Someone once quipped that Friedrich Nietzsche is often quoted but rarely read—by which he meant that Nietzsche’s ideas are frequently obscured by those who pay only superficial attention. So rich and deeply textured was Nietzsche’s thinking that pulling a single gleaming thread out from the larger fabric sometimes serves misinterpretation rather than understanding, often creating the false impression that Nietzsche’s works are ambiguous or contradictory.

Nietzsche scholar Walter Kaufmann warned that apparent contradictions in Nietzsche are “characteristic of legend and not typical of Nietzsche,” and that “utterly superficial inconsistencies dissolve as soon as one checks the quotations and recognizes the meaning they had in their original context.”

For Kaufmann (as for many other readers) there is a real Nietzsche and a false Nietzsche:

[I]n the face of attempts to claim his sanction for…relativism in matters of truth, it seems important to remember that Nietzsche himself was a fanatical seeker after truth…His intentions are singularly unequivocal, and he was not one to sit on both sides of the fence at once.

Nonetheless, some in today’s left-dominated “post-modernist” academia have a more open-ended view. Homosexual Marxist philosopher and famed sadomasochist Michel Foucault, for example, insisted there was no single Nietzschean philosophy. He suggested the right question to ask was, “What serious use can we make of Nietzsche?”

Taking Foucault’s apparently political invitation to heart, some Nietzsche scholars have decided to paint their left-
wing politics with a Nietzschean brush, claiming his pedigree for a variety of left-wing causes on behalf of the “oppressed,” even Communism.

In the 1970s, Tracy Strong, now professor of political science at the University of California in San Diego, suggested that Communist China and Cuba represent the “the very Nietzschean proposition of creating ‘new men.’” Referring to any Communist society as “Nietzschean” flies in the face of Nietzsche’s frequent denunciations of egalitarianism and socialism as manifestations of what he regarded as slave morality. Unfortunately, that sort of misinterpretation and mischaracterization appears throughout Nietzsche scholarship today, and seems to go unchallenged. While not every philosophy scholar is willing to go so far as to describe Communists as Nietzschean social experimenters, some deliberately attempt to minimize or camouflage those parts of Nietzsche’s writings that contradict or undermine the egalitarian and left-wing ideologies that pervade America’s university system.

Strong himself nearly admitted as much elsewhere:

[T]hose on the democratic left who have been attracted to Nietzsche and have wanted to enlist his thought in their projects have done so by arguing that, while Nietzsche’s thought is not (really) political, his thought provides material for developing a new progressive politics. Such interpretations thus conclude that it is necessary to set aside Nietzsche’s particular political judgments.

But even Strong’s candid assessment of his colleagues is accompanied by a bit of camouflage of his own. “It is hard, on the face of it,” he writes, “to find in Nietzsche support for liberal egalitarian democracy in any of its modern incarnations.” As an understatement, the remark is breathtaking. It is akin to suggesting that it is hard to find in Martin Luther King’s works any support for Southern slavery. The phrase “it is hard to find” implies that it might be found if one only looks hard enough. In truth, however, it is hard to find because it isn’t there.

Undermining Nietzsche’s antiegalitarian views by trying to diminish or minimize their significance appears to be common. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, authors of numerous books and essays on Nietzsche, have tried, for example, to dismiss a central tenet of Nietzsche’s antiegalitarianism by asserting “Nietzsche clearly intended the Übermensch as a fiction...” Walter Kaufmann, evidently embarrassed by Nietzsche’s seeming Aryan racialism in his explicit glorification of “the magnificent blond beast” described as mastering Europe, tried to explain away the reference by claiming that the blondness refers symbolically to the tawny lion, a metaphor used in Thus Spake Zarathustra to signify creative destruction. Kaufmann also dismissed Nietzsche’s decidedly politically incorrect views of women as “philosophically irrelevant.”

Close examination of Nietzsche’s texts reveals the weaknesses in these claims. Solomon and Higgins argue that since Nietzsche was not a Darwinian, the Übermensch must not be a biological notion, and that Thus Spake Zarathustra
(a fictionalized presentation of Nietzsche’s ideas) is the only text in which the idea is seriously addressed. While it is true that he did not accept all of Darwin’s theory of evolution, Nietzsche’s concern with a “higher” type of man, and the idea of breeding the higher type in both a eugenic and psychological/cultural sense, emerged early in his writing career and remained an important part of his philosophy. The Übermensch is indeed a “fiction” in the sense that such a being does not yet exist, but Nietzsche repeatedly urged its pursuit as a goal. As early as “Schopenhauer As Educator,” which appears in Untimely Meditations, his second book, Nietzsche calls for the creation of conditions under which “the individual higher exemplar, the more uncommon, more powerful, more complex, more fruitful” man can emerge.\(^\text{10}\) This was not yet the Übermensch of Zarathustra, but its beginnings are there, and Nietzsche remained committed to the concept throughout his life. In a notebook of 1885, the year he completed part 4 of Zarathustra, he wrote of the need to create a new morality “whose intention is to breed a ruling caste – the future masters of the earth” who are described as “a new species and caste of masters” who are the logical result of efforts by “a newer kind of ‘free spirits’” driven by their “dissatisfaction with present-day man.”\(^\text{11}\) In 1887, long after publication of Zarathustra, he wrote, “The progressive diminishment of man is what drives one to think about the breeding of a stronger race.... Not merely a master race, whose task would be limited to governing; but a race with its own sphere of life, with a surplus of force for beauty, valor, culture, manners, right up to the highest intellectual realm...”\(^\text{12}\) He did not use the word Ubermensch, but the concept is identical. In part two of Zarathustra itself, Nietzsche makes it rather clear that he regards the Ubermensch as a very real possible creation of will, in contrast to God, which was a fictional creation.

Once you said God when you looked out onto distant seas; now, however, I have taught you to say: Übermensch. God is a conjecture, but I do not want your conjectures to reach beyond your creative will.

