To a casual observer, the British writer and thinker Anthony Ludovici, one of the most politically incorrect Europeans of the twentieth century, was a paradox. After all, he had in the Jewish Nietzschean Dr. Oscar Levy a close friend, mentor, and patron—and yet Ludovici had toured Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s and found much to admire there. Ludovici’s most loyal friends, he recognized, were all women—and yet, as an extreme antifeminist who wanted women to remain in the home, he could describe academic knowledge gained by women as “so much trash.” His grandparents were natives of France, Germany, and the Basque country—and yet he repeatedly attacked human outbreeding, even between Europeans from different countries.¹

But Ludovici was not a paradox. The man’s detailed arguments about race, eugenics, feminism, and many other subjects always ran along strictly logical lines, just as a train holds to its rails. Ludovici had the kind of objectivity and intellectual honesty that puzzles egotists, and he didn’t care if his conclusions wounded his own or anyone else’s self-esteem. For example, when he lectured he had to explain patiently to audiences that, yes, he did find modern people on the whole to be physically botched—but that he included himself in this stricture.

Today, however, more than three decades after his death in 1971, Anthony Ludovici—the author of more than thirty books on subjects as varied as aristocracy, Nietzsche, eugenics, women, religion, and art—has been all but forgotten by the English-speaking world. Thankfully, there are signs on the horizon that after his period of oblivion Ludovici is beginning to make a small comeback, and a few friends and enemies have in recent years rediscovered his work.

Despite being one of the best propagandists of old-style conservatism, Anthony Ludovici currently receives most of his attention from historians of “fascism” and “racism.” The leftist historian Richard Griffiths has documented the role of Ludovici (and many other patriotic Englishmen) in the struggle to prevent Britain from going to war with Germany in the 1930s.² Another hostile critic, Dan Stone, whose interests are the predictable trio of eugenics, fascism, and the Holocaust, has taken a more general look at the man’s life and ideas,
noting that Ludovici’s “career trajectory” plummeted from his heyday in the 1920s and 1930s to a low point in the egalitarian 1960s, downgrading him “from a radical, provocative but mainstream thinker to an intellectual outcast.”\(^3\) Despite Dan Stone’s constant sneering, he recognizes that, if Ludovici had been prepared to compromise his frank opinions on race and politics, he might have become one of the leading writers of his time.\(^4\) More positively, a friend of the conservative English journalist Auberon Waugh, a latter-day Mencken who died in 2001, told me that Waugh admired Ludovici’s writings.

Ludovici should win more friends from *The Lost Philosopher*, the recently published anthology of his best work (see p. 66), which should be followed this year by his autobiography, a book that, if the terms of his will had been followed, would have been published thirty years ago. A few of Ludovici’s hottest works are available on the Internet. A website honoring Ludovici and his work now offers full-text versions of several of his out-of-print books, articles, reviews, and poetry (for more on Ludovici, visit: http://www.anthonymludovici.com).

**THE ANTI-DEMOCRAT**

A longtime Nietzschean, author of three books on Nietzsche, and one of his first translators into English,\(^5\) Anthony Ludovici tried to further the interests of what he regarded as superior people. He wanted the healthiest, best-looking, and most creative people in England and Europe to outbreed the rest, paving the way for a revitalized Western civilization. And, in place of the democracy that Nietzsche had dismissed as so much nose-counting, Ludovici wanted these superior people to take control of the government and resurrect not just a ruling elite but an hereditary aristocracy. Not without reason, the freethinker J. M. Robertson once described Ludovici as “the professional champion of lost causes.”

After all, Ludovici was swimming against the tide of a century of electoral reform in England. Back in 1832, when the British middle class was enfranchised, just one in twenty-four of the population could vote. In 1867 Disraeli turned against his earlier belief in England’s old aristocracy, enfranchising artisans, shopkeepers, and small farmers, and soon the cry went up throughout the nation that “we must educate our masters”—the new voters—it being belatedly recognized that having so many ignorant voters might be politically suicidal.\(^6\) Nevertheless, in 1884 Gladstone went on to enfranchise agricultural workers, and by that time the electorate made up about one-quarter of the population. In 1918, just three years after Ludovici published his *Defence of Aristocracy*, Lloyd George enfranchised all men over twenty-one and, much to Ludovici’s disgust, all women over thirty. And in 1928 the voting age for women was lowered to twenty-one.

