37.

18 President Harry S. Truman wrote in a 1947 diary that was recently discovered on the shelves of the Truman Library:

"The Jews, I find are very, very selfish. They care not how many Estonians, Latvians, Finns, Poles, Yugoslavs or Greeks get murdered or mistreated as D[isplaced] P[ersons] as long as the Jews get special treatment. Yet when they have power, physical, financial or political neither Hitler nor Stalin has anything on them for cruelty or mistreatment to the under dog." "Harry S. Truman 1947 Diary," July 21, Truman Presidential Museum and Library (<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/diary/page21.htm>); "The Truman Diary," *Washington Post*, July 18, 2003, p. A-18 (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8864-2003Jul17.html>).

THE FIRE MARSHAL'S REPORT ON RACE AND GLOBALIZATION

World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability

Amy Chua

New York: Doubleday, 2003

\$26.00

288 pp.

Reviewed by David Wilson

Amy Chua's awakening to racial and ethnic reality began more rudely than most. Her aunt, a wealthy ethnic Chinese woman living in the Philippines, was murdered in 1994 by her Filipino servant. What appeared at first to be a random killing turned out to have a decidedly racial undertone. As Chua came to discover, the intense resentment felt by the mostly poor Filipino majority toward the exceedingly wealthy Chinese minority in that country has led to the kidnapping of hundreds of Chinese a year, some of whom are murdered even after a ransom is paid. Others are killed in connection with robberies. The police, who are ethnic Filipino, are "notoriously unmotivated" to investigate crimes against Chinese, Chua says. The servant who murdered her aunt was never apprehended.

The experience got Chua, a Yale law professor who is herself ethnically Chinese, thinking about ethnic relations in countries where a majority and a minority share space and compete economically. She turned her attention to the United States' push to implement its favored political and economic systems—democracy and free markets—in countries around the world. She concludes in her book, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*, that the effort can lead to disaster.

In the many countries with a “market-dominant minority,” free markets and democracy are two trains on a collision course, she says, especially in countries where the markets and the democracy were rapidly introduced. Free markets concentrate wealth in the hands of an able and connected few, while democracy concentrates power in the hands of the poorer majority. When the few constitute one race or ethnicity and the majority constitute another, the result is chronic tension, repressive regimes, and genocide. This she calls the “sobering lesson of globalization over the last twenty years.”

As might be expected from a liberal academic, Chua ignores racial differences in intelligence and temperament as explanations for differences in economic success. Only briefly does she mention “cultural differences” as a possible explanation. Disappointingly, she seems to deny any biological basis for race at all. “Ethnicity,” she says, preferring the word to race, is “not a scientifically determinable status” but “a kind of group identification, a sense of belonging to a people ... That ethnicity can be at once an artifact of human imagination and rooted in the darkest recesses of history—fluid and manipulable yet important enough to kill for—is what makes ethnic conflict so terrifyingly difficult to understand and contain.”

Of course, to the growing number of Americans now viewing current events from a more racially conscious perspective, ethnic conflict is not difficult to understand. The races of the world are often profoundly different, a fact with far-reaching consequences, not the least of which is group conflict. Yet Chua’s book ranks as one of the few from a liberal perspective I am aware of that acknowledges some measure of racial reality. “[Ethnic] identity is rarely constructed out of thin air,” she concedes. “Try telling black and white Zimbabweans that they are only imagining their ethnic differences—that ‘ethnicity is a social construct’—and they’ll at least agree on one thing: that you’re not being very helpful.” Whatever doubts she has about the validity of race as a social function, she at least proceeds as if it were, faithfully reporting the fact of racial conflict without reflexive harping about oppressors and the oppressed.

In Chua’s book, I see revealed an academic who accepts the moral postulate of racial equality but sees racial difference at work in the world. She insists that it is the combination of politics, economics, and race that sets off explosions, perhaps taking comfort that by juggling the three, she can toss up the race ball when it gets too hot. Still, I am calling her book progress. If conservatives won’t start acknowledging racial conflict from new perspectives, maybe liberals will.