Could you create a God? Then do not talk to me about any gods! But you could certainly create the Ubermensch.\(^\text{13}\)

As for Kaufmann’s attempt to deny that the “blond beast” refers to any racial or ethnic group, the context disproves him. The phrase appears in a passage recounting an historical epoch. In one of those contexts where the phrase appears, Nietzsche explicitly refers to “the blond Germanic beast.”\(^\text{14}\) Nietzsche was no racist, but the weakness in Kaufmann’s argument betrays a certain anxiety, urgency, and even desperation to prove it. Kaufmann makes it hard to avoid suspecting him of a political motive. That is especially true with regard to his dismissal of Nietzsche’s comments about women being irrelevant to his philosophy. The assertion is simply untenable, because Nietzsche’s views of women are intimately bound up with his understanding of history and society, and his belief that social “progress” in which women
play a role is the decadence of modernity. In section 239 of *Beyond Good and Evil* he wrote:

> Wherever the industrial spirit has triumphed over the military and aristocratic spirit, woman strives for the economic and legal independence of a clerk: “woman as clerkess” is inscribed on the portal of the modern society which is in course of formation. While she thus appropriates new rights, aspires to be “master,” and inscribes “progress” of woman on her flags and banners, the very opposite realizes itself with terrible obviousness: woman retrogrades. Since the French Revolution the influence of woman in Europe has declined in proportion as she has increased her rights and claims; and the “emancipation of woman”…thus proves to be a remarkable symptom of the increased weakening and deadening of the most womanly instincts.¹⁵ [Emphasis in the original]

The decline of culture through this sort of progress/decadence, of which feminism is an integral part, sets the stage for the nihilism from which Nietzsche sought to provide the West an escape with his philosophy.

One egregious example of minimizing Nietzsche’s antidemocratic views deserves special mention. In a book purporting to explain what Nietzsche “really” meant, Solomon and Higgins admit that Nietzsche had “harsh words” for democracy, but reassure their readers that his criticism was merely “routine.”

His comments are not very different in tone or temper from the routine complaints we hear today (from democrats) about uneducated and ignorant voters who are easily led astray by demagogues, about the irrationality of making delicate and important strategic decisions by majority vote, about the need for leadership and wisdom at the top rather than simply a popular mandate through polls.¹⁶

That characterization of his views is easily refuted by any of a number of passages in Nietzsche’s writings that refer to democracy, of which the following is typical:

> I believe that the great, advancing and unstoppable democratic movement of Europe, that which calls itself ‘progress’ – and equally its preparation and moral augury, Christianity – fundamentally signifi es only the tremendous, instinctive conspiracy of the whole herd against everything that is shepherd, beast of prey, hermit and Caesar, to preserve and elevate all the weak, the oppressed, the mediocre, the hard-done-by, the half-failed; as a long-drawn-out slave revolt...¹⁷

Those comments reveal a profound and radical critique, and do not sound at all like “routine complaints” about democracy. The contrast between Nietzsche’s actual comments and the characterization of them by Solomon and Higgins is quite noticeable, and forces any educated reader to question the interpretative skills of these two scholars.

It would be tiresome to continue to produce examples from democratic egalitarian works on Nietzsche simply to refute them with quotations from...
Nietzsche’s texts. Suffice it to say that the Nietzsche most nonspecialists are familiar with today is largely a mass-market product of the left-wing university system, and should be regarded with the same sort of healthy skepticism that other effluences from the left inspire among the cultivated and discriminating.

GETTING NIETZSCHE RIGHT

That’s one reason why this new biography from Curtis Cate is such a welcome addition to the available literature on Nietzsche. It can be seen as a first small tentative step toward a commonsense—even conservative—rescue of Nietzsche’s legacy from the claws of the academic left. Although this biography is not, strictly speaking, a philosophical biography, Cate’s Nietzsche emerges convincingly as the cultural conservative he was.

In his preface, Cate explains that his biography is not “written for ‘professionals,’ for university professors or teachers of philosophy.” Instead, he wrote it “for non-specialists and ‘laymen’…for the benefit of those who may never have read a single book of [Nietzsche’s] and for whom Nietzsche is little more than a name: that of a blasphemer who had the gall to proclaim that ‘God is dead!’”

Consistent with this mission, Cate makes an effort to connect Nietzsche and his ideas to contemporary social and cultural problems, and includes intelligent, relatively sophisticated discussions of Nietzsche’s books and ideas in the main text. The prose is fluid and highly readable.

To Cate, Nietzsche “foresaw with prophetic clarity” the increasing decadence “all over the Western world.” For Cate, some of the symptoms are these:

Parents abdicate before their undisciplined children, teachers before their lawless pupils, priests before their restless, time-rationed congregations, politicians before their assiduously flattered voters…No area of life is spared. All “traditional” values are challenged, any trace of “elitism” becomes instantly suspect. Ugliness, precisely because it is the opposite of the traditionally “beautiful” is accorded an honorable status, just as what is incomprehensible…receives the stamp of profound “significance” by cultural snobs in frantic search of “originality.” The once elegant “art” of haute couture is dragged down to the sordid level of basse couture…

Cate apparently has his own conservative leanings. He is a Harvard-educated historian and former European editor of the Atlantic Monthly who has written for the paleoconservative journal Chronicles. He wonders, “what will happen to the Western world if the present drift cannot be halted, and to what sordid depths of pornographically publicized vulgarity will our shamelessly transparent culture, or what remains of it, continue to descend, while those who care about such matters look on in impotent dismay?”
CONSERVATIVE DISMISSAL

Nietzsche is more relevant to the deeper crisis of which the problems mentioned by Cate are merely symptomatic. But Cate’s question—and the appearance of his book—are strikingly new phenomena because conservatives do not generally turn to Nietzsche as a possible source of answers. Traditionally they have been loath to treat Nietzsche respectfully, much less with admiration, given his trenchant attack on Christianity and its morality.

Last year the conservative newspaper Human Events asked fifteen conservative intellectuals and activists to name the “Ten Most Harmful Books of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.” Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil was ranked ninth.\textsuperscript{18} So there was Friedrich Nietzsche, complete with horns and tail, situated next to Karl Marx, Mao, Alfred Kinsey, John Dewey, John Maynard Keynes, and other demons that haunt conservative nightmares. Human Events, with its partisan cheerleading for party politics and obsequious support for any Republican who enters the White House, is hardly a reliable measure of intellectual opinion, even among conservatives. But the poll does reflect an unfortunate distrust of Nietzsche, who is seen by conservatives as an adversary. From the highest to the lowest among them, from newspaper writers to cloistered intellectuals, conservatives have simply accepted the role assigned to Nietzsche by the academic left.