As long ago as the 1920s, Ludovici wrote that a professional author like himself could criticize democracy only at the risk of his living. Luckily for all admirers of stimulating prose, he did take that risk, repeatedly and at great
length, and going so far as to describe democracy as “a form of mass neurosis.”7
But although Ludovici was no democrat, he disliked snobbery and, in the belief
that a nation should value its manual workers as much as its intellectuals, he
could praise the German national labor service, which united men from
different classes in a common task.

Ludovici found many grave flaws in modern democracy. Fundamentally,
he argued that the average voter lacks the intelligence and knowledge to handle
political issues. Voters, at least in England, have little interest in politics. Most
voters are self-centered as well, and seldom consider the future of the nation as
a whole—a shortcoming that democracy’s promoters dress up as “enlightened
self-interest.”

Although Mediterranean peoples, especially Jews, are shrewd and make
good psychologists, the English and other northern European peoples are poor
observers of human nature and generally cannot fathom their candidates for
political office. In Ludovici’s opinion, asking the average voter to decide about
complex political matters that he cannot understand is like asking a tradesman
to carry out shoddy workmanship, which insults him:

It is notorious that everywhere on earth the wise, intelligent and discriminating
members of the community always constitute the minority. So that majority rule
must in any case mean government by the least able and least gifted elements in
our population. Can we wonder, then, that wherever today democracy is
established things go from bad to worse, and that chaos and anarchy are
becoming universal?8

The modern fetish for democracy, Ludovici showed, began further back
than the French Revolution. It has its origins in such sixteenth-century
reformers as Martin Luther and John Calvin. Whereas Roman Catholic priests
were expected to interpret the Bible for their parishioners, these founders of
Protestantism wanted every adult to read and understand the Bible for himself,
which paved the way for the masses to discuss questions other than religious
doctrine, such as political beliefs. As things turned out, though, both Luther
and Calvin were horrified when the common man started demanding political
power.

In democracies, Ludovici argued, breeding and heredity count for nothing.
People are judged not by their beauty, health, or talents, but solely by the
leveling factor of money, for this way everyone, even the poor, can believe that
money, unlike genius or beauty, may well be within their grasp. It is notorious,
Ludovici remarked, that most people think it in poor taste to ask how someone
of great wealth acquired his money; it is enough that he is rich.

Quoting Aristotle’s wisdom from over two thousand years ago, Ludovici
predicted that democracy’s leveling tendencies must eventually degrade into
socialism and then communism. Notably, democracies suffer from the absence
of a guiding elite to set the nation’s tone. Nowadays, the press and television
companies, overly powerful and irresponsible though they are, have that role,
if anyone has, but the mass media usually zero in on the nation’s lowest common denominator. As William A. Henry notes today, “The dominant mood of contemporary American culture is the self-celebration of the peasantry.” And whereas a true elite can look decades into the future to consider the nation’s long-term interests, the press and television companies are rooted in the present, and democratic politicians themselves look no further ahead than the next election.

How, then, could democracy have triumphed throughout the West? In a depressing example of what Alain de Benoist calls “the barbarism of homogeneity,” it seems that almost every nation in the world is currently democratic, or claims to be, or at least strives toward this political end. As Ludovici saw things, the modern world esteems democracy primarily because it appeals to the envy of inferior people, assuring them that their precious votes place them on the same level as their superiors. We are all equal in the sight of God, according to Christians, and we are all equal in the eyes of the state, according to democrats.

Something of a Nordophobe, Ludovici regretted that England’s great success as a commercial nation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had made it, unjustifiably, the European standard. Other nations wanted to emulate England’s economic success, and their thinkers began to praise England’s democratic transformation as the key to that success. Such democratic thinkers in England as John Locke and John Stuart Mill soon found their foreign admirers and disciples.