World on Fire takes the reader on a spicy world tour, highlighting the ethnic undercurrents of global business. She begins in Burma, where, as in many countries of southeast Asia, the Chinese dominate the economy. We meet characters like Lo Hsing-han, a Chinese businessman who began as an opium warlord in the 1960s but has come to have (relatively) legitimate business holdings estimated at \$600 million, including valuable ruby concessions and

stakes in jade mining. Meanwhile, many of the indigenous Burmans, 69 percent of the population, make about \$300 a year. The military government is run by ethnic Burmese, who are described by Chua as working hand in hand with the wealthy Chinese. Both, she says, are resented by the majority of Burmans. The result is a country reported to have one of the worst human rights abuse records in the world, including bans on Internet use, political organization, and free expression.

In Latin America, Chua lays bare what anyone who's seen pictures of Vicente Fox or Augusto Pinochet has come to suspect: that the successful sorts who run the show down there are primarily of European extraction. The blacks of Brazil and indigenous Amerindians of Bolivia and other countries occupy the lower rungs of society, economically and otherwise. At a dinner party in La Paz with a former student, she observes that "most were what North Americans would consider 'white'—light-skinned, blond and blue-eyed, auburn-haired and green-eyed, and so on. They were also disproportionately good-looking and on average about a foot taller than the indigenous maid and manservant serving us." Interestingly, she reports that in Brazil, despite years of racial mixing and boasts of utopian racial harmony, a "pigmentocracy" has always held, with whites at the top.

In recent years, however, indigenous politicians have made inroads in South America by appealing explicitly to race. Peru's Alejandro Toledo won the 2001 presidential elections with a campaign targeted toward the dark-skinned Peruvians "who look like I do." In Bolivia, an Amerindian movement led by an Aymaran known as "Mallku," or great condor, was threatening in 2001 to take over parts of the country. Bolivia "belongs to the Aymara and Quechua Indians and not the whites," he declared. "The whites should leave the country. We cannot negotiate the blood of my brothers. Kill me if you are men!"

In post-Soviet Russia, Jewish economic power has fueled considerable anti-Jewish sentiment. The outrageously wealthy "oligarchs" are widely hated by the Russian public. Chua came to suspect their Jewishness after reading a draft of an article by a Yale Law School colleague on the privatization woes in Russia. She remarked to the colleague—who was Jewish—that the key players had been Jewish. The professor angrily denied it, but in fact six of the seven "oligarchs" were Jewish. These men, some of whom had sharpened their business skills in the Soviet black markets, achieved extraordinary economic and political power by offering a "loans for shares" deal, in which they filled the empty Russian treasury in exchange for pennies-on-the-dollar shares in formerly state businesses rich in nickel, gold, and oil.

One of the more notorious Jewish oligarchs, Boris Berezovsky, convinced Russians to pour \$50 million into his "Avva Fund," ostensibly for the purpose of building a new car in a joint project with GM. The project went nowhere, but Berezovsky made off with \$50 million, tax-free. Another, Mikhail

Khodorkovsky, chairman of Yukos, Russia's second-largest oil company, installed cameras to monitor employees in one of the companies he took over and eventually fired a third of them. The result, Chua says, is Russian frustration with Jews that reveals itself with references to "zioncrats" and "bloodsucking Yids" on the Internet, anti-Jewish leaflets, and denunciations of Jewish economic control in the Duma.

The horrific murders of white farmers by Robert Mugabe's black followers provide a stark example of the market-dominant minority theory. Once unleashed by "democracy," blacks in Zimbabwe set about seizing the farmlands, killing the farmers, and declaring whites the enemy. "Vote for Zanu PF and you will all be given land, farms, houses," it was said, as the 2002 elections approached. "Down with the whites. Down with colonialism. Down with the MDC. Down with Britain."

Chua stretches her thesis—in my opinion, too thinly—to include whole countries as "market-dominant minorities" in certain regions, citing the United States as a "market-dominant minority" of the world and Israel as a "market-dominant minority" of the Middle East. The dominance, she says, helps to explain why Arabs and Muslims worldwide would have anti-American sentiments. Here, I think Chua overlooks what motivates much Arab and Muslim resentment of the United States: its alliance with and support of Israel, whose conflicts with the Arab world need no detailing here. She also reaches back into history to apply her market-dominant minority idea, noting that the American South following the Civil War and Weimar Germany following World War I both experienced rapid democratization and economic destabilization. In the South, blacks were enfranchised by amendments to the Constitution, and in Germany, a left-leaning republic was replacing monarchy. In the South, whites held property and were surrounded by former slaves, while in Germany, the minority Jews were "perceived" to control the economy (though Chua acknowledges that in some sectors they did dominate). The result, she says, was white attempts to disenfranchise blacks and the deaths of Jews at the hands of Hitler's forces.