More than thirty years before the idea occurred to Human Events, the revered conservative political philosopher Eric Voegelin also placed Nietzsche in the same category he assigned to Karl Marx. According to Voegelin, the two are allegedly responsible for contributing to “egophanic” history, a term Voegelin contrived to express “the pathos of thinkers who exist in a state of alienation and libidinous obsession.”\textsuperscript{19} (He meant “libidinous” in Pascal’s sense of being ruled by passions.)

Voegelin treats Nietzsche’s ideas seriously, but his placement of Nietzsche in the same ideational basket as Marx seems to reflect a reductionist habit of mind among conservatives in which all their perceived enemies acquire the same labels, i.e., “statist,” “collectivist,” “utopian,” “Gnostic,” etc.

In his New Science of Politics, Voegelin quotes Nietzsche as recommending to Christians that instead of needing God’s love, they should love themselves, then they would no longer need God, “and you can act the whole drama of Fall and Redemption to its end in yourself.” Voegelin refers to this quote from Daybreak (section 79) in a discussion of Gnosticism’s effort, as he sees it, to endow man’s civilizational activity “with the meaning of eschatological fulfillment,” by turning it into a “mystical work of self-salvation.” After quoting Nietzsche, Voegelin asks rhetorically how this “miracle” of self-salvation is to be achieved. The Gnostic’s answer, he says, lies in the activities that have made civilization what it is—through literary and artistic achievement, economic success, “and finally through the revolutionary action that will establish the Communist or some other Gnostic millennium.”\textsuperscript{20}
Voegelin said that Nietzsche’s quote tersely expresses the nature of the diversion of man’s spiritual life into civilizational activity. But his use of the quote in that context appears to place Nietzsche within the Gnostic project of “self-salvation,” where he does not belong. For Nietzsche is not arguing for “self-salvation” at all; he saw no need for man to be “saved.” The meaning of Nietzsche’s statement has been moved from one context to another. In the original context, Nietzsche chides the Christian who seeks love, whether from God or man: “It would be contrary to all decency to let oneself be loved while being all the time well aware that one deserves only hatred,” he says of the unworthy guilty sinner. If the Christian responds that this is a matter of clemency, Nietzsche suggests loving yourself as an act of clemency, ”then you will no longer have any need of your god, and the whole drama of Fall and Redemption will be played out to the end in you yourselves!” Nietzsche is mocking the Christian for needing God’s love, not recommending or endorsing the notion that man’s condition is something from which he needs salvation.

Seeing in Nietzsche’s philosophy a congruence with utopian or Gnostic designs to achieve limitless progress, the end of history, human perfection, immortality, non-divine “salvation,” or other variations of what Voegelin called attempts to “immanentize the eschaton” is quite unjustified. In a passage from his late notebooks that was published posthumously in the compilation The Will to Power, Nietzsche described how he saw the world as being in a perpetual state of recurring conflict and flux in which man was an inextricable part, thus foreclosing the possibility of any human effort to arrest it, or to forge it into some paradisiacal stasis:

And do you know what “the world” is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but likewise without increase or income;…not something endlessly extended, but set in a definite space as a definite force, and not a space that might be “empty” here or there, but rather as force throughout, as a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back…with an ebb and a flood of its forms…without goal…

In that world, there is no linear progress or end state.

Conservative writers further removed from the halls of academia and closer to the newsstands have expressed varying degrees of contempt. One of Cate’s reviewers, writing in the neoconservative journal The Weekly Standard, described Nietzsche as having a “mile-wide sadistic streak,” and claimed he suffered from “desperation” because he sought to be “impossible to ignore.”

At least one conservative intellectual simply misconstrued Nietzsche by relying on a demonstrably faulty interpretation. Author and essayist Thomas
Molnar, a professor at City University in New York and a visiting professor at Yale University, asserted that the goal of modern “neopagans” was essentially the goal “summed up by Nietzsche” as “the perfection of mankind.” Molnar gave the impression the quote was from Nietzsche himself, and cited a page from The Nietzsche-Wagner Correspondence as his source. But a check of the citation reveals that the text he quoted was not from anything Nietzsche himself had written, but from an interpretation of his ideas written by his sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Unfortunately for Molnar, she is universally regarded by Nietzsche scholars as a wholly unreliable interpreter of her brother’s philosophy. Nietzsche often referred to “surpassing” or “overcoming” man, but he never advocated or even thought possible the “perfection” of man. Had Molnar paid closer attention to Nietzsche’s actual text, specifically the essay, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” he would have discovered Nietzsche’s views on perfectibility in history. In that essay, Nietzsche ruthlessly derides the Hegelian progressives’ notion of the “end of history,” and declares that man’s memory of his past reminds man “what his existence fundamentally is—an imperfect tense that can never become a perfect one.”

There is at least one important exception to the general conservative disdain for Nietzsche, the influential neoconservative thinker Leo Strauss. In a private letter, he admitted being quite taken with Nietzsche’s ideas. “Nietzsche so dominated and charmed me between my twenty-second and thirtieth years that I literally believed everything I understood of him.” He eventually became disappointed in Nietzsche because, in Strauss’s view, he had effectively debunked many political theories such as liberalism, socialism, nationalism, and democracy, but failed to provide “a way to political responsibility.”

Despite that disappointment, however, Strauss did come to see Nietzsche as profoundly conservative. In a universe without God, the atheist Nietzsche still loved life and existence and sought to affirm all existence, joy as well as suffering. This is Nietzsche’s amor fati, love of fate. Nietzsche argued that man must affirm the world by saying “yes” to it, making him, in Strauss’s view, perhaps the ultimate conservative: “By saying Yes to everything that was and is Nietzsche may seem to reveal himself as radically antirevolutionary or conservative beyond the wildest wishes of all other conservatives, who all say No to some of the things that were or are.”

Of modern American conservative intellectuals, Strauss and his colleagues may be Nietzsche’s most accurate political interpreters. Nietzsche is correctly described in Strauss’s History of Political Philosophy as “the inventor of an atheism of the political right,” a category on which most American conservatives apparently prefer to slam the door.