Of course, other scholars have added to Ludovici’s critique of democracy. As an example, the libertarian Hans-Hermann Hoppe maintains that democratic rulers thrive when creating problems to solve, and are unconcerned about the quality of electors or even who, and how many, are migrating to become their new electorate. One might add that the unprincipled but charming actor-politicians who shine on television—Bill Clinton and Tony Blair come to mind—always prefer a gullible electorate dazzled by Hollywood smiles when they should be remembering voting records.

BREEDING AND CIVILIZATION

In revolt against modern democracy, and always a traditionalist, Ludovici studied the highest civilizations of the past to see how they had emerged and prospered. Never, dare one say, “Eurocentric,” he revealed that the great civilizations of Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas always shunned democracy in favor of rule by elites. Moreover, they tended to be isolated from foreigners, usually by the geography of the land. As he observed:

A further interesting fact is that all these [high] cultures arose in naturally or artificially confined areas, where broadmindedness, the universal brotherhood of mankind, internationalism, the love of one’s neighbor, and other forms of claptrap were quite unknown.
Specifically, Ludovici pointed out that Britain, Japan, and Crete (the home of the Minoans) are islands. Italy (the home of the Romans and the Renaissance) and Greece are both peninsulas; and, within Italy, Venice is further set apart by being a cluster of islands in a lagoon. Egypt is surrounded by deserts. Mesopotamia, situated in modern Iraq, is flanked by deserts on one side and mountains on the other. Peru (the home of the Incas) is also surrounded by mountains. China fenced itself in with a manmade barrier, the Great Wall, specifically to keep out intruding foreigners. Finally, Jews, although resident throughout much of the world for thousands of years, have, at least until recent times, largely avoided intermarriage with non-Jews owing to a religion insisting on endogamy.\textsuperscript{13}

Ludovici found, in addition, that each of these great culture-bearing peoples was founded on xenophobia—or, in modern terms, that they were “racist.” He also discovered that the elites within each people, who made up the creative element, encouraged inbreeding.

To begin with Ludovici’s favorite civilization, ancient Egypt, the Greek historian Herodotus found that Egyptians despised foreigners, shunning customs from Greece and elsewhere and regarding all non-Egyptian-speakers as barbarians. Genesis confirms that Egyptians found it an abomination to eat bread with Hebrews. And in a nice example of role reversal, Egyptians also believed that they were a chosen people; they alone were romet or “men.” (Indeed, some historians conclude that Jews borrowed the idea of being God’s chosen people from Egypt.) When Egyptian civilization was at its height, strangers were forbidden to enter Egypt, and, according to Herodotus again, in the seventh century B.C. certain Ionian and Carian mercenaries were the first foreigners allowed to settle there.\textsuperscript{14}

As is well known, Jews in antiquity also despised aliens and were forbidden by their religion to intermarry. For example, Deuteronomy states that the Lord will deliver their enemies, the Hittites, the Amorites, the Canaanites, and other peoples, “to be utterly destroyed; thou shalt not marry your sons or daughters with them,” because only Jews are a holy people. In a later period, however, the great prophet Ezra bemoaned that the people of Israel hadn’t separated themselves fully from Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Egyptians, and other peoples, but had married their sons and daughters, mingling their own holy seed with them—and that “the princes and rulers have been chief in this trespass.”\textsuperscript{15}

Educated Greeks in their highest period were, Ludovici demonstrated, hostile both to low-born Greeks and to foreigners. Greeks used the word “barbarian” (probably an onomatopoeic imitation of unintelligible speech) for all non-Greeks, whatever their level of culture. The famed Athenian “democracy,” it turns out, was restricted to well-off men. However, by the sixth century B.C. the poet Theognis of Megara was complaining that Greeks would
marry anyone, no matter how ignoble, for their money, and that whereas farmers find the best mates for goats and horses, the worst humans are mixing with the best, making the breed degenerate.\textsuperscript{16}

Even among the Romans, whom Ludovici regarded as vulgar and lacking in biological or aesthetic values regarding human breeding, most people tended to be xenophobic. When Mark Antony married the Egyptian queen Cleopatra, he found his renown in Rome ebbing. Similarly, popular opinion in Rome compelled Emperor Titus to give up his Jewish mistress.\textsuperscript{17}