The United States today, and much of the rest of the West, Chua says, do not suffer from the market-dominant minority problem because they don't have a market-dominant minority. Whites are still a numerical majority in the United States, and within the top stratum of the American wealthy, there are few Jews. Advanced economies with high levels of tax-and-spend wealth transfers take care of the rest. Here, Chua underestimates the racial tensions within the United States, neglecting to mention its frequent racial violence and open-immigration pandemonium. And if Jews aren't a market-dominant minority, they certainly qualify as a media-and-politics dominant minority.

But even without the levels of internal ethnic conflict experienced elsewhere, the proliferation of McDonald's and other marks of U.S. economic dominance across the world creates resentment toward us, Chua

says. This is where her theory starts to fall apart. As noted, Arab and Muslim resentment is fueled mostly by U.S. support of Israel, and, to date, Islamic militants are the only ones to have directly attacked the United States. A French farmer's dismantling of a McDonald's restaurant in France can hardly be equated with suicide attacks using commandeered airplanes.

In fact, there is evidence that once the territorial designs of an economically successful country are factored out, the rest of the region responds favorably to it. Smaller regional countries in Asia are now reported to be looking toward China as a trading partner. Nor is China's racial homogeneity presenting any sort of problem. Chua concedes that "in societies with no market-dominant minority, the division between the few who are rich and the many who are poorer is unlikely to be ethnicized – but it remains, at least potentially, a source of conflict," potentially being the key word. It is only when the Chinese filter out to smaller Asian nations and set up shop that the problems arise. Chua cites no examples of monoracial societies beset by conflict and bloodshed, economic or otherwise.

The reader eager for Chua's brilliant solution to the world's ethnic conflicts will be disappointed; in fact, to her credit, she acknowledges there may be none. A solution like "additional education spending" typically "produces depressingly few benefits," she says, and believably so. She dismisses forced assimilation. I was surprised to hear Chua recommend affirmative action as a possible ameliorative, but she righted herself by later acknowledging that affirmative action often creates more tension than it soothes. Beyond that, she resorts to that liberal catchall, more spending on the poor. But even here, Chua so honestly qualifies the benefits to be had as to acknowledge that spending, too, can be of little help. If nothing else, it will demonstrate humility, she says. As an example, she cites Coca-Cola's construction of El Paplote, a children's museum in Mexico City.

Whether such gestures yield results is questionable. If, in fact, huge cash donations by wealthy white Americans to poor black and Hispanic Americans served to lessen racial tension, then Bill Gates's recent donation to New York City public schools would mean that white people in New York City would not be subject to racial attacks by blacks and Hispanics. And yet they are. In recent decades, whites have clamored to present blacks with gift baskets on bended knee, and yet blacks have only become more resentful, more demanding, and more violent. Similarly, the American government's coddling of illegal immigrants has resulted in only more brazen demands by the immigrants and their lobbyists.

Chua concludes that "Market dominance is surprisingly intractable, and resistant to government-sponsored 'corrective' ethnic policies." But as Chua herself seems to admit, it isn't really "market dominance" that's so intractable.

After all, as Chua details, a racial majority can and will seize the assets of a market-dominant minority through nationalization, which may dampen economic performance but certainly solves the problem of market dominance by a minority. What Chua really means is that racial difference is surprisingly intractable, and resistant to government-sponsored corrective ethnic policies.

It is interesting that Chua would lay out so thoroughly the incompatibility of democracy, markets, and multiracialism. Her critical praise on the dust jacket takes her work to be an indictment of “markets” and “democracy.” Needless to say in this day and age, “multiracialism” is left out. For Chua, as for so many others, multiracialism is a given that we must work around. But why? If democracy and free markets are not compatible with multiracialism, is she suggesting that totalitarianism and communism are? In fact, she might be: Tito, she recalls, kept a lid on ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia with just those tools.