Whether Cate’s biography will succeed in opening that door, even if just a little, remains to be seen. Given the stigma attached to Nietzsche in the imagination of popular conservatism, it may take much more than Cate’s
generally sensible book to initiate change. That was certainly not Cate’s intent in any case.

**A WELCOME BIOGRAPHY**

Whatever its effect on political conservatives, the book succeeds in its author’s stated aim, which is to provide a primer and understanding of Nietzsche’s life and work for “non-professionals.” It succeeds not only because he generally gets the philosophy right, but also because, unlike some Nietzsche biographers, he doesn’t waste his readers’ time trying to divine his subject’s behavior and ideas by means of debatable psychological analysis. For the most part, Cate sticks to the known facts and the wealth of documentation available in the form of letters, notes, and other records in the Nietzsche archive.

Only rarely does Cate appear to assert his judgment in place of a more uncertain reality, and when he does, he is sometimes on thin ice. Fortunately, the effects are inconsequential, as when for example, he attributes some of Nietzsche’s well-known bouts of headaches, visual disturbances, and vomiting to “psychosomatic” causes. In describing one episode Nietzsche suffered in March of 1878 after he sent copies of the latest published installment of *Human, All Too Human* to friends, Cate maintains the “nausea and vomiting were almost certainly psychosomatic symptoms of nervous anxiety over his friends’ reactions to his new book.” The diagnosis is unconvincing. After all, the biographer is more than a hundred years removed from the event and untrained in medicine. Nietzsche had suffered regularly since his student days from those sorts of symptoms, which were regarded at the time as a form of violent migraine headaches. Who can say with authority which episodes were psychosomatic and which were not?

That’s a rather minor flaw compared to a more troublesome turn the book takes at the end. Instead of debunking and exposing the misappropriation of Nietzsche by academic left-wingers in the contemporary era—a task that cries out to be accomplished—Cate lends unfortunate credence to the view popularized and promoted by the egalitarian left that Nietzsche was misused by the German right. In an epilogue, Cate recounts how Nietzsche came to be popularized in the decades immediately following his death by apparent heart attack in 1900. Cate correctly notes that Nietzsche’s following among Germans was well established long before the National Socialists took power in 1933. However, Cate strongly implies that the National Socialists’ embrace of Nietzsche was somehow illegitimate, a view long promoted by the left and now thoroughly embedded in academia. “Indeed, perhaps no opinion in Nietzsche scholarship is now more widely accepted than that the Nazis were wrong and/or ignorant in their appropriation of Nietzsche,” says one Nietzsche scholar. That view, pioneered by Walter Kaufmann in the 1950s, is fast becoming the standard of political correctness to which Nietzsche scholars must pay obeisance. And
little wonder: For in order for left-wingers to claim Nietzsche, they must first discredit his cultural and psychological embrace by the right.

**Race and Nation in Nietzsche**

As advanced by Kaufmann in his celebrated book, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, the argument holds that because Nietzsche explicitly denounced nationalism, racial hatred, and anti-Semitism, and advocated racial admixture, his philosophy was therefore diametrically opposed to the ideological pillars of National Socialism. In that context, Adolf Hitler’s several visits to Elisabeth Förster Nietzsche in Weimar—at least one of which was famously photographed and publicized—and the dispatch of Albert Speer to build a monument to her brother next to the Nietzsche Archive are seen as cynical political manipulations of the Nietzsche legacy by the Nazis for their own ends.

The argument has only surface appeal, however. An examination of what Nietzsche actually wrote on those subjects creates a much more complex picture.

With the decline of the power of aristocracies and monarchs, the rise of nineteenth century nationalisms was driven mainly by liberal bourgeois democratic movements that Nietzsche saw as part of a headlong rush into the decadence and triumph of “herd morality.” His criticism of that sort of nationalism might well have been subsequently shared by the National Socialists who, seeing themselves as revolutionaries in political competition with patriotic “conservative” parties, often issued their own criticisms of what they called “bourgeois nationalism.” In any case, Nietzsche detested popular mass movements of any sort, and he saw Europe’s various nationalisms as a divisive threat to the unity of the larger European culture encompassing Europe’s peoples, and to the emergence of what he hoped would become known as European man. He saw himself as a “good European” who longed for Europe to become “a political and economic unit.” He feared that “the neurosis called Nationalism” would be responsible for “this eternal subdivision of Europe into petty states, accompanied by petty politicos” and rob Europe “of its meaning and intelligence.”

This view is consistent with the post-Second World War politics of fascist leader Oswald Mosley, who, after his release from a British prison where he had been confined for advocating peace, campaigned for a united Europe as a counter-pole to the two giant world powers, the capitalist U.S. and the Communist U.S.S.R. His slogan was, “Europe, a nation!”

Nietzsche was quite willing to accept the unification of Europe by force, if need be. He saw Napoleon as “a superior force of genius and will strong enough to weld Europe into a political and economic unit” that might “rule the world.” One of his many—and frequent—criticisms of the Germans is that they, “with their Wars of Independence, robbed Europe of the meaning, the marvelous meaning, of Napoleon’s life.” Whether Nietzsche would have endorsed the
German National Socialists’ titanic but ultimately doomed struggle to unite Europe into an international force recruited to fight Russia’s Bolshevik army, we can never really know. Nevertheless, his denunciation of nationalism must be considered within the context of his larger devotion to and concern for the preservation and enhancement of European culture (even to the extent that it might “rule the world”), a concern he shared with the National Socialists in their struggle against democracy and communism.

Nietzsche’s recommendation for racial admixture, cited by Kaufmann as a direct contradiction of the National Socialists’ race theories, is also intimately connected to Nietzsche’s attachment to European culture, and is often misinterpreted by the academic left. Kaufmann asserts, “There can be no question but that Nietzsche favored mixture of races and cultures, even if the mixed breed might often be ‘more evil, cruel, and restless.’” He cites various passages in which Nietzsche envisions the birth of the new out of chaos and argues that only weaker natures fear chaos, while the strong subdue and organize it. He quotes Nietzsche asserting that most races are not really pure, but become pure over time. Kaufmann says this view of chaos and racial purity is Nietzsche’s explanation for the development of the Greeks and their culture, which came from a chaos of peoples but became “pure” over centuries.