It is well known that ancient India had religious laws, just as modern India does, prohibiting intermarriage between different castes. For instance, \textit{The Laws of Manu}, composed around two thousand years ago, decrees that if a brahmin—a member of India’s highest caste—takes a non-Aryan sudra wife, he will sink into hell after death and forfeit his brahmin rank.\textsuperscript{18}

The great civilizations also approved of inbreeding among their elites. Ancient Egypt allowed close inbreeding, and in several dynasties the pharaoh even married his sister. The Bible confirms that the ancient Hebrews knew close inbreeding, too, since Abraham married his half-sister, Nahor married his niece, and Lot even mated with his two daughters. Fragments of evidence suggest close inbreeding among such eminent ancient peoples as Greeks, Persians, Phoenicians, Assyrians, and Incas.\textsuperscript{19}

In the modern world, though, Ludovici found that migrations, racial intermarriage, and a general refusal for like to marry like are combining to create populations who have inherited from their unlike parents disparate physical and mental traits. He used a crude simile to illustrate why our inherited body parts should be as standardized as car parts.\textsuperscript{20} For example, a man might inherit his physique from a large parent and his internal organs from a small parent, which will lead to poor functioning. Or he might inherit incompatible mental traits. For Ludovici, any great culture-bearing people, past, present, or future, must always have its genius and \textit{joie de vivre} rooted in flourishing health:

Nobody would claim that the incessant crossing between innumerable races that has been going on in the Levant or in South America, ever since the ancient Greeks and the ancient Peruvians ceased to exist, has produced stocks anything like as desirable as these two inbred peoples. Nobody would claim that modern North America, with its hotchpotch of races, is superior to ancient inbred Egypt.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Advocate of Aristocracy}

In several works, Ludovici showed that European upper classes down the centuries have largely themselves to blame for their own decline. Although they mostly lived on the land in agricultural societies, they ignored the farmer’s elementary rules of animal breeding and failed to ensure that their own human offspring would be marked by character and intelligence. Indeed, over three hundred years ago William Penn echoed Theognis of Megara when he remarked that men tend to breed dogs and horses with more care than their own children.\textsuperscript{22}
Scions of the historic European royal families would marry to cement political alliances with foreign countries, never worrying about spouses blemished by ugliness, stupidity, or poor physical and mental health, even to the point of madness. Although Ludovici championed human beauty, he observed that, amongst non-royals in Europe, members of the supposedly noble families have taken as wives many women distinguished merely by pretty faces. He was distressed to calculate that in the two centuries from 1735 to 1945 the nobility in England alone had married no less than forty-two actresses. (This is another example of Ludovici’s relentless objectivity, by the way, because even his own mother, whom he adored, had been trained as an actress.)

Furthermore, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many European aristocrats suffering from dwindling resources tried to retain their historic seats by marrying rich heiresses, often from America and occasionally Jewish. In this regard, Ludovici cites Sir Francis Galton, who first pointed out that these women tended to be heiresses because they were only children, owing to their parents’ low fertility, and in marrying them the aristocrats might keep their extensive houses and estates, but at the expense of introducing into their lineage an inherited tendency to infertility—a lineage which soon dies out.

Most aristocracies, too, have fostered the dysgenic practice of primogeniture, handing on the bulk of their wealth to the eldest son, even though he might be the family’s worst-endowed prospect. Among commoners, Ludovici showed, such eminent figures as Galton, T. H. Huxley, and Jane Austen appeared only seventh in their families. This implies that large families are needed for the emergence and selection of talented offspring, and so primogeniture must have deprived many aristocratic families of potentially their best bloodlines.

Aristocrats, moreover, have failed to control their fellow aristocrats. If professional associations of lawyers and physicians can discipline their wayward members, Ludovici reasoned, then aristocrats should have done the same among themselves, following a code of honor that would have cut the ground from beneath Thomas Paine and other democratic opponents of rakish aristocrats. After surveying world history, though, Ludovici discovered only one body of aristocrats that had regulated themselves—Venice’s long-lasting Council of Ten, which would even discipline the doge, Venice’s supreme ruler.