That should be a sobering insight for the multitudes of conservative and liberal race-deniers, and it is perhaps the best insight to be drawn from *World on Fire*. If the price of multiracialism is the loss of freedom, do we want to pay it?

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THE WARPED PHENOMENON OF WHITE RACISM

Racism: A Short History

George M. Fredrickson

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002

\$35.00

207 pp.

Reviewed by Robert S. Griffin

On the History Channel recently, I saw what has become classic documentary footage from the mid-1950s of the entry of black students into the previously all-white Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. President Eisenhower had dispatched federal troops to Little Rock to ensure that white resistance would not disrupt the court-ordered desegregation of the school. Two grainy black-and-white images come to mind from the footage: The first, a hundred or so soldiers marching down a city street twelve abreast toward the camera, rifles held diagonally in front of them, helmets obscuring their faces, heavy boots striking the pavement in unison. The second image, a black girl of about fifteen, dark-rimmed glasses, hair straightened and neatly combed, in a white blouse and dark skirt, clutching her school books tightly to her chest as she strides quickly toward the school steps amid soldiers and a throng of protesting whites.

I had seen these pictures time and again over the years and, as always, they were riveting—an incredibly tense time, a charged moment, that came through. But while the visceral impact of this footage was as strong as ever, I was struck by how drastically its meaning had changed for me this time. Always before, I had perceived these scenes in the same way. The protagonists had been the black students—I just looked it up, there were nine of them, and this was 1957. They were the focal actors in the drama, its heroes, if you will. They were the ones I cared about. Their fate was the central question at hand.

Drama involves conflict, and the conflict in this drama as I had always seen it until this last time was over whether or not these black children would achieve equal educational opportunity. The antagonists in the drama were the whites who were there that day. They were the “other,” faceless, nameless, the villains in the piece.

The morality in this conflict was clear-cut: the black children were on the side of justice, on the side of fairness and decency, on the side of progress, on the side of history. They were aligned with what America stands for at its core, at its best: justice for all. The whites, in contrast, represented the oppressive and cruel system of racial segregation. They embodied bigotry and backwardness. As for the soldiers, until this last time I saw them as being on the side of righteousness as they protected the innocent and peaceful black children from the mob of racist and violence-prone whites that pressed in upon them.

And every time but this last time the drama had had a happy ending: Through their bravery and determination, these black children, with the support of an enlightened civil rights leadership and a benevolent federal presence, won the right to go to school just like all children have the right to go to school, and that was a victory not only for them and the civil rights movement generally, but for us all. Their victory was a victory for America.

But this time for me the story was a different one. The pictures and the narration were the same as they had always been, but the drama had changed. This time, the protagonists weren't the black children but rather the white parents. I found myself looking beyond the faces of the black children in the foreground to the white faces in the background, bringing them into focus if I could. This time, instead of being “them,” the white people were “us,” my people. Who were they? I asked myself. Why haven't I ever heard from them? This time, the central issue wasn't justice for blacks; instead, it was whether the whites' cultural and racial integrity and freedom of association would be compromised. This time the drama was about democracy and the right of a people to control their own destiny rather than have it dictated from afar. This time the drama was about whether white children, as well as their parents, would be compelled at the point of a bayonet to acquiesce to something that in the deepest recesses of their beings they found abhorrent. This time the soldiers represented tyranny, not protection. And this time the story didn't have a happy ending. This time freedom lost, our republic lost, people of European heritage—white people, the white race—lost ... and this time I lost.

This Central High School footage had a completely different meaning for me this time and I knew why. I had written a book in the late 1990s—*The Fame of a Dead Man's Deeds*—about the late William Pierce, a white nationalist leader, and had followed that up with other writings that had brought me into contact with a number of racially conscious white Americans, and I had learned of another way of perceiving the race question in this country. Also, in the process

of researching these writing projects my own racial awareness and commitment had been heightened. So the change in my perception of the Central High School footage this last time is no great mystery.