Missing from Kaufmann’s argument is a clear statement of what Nietzsche viewed as a race. Many different views about races and their origins were circulating in the late nineteenth century, and different observers used the term differently. A review of his texts reveals that Nietzsche, who was certainly no racialist, conflated national groups and peoples with races. He refers to the English as a race, for example, as well as to the Jewish race and Latin race. In an early work, Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche recommends intra-European racial mixing, using “race” interchangeably with “nation.” “[O]ne should not be afraid to proclaim oneself simply a good European and actively to work for the amalgamation of nations,” he wrote. He said existing conditions were already working to bring about “a weakening and finally an abolition of nations, at least the European: so that as a consequence of continual crossing a mixed race, that of European man, must come into being out of them.”

The race theorists on which Kaufmann says the Nazis relied might not have strenuously objected. According to Kaufmann, the Nazis “derived their racial doctrines from Dr. Hans F.K. Günther, who in turn made no secret of his reliance of Plato’s Republic, [Arthur] Gobineau, [Houston Stewart] Chamberlain, Georges Vacher de Lapouge, Madison Grant, and Lothrop Stoddard.” Although some of them might have objected to including Slavic people in Nietzsche’s European project, most of those theorists would not have objected to marriages across Europe’s national boundaries. They were much more concerned about the preservation of the transnational population responsible for the development of European culture than they were about national identities. Nor would the theorists on whom Kaufmann says the Nazis...
relied object necessarily to the notion that a “race” — as a breeding population in relative isolation — could become “pure” (with its own defining attributes) over the centuries, as Nietzsche said of the Greeks.

As a political matter, the National Socialists were interested in uniting and advancing the self-interests of Europe’s ethnic Germans. To that extent, their agenda conflicts with Nietzsche’s pan-Europeanism. But in the larger context of history and concern for the development of Western culture, they might not have been as far apart.

**NIETZSCHE ON THE JEWS**

In the same passage in *Human, All Too Human* in which the early Nietzsche recommends European mixture to eliminate national distinctions, he attacks anti-Semitism (which he came to see as a popular product of resentful, bourgeois Christians) and describes Jews as “usable and desirable” as any other national component in “the production of the strongest possible European mixed race.”

That is a troublesome passage for anti-Semites, but it would be a glaring error to see it as the central or conclusive tenet of his thinking on the Jews and their role in his philosophy. Nietzsche’s attitude toward the Jews is much more complex and multi-faceted. It cannot be reduced to simple political formulas. The later Nietzsche of *Beyond Good and Evil* finds that “the significance of the Jewish people is to be found” in the history of morals; “it is with them that the slave-insurrection in morals commences.”

Nietzsche believed the Jews, as an historically oppressed group, were responsible for the spread and triumph of “slave morality” over the “master morality” of noble, culture-creating aristocracies:

> All the world’s efforts against the “aristocrats,” the “mighty,” the “masters,” the “holders of power” are negligible by comparison with what has been accomplished against those classes by the Jews — the Jews, that priestly nation which eventually realized that the one method of effecting satisfaction on its enemies and tyrants was by means of a radical transvaluation of values, which was at the same time an act of the cleverest revenge. Yet the method was only appropriate to a nation of priests, to a nation of the most jealously nursed priestly revengefulness. It was the Jews who, in opposition to the aristocratic equation (good = aristocratic = beautiful = happy = loved by the gods), dared with terrifying logic to suggest the contrary equation, and indeed to maintain with the teeth of the most profound hatred (the hatred of weakness) this contrary equation, namely, “the wretched are alone the good; the poor, the weak, the lowly, are alone the good; the suffering, the needy, the sick, the loathsome, are the only ones who are pious, the only ones who are blessed, for them alone is salvation — but you, on the other hand, you aristocrats, you men of power, you are to all eternity the evil, the horrible, the covetous, the insatiate, the godless; eternally also shall you be the unblessed, the cursed, the damned!” We know who it was
who reaped the heritage of this Jewish transvaluation. In the context of the monstrous and inordinately fateful initiative which the Jews have exhibited in connection with this most fundamental of all declarations of war, I remember the passage which came to my pen on another occasion (Beyond Good and Evil, #195) — that it was, in fact, with the Jews that the revolt of the slaves begins in the sphere of morals; that revolt which has behind it a history of two millennia, and which at the present day has only moved out of our sight, because it — has achieved victory.41

Nietzsche saw Judaism as the soil out of which Christianity, the flower of slave morality, grew.

Kaufmann unconvincingly tries to minimize the significance of this formulation of the contest between slave morality and master morality in Nietzsche’s philosophy. “One may wonder about the conception of master morality and slave morality which is introduced in Beyond Good and Evil and discussed further in the Genealogy [of Morals]. It is noteworthy that these two slogans play a comparatively small role in Nietzsche’s writings…” he wrote.42

But to Nietzsche, the struggle between the competing moralities is the single most important event in all of history, symbolized as a conflict between Judea, representing slave morality, and Rome, representing master morality:

The symbol of this fight [between the two means of valuations] written in a writing which has remained worthy of perusal throughout the course of history up to the present time, is called, “Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome.” Hitherto there has been no greater event than that fight, the putting of that question, that deadly antagonism. Rome found in the Jew the incarnation of the unnatural, as though it were its diametrically opposed monstrosity, and in Rome the Jew was held to be convicted of hatred of the whole human race: and rightly so, in so far as it is right to link the well-being and the future of the human race to the unconditional mastery of the aristocratic values, of the Roman values…The Romans were the strong and aristocratic; a nation stronger and more aristocratic has never existed in the world, has never even been dreamed of...The Jews, conversely, were that priestly nation of resentment par excellence, possessed by a unique genius for popular morals...Which of them has been provisionally victorious, Rome or Judea?...Rome is undoubtedly defeated.43 [Emphasis in the original.]