Aristocrats in the West have had many rivals eager to share their political power, and among them Ludovici identified the Jews. He anticipated Kevin MacDonald’s work on Judaism as an evolutionary strategy by arguing that in modern times Jewish anthropologists and other powerful Jewish influences have militated against Gentiles in the West studying heredity and practicing eugenics. Homogeneous Gentile societies, particularly when based on Christian principles, have usually tried to exclude Jews from positions of power, and in reaction many twentieth-century Jewish anthropologists have tended to minimize genetic and racial factors and to promote environmentalism. Although practicing, or at least being influenced by, a religion that insists on
believers marrying in and shunning non-believers, the Jews in recent decades, in Ludovici’s words, “became ardent liberals and everywhere became the fervent advocates of indiscriminate and unlimited outbreeding, although themselves strictly continuing to enjoin endogamy at least on their own males.”

While Jews have consolidated their influence in the Western world during the last hundred years, the power of the traditional nobility has diminished. And it is noteworthy that a recent student of aristocrats compares them with Jews, although to their disadvantage. “Aristocracy,” says Robert Lacey, “does not stand up well to misfortune. It is a fair-weather way of life.... In the years since the Second World War one looks in vain amongst dispossessed aristocrats for the spirit displayed in the same period by the dispossessed Jews; there is no Zionism of nobility.”

**INBREEDING AND ISOLATION**

Ellsworth Huntington and others have agreed with Ludovici that it is often the numerically small and inbred peoples who, at least in modern times, display the most talent. Huntington cites, among others, the Parsees in India, the Copts in Egypt, the Icelanders marooned on their bleak homeland, and, most striking of all, Jewish groups throughout the world. The Jews’ tendency to suffer from such hereditary complaints as Tay-Sachs disease is more than compensated for by their high intelligence and its concomitant of great achievements in many walks of life, with the notable exception, perhaps, of invention.

Yet Ludovici recommended inbreeding not only within each ethnic group, but within each family. Acknowledging that close inbreeding would bring deleterious heritable traits to the fore, he believed this was outweighed by an increase in desirable traits. But did he realize the scale of the defects produced? For instance, Edward O. Wilson cites a study of 161 children born to Czech and Slovak women made pregnant by their fathers, brothers, or sons. Within a year, no less than fifteen of these children were dead, while more than 40 percent of the remainder “suffered from various physical and mental defects, including severe mental retardation, dwarfism, heart and brain deformities, deaf-mutism, enlargement of the colon, and urinary-tract abnormalities.”

Incidentally, Ludovici admitted with breathtaking honesty that even before he had begun collating evidence about the effects of inbreeding he had an “emotional bias” toward the closest inbreeding. More specifically, as he acknowledged in print, he didn’t simply love his mother; he was in love with her.

As for ancient times, though, the study of inbreeding and its effects can be hard to follow. Ludovici offers some notable clues as to isolation being a factor in producing high culture. But for much of the ancient world we have only just begun to reconstruct racial history, a task that really needs many more archaeological excavations and the retrieval of ancient DNA from skeletal material.
Since Ludovici’s day, various social anthropologists have analyzed the intricate family structures of many ancient Indo-European peoples and shown that the nobilities among each—in Greece, Rome, Ireland, India, and Iran—were closely inbred. And, from the standpoint of biological anthropology, such evidences as biographies of early Roman emperors, portrayals of Homeric and Celtic heroes, ethnographic reports of Iranian tribes, and a description of ancient Indian brahmins all point to the nobilities of these Indo-European peoples having largely kept their original northern European physical type. They had evidently avoided racial aliens and, keeping to themselves, had married in.

Ignoring this evidence, intellectuals—throughout America and Europe, at least, if not in East Asia—venerate the current buzzword of “diversity,” especially in the sense of racial diversity. Modern intellectuals praise genetic diversity while damning inbreeding, and, indeed, every population does need to vary genetically if natural selection is to function. But genetic diversity alone means nothing; after all, northern Europe has much less of it than black Africa.

Geographic isolation promotes not only genetic isolation, of course; it also promotes cultural isolation. Although trading routes in the ancient world often ensured that inventions and innovations would be picked up by nearby cultures—for example, the diffusion of “Arabic” numerals, perhaps originally from India, westward via the Arabs to Europe—one wonders to what extent the ascent to high civilization in Egypt, Greece, Rome, or England, say, could be attributed to the factor of cultural isolation and the slow build-up of tradition. As Raymond B. Cattell observes of modern times: “Possibly the musical beat from the jungle, or even the mood of the literature of Dostoyevsky, introduce incompatible elements in, say, Anglo-Saxon culture....”