What does intrigue me, however, is how I had come to see these events as I had all those other times. It certainly hadn't come from direct experience. I hadn't been in the South or around the people and events of that time. Rather, I had picked up my frame of reference—my basic assumptions, my outlook, what I thought the story was about—second hand: from what I had learned in school and from the media. That is to say, my contact with the civil rights movement in general and this Little Rock incident in particular had been mediated contact. What I knew, or thought I knew, had come to me vicariously, from, call it, the flow of public discourse, from the ideas and images in films, television, newspapers, mass market magazines, popular writings, from politicians, university professors and teachers in elementary and secondary schools. People had stood between me and reality, and they had depicted and interpreted it for me; that's what had happened.

I find it particularly interesting, looking back on this process, how absolutely certain I had always been that the facts and interpretations that had been presented to me and the frame, the story, I had created were valid. I find it remarkable now, thinking back on it, how I was completely, utterly confident that I knew what was going on in the area of race relations in America. It never occurred to me that there might be another way to look at these phenomena. The flow, or stream, of public discourse, as I'm calling it, had not simply given me a way to look at racial matters, it had provided me with what seemed to be the only defensible way to perceive this concern; to the point that, even though I hadn't investigated the situation for myself, I had a strong sense of superiority, a smugness, really. I was in the know and I was on the moral high ground. Plus, I belonged: I was a member of the enlightened group who were allied against the forces of darkness.

As I look back on it, I had done what we all do: I had distilled everything I had been told and shown about race and the civil rights movement and its leadership, all that I had taken from the stream of public discourse on this topic, and put together an overall sense of what was going on and ought to go on in the area of race in this country. The distillation had been easy in this instance. I hadn't encountered any conflicting views; there wasn't any complicating dissonance for me to resolve that I knew about. It's this process of deriving a "sense of it all" from the many particulars that is the angle I bring to a critique of George Fredrickson's recent book, *Racism: A Short History*. I look here at Fredrickson's book not from the perspective of his intentions or the specifics of what he writes but rather from the perspective of what I think a reader will take away from this book. My point is that the impact of this book on individual readers and on this society and culture will be less a function of what the book says than what readers take from it, what remains inside of them after reading it.

Fredrickson is professor emeritus of U.S. history at Stanford University and has a long publishing record in the area of race going all the way back to the 1960s. The titles of three of his books give a sense for how he approaches this topic: *The Black Image in the White Mind*; *White Supremacy*; and *Black Liberation*. *Racism: A Short History* is based on a series of lectures Fredrickson gave at Princeton University. The book is indeed short, but at least for me its plodding academic prose overcame its brevity and made for a long and tedious read. I suspect that the only people besides reviewers and academics in this area of inquiry who will read this book will be students who take it on as an assigned reading for courses. I know if I hadn't volunteered to review the book, I wouldn't have finished it.

Like so many so-called scholarly books, the Fredrickson book is largely a series of paraphrases of the writings of other academics. I didn't find it fresh: I brought only the average layman's level of knowledge on this topic to the book, and yet I'd heard just about all of this before somewhere or another. Frankly, the book read to me like the product of a sincere, dutiful, hard-working but uninspired graduate student. I work in a university and I have spent a lot of my time reading this kind of thing. What I find interesting is how much positive attention this pedestrian work has received in the mainstream media: "masterly," "learned and elegant," "intense, incisive," "crisp, clear prose," and so on. Clearly, this book is very appealing to those who metaphorically row their boats in the mainstream waters of public discourse. Fredrickson is telling them what they like to hear. Staying with the metaphor, Fredrickson doesn't rock any boats.

Racism: A Short History focuses on the persecution of Jews and blacks over the centuries, especially by Christians, and on three relatively recent phenomena: racism against Negroes in the Southern United States between 1890 and 1950; events in South Africa between 1910 and the 1980s; and the "horrendous climax," Fredrickson's words, of anti-Semitism in Germany between 1933 and 1945. I read the book a couple of weeks before writing this review and tried to be conscientious about it. Since I want to center this review on what is likely to be retained by the book's readers, I didn't go back through the book or any notes that I had made while reading it before answering the question, what am I left with after reading this book?