Nietzsche saw this struggle and the triumph of slave morality as the very central problem his philosophy grappled with. In a letter to an academic who had inquired about his philosophy, Nietzsche made it clear that he regarded his books dealing with the discovery of slave and master moralities as his most important works. “I would almost advise anyone to begin with my last works, which are the most expensive and important (Beyond Good and Evil and Toward a Genealogy of Morals).”44 (In the same letter, he refers to Untimely Meditations as comprising “youthful works...for tracing my development,” a statement that enhances the claim of National Socialist scholars who saw significant differences between the early and late Nietzsche, a difference Kaufmann disputes.)
Nietzsche regarded the triumph of slave morality as such a significant event in European culture that he planned to launch a major attempt to try to reverse it. He viewed this task of such great importance that he immodestly suggested that his work, once completed, would cause human history to be divided in two. It was, he wrote to a friend,

[A] tremendously difficult and decisive task which, when rightly understood, splits the history of mankind into two halves. Its meaning, expressed in four words, is “transvaluation of all values.” When I am done much of what was debatable till now is no longer debatable…Much of this most revolutionary conversion of which the world shall know, is already going on and progressing inside me.\textsuperscript{45}

In a culture in which God had died due to the development of science and rationalism, the values of Judeo-Christian slave morality had been taken up by the causes of democracy, socialism, equal rights, and other movements of the weak and “oppressed.” Nietzsche believed the purpose of his philosophy was to give birth to a renaissance of “noble,” or aristocratic, values in the struggle against slave morality.

The first volume of this “transvaluation” appeared as \textit{The Antichrist}. Nietzsche’s collapse at age forty-four precluded completion of other planned volumes in the task, but many of his notes for the final works were eventually published as \textit{The Will to Power}.

Kaufmann’s attempt to minimize the significance of Nietzsche’s insight into the struggle between slave and master morality is forthrightly contradicted by Nietzsche’s clearly expressed beliefs.

Because Nietzsche saw the central task of his philosophy as overcoming the triumph of Jewish-inspired slave morality and its manifestations in the decadence of equal rights and democracy, his embrace by Germany’s National Socialists is not difficult to understand. The oft-repeated references by egalitarians to Nietzsche’s comparatively superficial opinions about nationalism and race simply serve to divert attention from the more important and deeper meaning of his philosophy and to undermine its serious study. The academic left’s interminable efforts to overturn Nietzsche’s association with the Nazis appear driven more by the left’s own psychological and propaganda needs than by concern for truth.

To bolster the case that the Nazis misappropriated Nietzsche, Kaufmann chastises National Socialist scholars for lifting quotes from Nietzsche out of context in an effort to make him fit more comfortably with National Socialist ideology. In one work by a National Socialist, the author quotes a passage from \textit{Human, All Too Human} in which Nietzsche wrote “perhaps the young stock-exchange Jew is the most disgusting invention of mankind.”\textsuperscript{46} Kaufmann correctly notes that the larger passage in which it is found describes many Jewish virtues, and praises the Jews for helping to keep freethinking alive during the Middle Ages, all of which were ignored by the National Socialist author.
Lifting a quote found most agreeable while ignoring others that contradict a regime’s ideology is a kind of deception-by-omission practiced by governments across the spectrum. The Nazi scholar did precisely what the democratic egalitarian American government has done with respect to Thomas Jefferson. On the third panel of quotations inscribed on the imposing Jefferson Memorial that presides over the tidal basin of the Potomac River in Washington, D.C., visitors are treated to what purports to be Jefferson’s view of slavery: “Commerce between master and slave is despotism. Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that these people are to be free.” The monument’s democratic egalitarian designers decided not to engrave the rest of the paragraph, which reads, “Nor is it less certain that the two races, equally free, cannot live in the same government. Nature, habit, opinion has drawn indelible lines of distinction between them.” In that same passage from his autobiography, Jefferson recommends that African slaves be deported immediately upon their manumission. Yet those words, too, mysteriously escaped memorialization in stone. Has democratic egalitarian America misappropriated Jefferson? Is the appearance of his visage on U.S. money a cynical political manipulation by a multiculturalist regime that enforces racial integration with bayonets, as it did in Little Rock, Arkansas?

In light of Jefferson’s views on additional subjects, such as his detestation of standing armies, deficit spending, immigration, foreign entanglements, large, powerful government, etc., one might plausibly argue that the National Socialists had a stronger claim on Nietzsche than the U.S. government has on Jefferson. Nietzsche was a major antiegalitarian, antidemocratic thinker who endorsed euthanasia and eugenics and trumpeted the need, as he saw it, to overcome Jewish moral influence. The National Socialists’ reverence for him is neither surprising nor unreasonable, no matter what other opinions Nietzsche might have held.

Unlike Kaufmann, Cate noticeably does not accuse the Nazis directly of deliberate or deceptive misinterpretation or falsification; he seems to prefer remaining aloof from the academic food fight over Nietzsche’s legacy, observing simply that even before 1933, Nietzsche’s philosophy had already been “nationalized, collectivized, massified and made ‘respectable...’” The Syphilis Canard

Cate also avoids seriously discussing the controversy surrounding Nietzsche’s alleged syphilis. The word itself appears only twice in the entire book, while Cate straddles both sides of the issue. He doesn’t avoid taking a position, he simply takes two positions at once. First he repeats the claim that “there is reason to believe” that Nietzsche contracted syphilis as a student; then he adds, “There is here a mystery that will probably never be elucidated, but which helps to explain Nietzsche’s later mental breakdown...”
The mystery about Nietzsche’s syphilis is largely the result of the negligence of recent Nietzsche scholars and biographers, who inexplicably failed to inquire among medical professionals whether the diagnosis made in 1889 is tenable in light of the more advanced scientific knowledge gained in succeeding years about biology and disease. Had they done so, they might have arrived at the conclusion reached in 2003 by a medical professional who took the time to investigate the tale of Nietzsche’s syphilis on his own and discovered that the likely source of his long suffering and eventual mental collapse was a brain tumor.

The legend of Nietzsche’s syphilis has always been built on the quicksand of innuendo, speculation, unsubstantiated allegations, and the notoriously incompetent practices of nineteenth century medicine, which oftentimes bordered on pure quackery. (It was Nietzsche’s misfortune to be diagnosed by a medical profession that, according to Cate, was still “treating” him with leeches for violent headaches.) So far, none of his biographers have bothered to dismantle the legend, which the facts now refute.

The syphilis legend rests on several different principal elements that when examined closely are not strong enough to sustain it.