A Modern Aristocracy

Returning to the problems of the present day, Ludovici had little time for contemporary so-called aristocrats. He remarked that “the Conservative and man of qualitative judgment—I do not mean the aristocratic ruler—is an example of a very definite type of mind and body, which occurs in all classes, and is by no means necessarily more common in the present House of Lords than in a coal-pit.” After writing his Defence of Aristocracy he found, over eighty years ago, that the aristocrats, at least in England, didn’t want to be defended: they already believed that their cause was lost. It might be coincidental, but Lord Lymington (who later became the Earl of Portsmouth), the main upper-class man Ludovici worked with in England, campaigning for a revival of British farming and other causes, was a most untypical lord, born in Chicago, of all places, and who had worked as a rancher in Kansas.

At any rate, in England over the last hundred years perhaps only a few dozen members of the upper class have worked for patriotic groups and movements, most notably in the 1930s, when members of the upper class joined various British groups that aimed at halting the drive to declare war on
Germany. After the Second World War, however, these people retreated to their grand houses and tended to disregard such important matters as immigration control. Judging by their accomplishments, then, the present-day “aristocracies” contain few valuable people, and any attempt at building upon an existing “aristocracy” to recreate past greatness will prove fruitless. In Robert Lacey’s words, the modern so-called aristocrat “is an inheritor, by definition, and though there are aristocrats, like Bertrand Lord Russell, who achieve things in their own right, the world is rather surprised by them—and the aristocracy as a whole is definitely disconcerted.”

Obvious remedies for the construction or reconstruction of an elite, hereditary or otherwise, are thin on the ground. If magic wands really worked, one might wish for the fairytale solution offered by Hans Christian Andersen’s story, “Everything in the Right Place,” in which one tootle from a magic flute administers a come-uppance to upstart and boorish lords and bankers, who are turfed out of their imposing houses and cast into their rightful place of shepherds’ cottages and henhouses.

Back in the real world, Ludovici argued over several decades that the West must begin by establishing and inculcating scientifically based values in human mating, only after which can flourishing peoples arise. From these peoples, he believed, nobilities will eventually emerge spontaneously, rather like Jefferson’s natural aristocrats, because ordinary people always recognize and willingly follow superior people. Unfortunately, Ludovici never explained how this line of thought dovetails with his suggestion that widespread envy prevents most people from accepting that others might be their superiors, although Hans F. K. Günther, for one, believed that education on the inheritance of talents could overcome envy incited by liberals and socialists. Alas, the political groups that Ludovici associated with in the 1920s and 1930s—the elitist, ruralist, and quasi-masonic English Mistery and its successor, the English Array—were marked only by their obscurity and lack of influence.

Political theorists can dream up any number of parlor games to refine modern democracy. For example, nations might award votes in accordance with intelligence and allot perhaps five votes for anyone whose IQ puts them in the top 10 percent of the population and ten votes for anyone whose IQ is in the top 5 percent. Alternatively, nations might award votes solely to taxpayers, or to taxpayers who have passed tests in history, economics, and political science, say, and who have demonstrated their patriotism by serving in the armed forces. In such a country, politicians would have to raise their standards when campaigning for election.

But at present one can forget about political schemes to restrict the franchise. In the Western democracies any elitist party seeking to reduce the electorate will need the support of millions of voters, although it seems self-evident that such a party would attract little support. Although the masses are bored by politics, their vote is too precious to their self-esteem for
them to allow its withdrawal. Concluding, however reluctantly, that modern patriotic parties must favor democracy, Nick Griffin, the chairman of the British National Party, offers the clinching argument that turkeys will never vote for Christmas. In England, such “far right” parties as the British National Party and the National Front have fallen over themselves in emphasizing that, at least internally, they are far more democratic than mainstream parties.