At the level of specificity, I remember very little of the flood of details I encountered in the book, and for the most part even with those I'm not altogether sure that something I think I recall wasn't actually gotten from some other source, some other time—again, so much of this book seemed familiar, derivative. One thing Fredrickson's book talks about that has stuck with me is the "curse of Ham." I remember that as the use of a passage in Genesis in centuries past to explain the plight of blacks. Blacks, so it goes, are descendents of Ham, who was the son of Noah, and are cursed and condemned to perpetual bondage because of Ham's mistreatment of his father. I just now checked the

book and found that with this curse of Ham idea, Fredrickson was reporting the work of a couple of other historians, Bernard Lewis and William McKee, and then reiterated it three times, which is perhaps why I remember it. There are a few other details like the curse of Ham business that I remember, but they don't amount to much. My contention, though, is that just because I and other readers—I assume I am a typical reader of this book—can't remember much of anything specific, it doesn't mean nothing came through to me, to us. Indeed, there were messages, generalizations, a basic feel of "all of it," what racism is about, that did come through to me and that I think add up to something important. Namely:

- *Racism is a failing of gentile whites.* In this book on the history of racism, every example of racist conduct, no exceptions, was committed by white gentiles. In the entire book, the only racists were white gentiles. It isn't much of a stretch to conclude, at a global, "totally felt" level, if not at the completely articulate level, that if you're talking about racism you are talking about white gentiles. And more, if you're a white gentile and the topic of racism comes up, it's about you.

- *There is absolutely no defensible reason at all for racism.* Its victims—minorities, Jews—have done nothing whatsoever to provoke racist actions against them. Racism is senseless and stupid and vile, period. No need to look any further into what precipitates it. Case closed.

- *Racism is a very wide-ranging phenomenon.* The Holocaust, enslavement, racial segregation, questions about the mutability of human beings, assertions that there are persistent physical or cultural differences among peoples, white separatist impulses, collective actions by whites, animosity toward Third World immigration, disapproval by whites of other groups, social exclusion—all are part of the same package, racism. In fact, the favorable critical reception of *Racism: A Short History* centers on Fredrickson's linkage of racism to a whole host of actions and thoughts (racism is thinking the wrong way as well as doing the wrong thing; a thought crime, if you will), especially as it ties racial animosity and anti-Semitism together. It should be pointed out, however, that this amorphous concept of racism has been common parlance in universities for years; it comes at students all the time. Fredrickson is simply reiterating and endorsing it.

- *The Christian church is suspect.* Yes, there is its universalism—we are all one under Jesus and so on—but that positive is outweighed by the negative of the Church's deprecation and abuse of Jews and blacks.

- *Gentile whites should carefully watch their step lest they be guilty of the sin of racism.* Affirmation of European traditions and one's white racial identity and solidarity with other whites? Criticism of minorities, refusal to defer to and serve minority interests? Talk about Jewish influence on American culture and foreign policy? Movement to create white organizations paralleling those serving the interests of minorities and Jews? Thinking or doing anything other

than liking and approving of minorities and Jews? Suppress those impulses; condemn them when they arise from within you. They are arguably racist in themselves, and in any case they place you on a slippery slope to outright oppression and even genocide.

Those basic messages are what I am left with two weeks after reading *Racism: A Short History*, and I suspect that that is what the university students who will read book for courses will be left with two weeks after the test.

So what do I conclude from all this?

First, unless you have insomnia that you are trying to combat I'm not recommending you read *Racism: A Short History*. Second, we need to keep in mind that the personal, social, and cultural impact of a book—or television show, or movie, or lecture, whatever—isn't what it says so much as it is what readers/viewers take away from it. Fredrickson's book may not be all that good as a piece of scholarship and work of prose, but it is very good at getting across certain fundamental messages to readers who choose to or, more likely, are compelled to read it. Third, what I am calling the flow of public discourse is very powerful in shaping how one perceives and lives in the world. To his credit, Fredrickson has actively participated in this public forum, this public dialogue, and other ways to put it. He has written books that generations of university students have read and will read. He has taught and graded thousands of the best and the brightest at one of America's premier universities. If you and I have a story about race to tell different from the one the Fredricksons of the world are telling, we are going to have to find a way to get our boats into the mainstream waters.

Robert S. Griffin is the author of One Sheaf, One Vine: Racially Conscious White Americans Talk about Race.

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