One of these is the story told by Nietzsche’s friend and fellow student Paul Deussen. He said Nietzsche told him that in February 1865 he took a trip to Cologne and that the cab driver who took him around town dropped him off at a brothel without telling him the sort of place it was. Deussen claimed Nietzsche told him

*I suddenly saw myself surrounded by half-a-dozen apparitions in tinsel and gauze who looked at me expectantly. I stood for a moment speechless. Then I made instinctively for a piano in the room as to the only living thing in that company and struck several chords. They broke the spell and I hurried away.*

Biographer R. J. Hollingdale says the story “connects us in what are almost certainly Nietzsche’s own words with the probable origin of his illness.” That is nonsense on its face. Nietzsche’s own words—which Hollingdale claims to believe—indicate that he fled from the brothel rather than partake of its services. On what basis does Hollingdale believe only the first half of the story, that Nietzsche visited a brothel, but does not believe the second half, in which Nietzsche flees from it? Hollingdale does not explain. Far from supporting the legend, Deussen’s story undermines it.

A seemingly stronger element of the legend is Nietzsche’s own testimony. Biographers report that an examining physician at the mental asylum in Basel to which Nietzsche was hastily spirited by his mother and friends after his breakdown and collapse in the streets of Turin remarked in his notes that the patient claims to have “infected himself.” But Nietzsche’s remark is part of a stream of bizarre and disconnected rantings and behavior that, coming from
someone deranged, cannot be believed. Kaufmann translated the physician’s notation as follows:

In the afternoon, patient. speaks continually in utterly jumbled confusion, at times singing and yelling loudly. The contents of his talk is a variegated confusion of former experiences; one thought chases another without any logical connection. – Claims that he has specifically infected himself twice.51

Apart from the obvious problem that the assertion comes from a patient who claimed that Cosima Wagner was his wife and who referred to himself as the Duke of Cumberland, the claim is itself illogically expressed. How can one be infected twice, unless one was cured after the first infection? Nietzsche does not say what he believes infected him. The remark is quite useless in diagnosing his condition.

The syphilis legend gets its best support from the diagnosis made by physicians when Nietzsche was admitted to the mental clinic, but recent analysis shows that the diagnosis was not merely extremely weak, but likely wrong.

The original diagnosis of “paretic syphilis” was based on a superficial examination. At the time there were no blood tests for syphilis, and a syphilis diagnosis was almost routinely assigned to any middle-aged person suffering from dementia and signs of paralysis. Nietzsche’s mother could not afford the fees for the kind of first-class treatment in which the patient would receive personalized attention, so Nietzsche was housed in a large, open ward where he did not receive regular or individual attention from staff.

According to Leonard Sax, a Maryland physician who intensively investigated the syphilis claim, the diagnosis in Basel “was based on Nietzsche’s asymmetrically large and sluggishly reactive right pupil” and the sudden appearance of dementia. The examining physician found that the right pupil constricted in response to light more slowly than the left one, a symptom sometimes seen in syphilis cases.52

But no one told the physician that Nietzsche’s right pupil had been larger than his left one since boyhood. Sax explains that severe migraine headaches “can cause a temporary loss of pupillary light reflex” and that “after multiple severe migrainous episodes, the loss of reflex can be permanent.”53

As Sax describes in detail, there are several problems with the diagnosis overall:

Dr. Houston Merritt, perhaps the leading twentieth century authority on syphilis, identified five distinctive signs of paretic syphilis: an expressionless face; hyperactive tendon reflexes; tremor of the tongue and facial muscles; impairment of handwriting; and slurred speech. Nietzsche exhibited none of these five signs.54

His handwriting and speech remained normal, except for the often bizarre content. One physician at the Basel clinic was startled to notice the absence of tongue tremors. “Tongue heavily furred; no deviation, no tremor!” he wrote.
Moreover, paretic syphilis affects both sides of the brain. “Signs and symptoms tend to be generalized and bilateral. But Nietzsche’s symptoms before and after the collapse suggest a process confined to the right cerebral hemisphere. His headaches persisted and remained typically right-sided.”

Ronald Hayman noted in his biography that at the clinic, Nietzsche persistently complained of headaches on the right side of his head and “pains around the eyes,” the same symptoms of blinding headaches he had suffered throughout his life.

The normal course of the disease also argues against the Basel diagnosis. “In the pre-antibiotic era, it was unusual for patients with paretic syphilis to survive longer than two years after the onset of symptoms.” Yet Nietzsche lived for another eleven years, an unheard-of survival time.

The conclusion is inescapable: The diagnosis of syphilis is faulty and unjustified.

The most persistent component of the syphilis legend comes from an influential opponent of Nietzsche’s philosophy who spread word of the diagnosis and tried to persuade the public that Nietzsche’s ideas were the product of a disturbed mind. Psychiatrist Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum asserted that a Berlin neurologist told him that Nietzsche contracted the disease in a Leipzig brothel when he was a student and that he had been treated for syphilis by two Leipzig physicians. But Lange-Eichbaum never revealed the name of the Berlin neurologist, nor the names of the two Leipzig physicians. He also claimed to have spoken with the son of one of the Leipzig physicians who confirmed that his father treated Nietzsche, but Lange-Eichbaum declined to reveal his name. Lange-Eichbaum also failed to reveal what specific problem was treated, and how it was treated. In fact, Lange-Eichbaum neglected to produce any evidence at all.

Sax reports that “exhaustive scholarly efforts to identify these two Leipzig doctors—including a search of all extant records of Leipzig doctors from that period to see if any of them had treated anyone named Nietzsche—have turned up nothing.” He notes that “there is no corroborating record of these visits [by Nietzsche to Leipzig doctors] in the extensive documentation” of the time Nietzsche spent in Leipzig.

In other words, except for hearsay there is no evidence that Nietzsche was treated for syphilis.

And yet it is Lange-Eichbaum’s claims that became the wellspring of the syphilis legend. Lange-Eichbaum is the source cited by Richard Blunck’s biography, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Kindheit und Jugend*, in which he said, “we cannot doubt the report of such a sincere psychiatrist as Lange-Eichbaum.” Blunck is later cited by R. J. Hollingdale in his own English-language Nietzsche biography, which repeats the syphilis legend generated by Lange-Eichbaum.