That perceptive writer, A. T. Culwick, once predicted that the most intelligent and most creative middle-class people—who are usually also the most overtaxed—might one day revolt en masse at their economic burdens and withhold their valuable services until the state grants them full political control. It makes for a pleasant fantasy. But Culwick was writing in South Africa during the 1960s, a society where whites in general were politically aware and, faced by a large black majority, comparatively united. One cannot imagine his scheme working in atomized Western Europe or America nowadays, where the middle classes might grumble about crime, taxes, and government control, but, while their incomes remain high, rarely join forces effectively.

George Bernard Shaw proposed toward the end of his life that we replace modern democracy—or “this haphazard mobocracy,” as he termed it—with “democratic aristocracy: that is, by the dictatorship, not of the whole proletariat, but of that five per cent of it capable of conceiving the job and pioneering in the drive towards its divine goal.” But exactly how, in practical terms, democratic aristocracy might supplant mobocracy, and exactly how one can identify these democratic aristocrats, Shaw never explained.

**THE FUTURE**

Always looking to the past, Ludovici reminded us that for the ancient Hindus the creation of a new hereditary elite required no less than seven generations. But can we in the West’s crumbling civilization wait for seven generations, or about two hundred years, to experience this elite?

At least in this respect, Ludovici’s views now seem antiquated. His approval of eugenics based on numerous offspring from appropriate marriages would have seemed familiar to Plato. But recent advances in genetic engineering have thrown up radically different prospects for man’s biological future. At the current rate of discoveries in genetics, we shan’t have to wait two hundred years for signs of evolutionary progress.

Nevertheless, Ludovici was right to stress that human groups should keep apart. For mankind to evolve into different species and maximize our descendants’ chances of surviving in a pitiless universe, modern nations must splinter into a host of micronations—”ethnostates,” as Wilmot Robertson calls them. Regrettably, for the past century or two our roads, railways, and now airways have all colluded to mix people together.
But we might soon find that artificial intelligence will match and even surpass mankind’s accomplishments. Who knows, before the century is out intelligent machines may be so concerned by the stupidity and poor memories of even the brightest members of *Homo sapiens* that they will discuss denying us the vote—in our own best interests, of course.

For the time being, though, Ludovici’s typically candid analysis has detected a flaw in the psychology of northern Europeans which means that the end of Western democracy is not yet in sight:

The Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon races have little of the seer in their constitution. They are better at meeting and enduring disaster than at foreseeing and forestalling it.... They are completely wedded to the doctrine of experience.... It is so with democracy and it will be so with ochlocracy. These things have been tried before. They are known and have proved fatal to the civilization that tried them. But what is that to the Teuton and Anglo-Saxon? He has no personal experience of their evils and is therefore determined to stake the fate of his civilization on trying them.\textsuperscript{41}

Such candor makes Ludovici an ever-stimulating writer and, for those who hold with Spengler that “optimism is cowardice,” a great prophet.

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**Endnotes**


6. The poet Coventry Patmore described 1867 as “The year of the great crime / When the false English nobles and their Jew, / By God demented, slew / The trust they stood twice pledged to keep from wrong.”
10. For an historical survey of opponents of democracy, from Plato down to the twentieth century, see Alexander Jacob, Nobilitas: A Study of European Aristocratic Philosophy from Ancient Greece to the Early Twentieth Century (Lanham: University Press of America, 2001).
17. A Defence of Aristocracy, p. 307; The Quest of Human Quality, p. 166.
19. A Defence of Aristocracy, pp. 331–2; The Choice of a Mate, pp. 73–85; The Quest of Human Quality, pp. 161–2.
20. The Quest of Human Quality, p. 98.
21. The Choice of a Mate, p. 118.
23. Compare, perhaps, the late Princess of Wales’s own observation that her brain was “the size of a pea,” and the observation of many others that her mind, whatever its size, was not attuned to reality.
28. Lacey, op. cit., p. 178. However, Lacey also quotes Princess Gloria von Thurn und Taxis, who, if she had to liken aristocrats to any other social group, declares that “it would be to the Jews—and also to the Mafia because, she says, ‘they only marry their own kind, and they always stick together.’” Op. cit., pp. 24–5.
30. The Choice of a Mate, pp. ix, 302.


35. Lacey, op. cit., p. 21.