Lange-Eichbaum’s motives acquire a less sincere, less scholarly patina when viewed in light of his political and philosophical beliefs. In a 1947 book, Lange-Eichbaum blamed Nietzsche’s thought for World War II. “The
Second World War was a war of insanity. Such a catastrophe can of course not develop solely out of the writings of one disturbed philosopher … But the formulas employed by the perpetrators of the war, and the moral and philosophical justifications which they employed—these were given the ‘Powers of Darkness’ by the lonely thinker of Sils-Maria and Turin.”

Lange-Eichbaum was a man of many opinions about famous men. In his book, *Genius, Insanity and Fame*, he engaged in what he called “pathography,” a technique he used to analyze the psyches of famous men long dead. Using this analytical technique, he decided that Shakespeare was a “psychopath” and that Jesus Christ was a “mental case.”

But if not syphilis, what accounts for Nietzsche’s collapse? The most likely cause among other possibilities, according to Sax, is a meningioma (tumor) of the right optic nerve:

Psychiatric symptoms are common in patients with meningiomas. These symptoms may range from mania to dementia… The hypothesis of a meningioma of the right optic nerve accounts for the facts of Nietzsche’s case far better than does the diagnosis of paretic syphilis. The commonest presentation of meningioma includes chronic intermittent headache, visual disturbances… A meningioma of the optic nerve gives rise to retinal findings which may even mimic other disease processes… [Experts] suggest that any patient who presents with the combination of migrainous headache and significant retinal disease should always be evaluated for possible meningioma… The headache associated with meningioma is typically severe and intermittent, as Nietzsche’s was, and is easily confused with migraine. Meningiomas typically grow very slowly; they may stop growing altogether for a period of several years, then resume a slow rate of growth. The right-sided predilection of Nietzsche’s headaches—a fact which is completely unaccounted for by the hypothesis of paretic syphilis—would be expected in a patient with a meningioma of the right optic nerve, underlying the right frontal lobe of the brain.

Nietzsche’s family history includes neurological problems. His father, Karl Ludwig Nietzsche, who also complained of frequent, severe headaches, died at the age of thirty-six from what was then called “brain softening.” A postmortem examination found a brain tumor. Karl Ludwig’s sister, Nietzsche’s aunt, also suffered from what was presumed to be migraine headaches. Nietzsche’s brother, Joseph, died at just twenty-two months after experiencing seizures and a terminal stroke.

Cate’s biography was copyrighted in 2002, which means that the author was unable to benefit from Sax’s extremely valuable investigation, the results of which were not published until 2003. And he appears to be unaware—or at least does not mention—the work of neurologist Richard Schain, author of *The Legend of Nietzsche’s Syphilis*, which appeared in 2001. (Like Sax, Schain disputes the accuracy of the syphilis diagnosis, but unconvincingly proposes that Nietzsche suffered from a progressive schizophrenia.)
The exact cause of Nietzsche’s dementia is ultimately irrelevant to the importance and meaning of Nietzsche’s life and philosophy—which perhaps explains Cate’s sparse mention of the syphilis story—but it is nonetheless a telling indictment of the state of Nietzsche scholarship that no one in the left-dominated academic establishment bothered to assemble the available information on his condition and present it for evaluation by modern medical experts. Correction of the syphilis legend came from outside of that establishment, revealing to modern readers still another reason why they need to be wary of accepted interpretations of Nietzsche’s life and philosophy.

Despite its own flaws, if Cate’s biography helps to steer “nonprofessional” readers toward their own reading of Nietzsche and away from an uncritical reliance on the academic left’s often distorted official line, it will have performed a valuable service.

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ENDNOTES

2. Ibid., 16.
6. Ibid. In an unrelated footnote (no. 25 on page 144) Strong mentions that the revival of scholarly interest in Nietzsche’s thought in Germany is “braked by the memories of the 1930’s.” He adds, “the dynamics are fundamentally the same across the Western world,” which is a cryptic admission of the power of contemporary egalitarian politics to impose limits on the scholarly pursuit of truth.
12. Ibid., 166.
17. Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 68.
34. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 292. Of course, not all race theorists are alike. Writing in 1933, Madison Grant believed most Europeans were already a mixture of three white races designated Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean. In *The Conquest of a Continent*, Grant noted, “while pure types [of the three white races] exist everywhere in sufficient numbers to enable us to define race, nevertheless there has been so much intermixture in the past that it is hard sometimes to assign a given individual to a specific race.” Grant’s
overriding racial/geopolitical concern was the preservation of the white Europeans’
global hegemony vis-a-vis the colored races. “Probably the greatest tragedy in the
world today is the corrosive jealousy of the fair skin of the white races felt by those
whose skin is black, yellow, or brown. The world will hear more of this as the revolt
of the lower races spreads,” he wrote. Grant called for laws against miscegenation
among widely “diverse races” such as between whites and non-whites, but did not call
for laws against mixtures among whites. Lothrop Stoddard, writing a decade earlier
in his Racial Realities in Europe, expressed the view that the development of Nordics,
Alpines, and Mediterraneans was still largely separate: “Although they have been in
Europe for thousands of years, have been in constant contact with one another, and
have widely intermarried, they have never really fused and remain essentially distinct
to-day.” Stoddard urged “each country” to preserve its “racial stocks” through strict
immigration laws.

39. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 175.
40. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, in The Philosophy of Nietzsche, 486.
42. Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 296.
45. Ibid., 142–143.
46. Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 290.
(New York: The Library of America, 1984), 44.
48. Cate, Friedrich Nietzsche, 575.
49. Ibid., 72.
53. Ibid., 48.
54. Ibid., 49.
55. Ibid., 50.
57. Sax, “What Was the Cause of Nietzsche’s Dementia?”: 50.
58. Ibid., 53.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Some physicians did question the syphilis diagnosis, including Dr. Kurt Hildebrandt
in his book, Gesundheit und Krankheit in Nietzsches Leben und Werk (Berlin: Karger, 1926);
but their views were apparently ignored after Lange-Eichbaum’s claims circulated.
62. Sax, “What Was the Cause of Nietzsche’s Dementia?”: 52.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 50.
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